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ABSTRACT
Environmental philosophers have argued that Kant’s philosophy offers little for environmental
issues. Furthermore, Kant scholars typically focus on humanity, ignoring the question of duties
to the environment. In my dissertation, I turn to a number of underexploited texts in Kant’s work
to show how both sides are misguided in neglecting the ecological potential of Kant, making the
case for the green Kant at the intersection of Kant scholarship and environmental ethics. I build
upon previous literature to argue that the green Kant matters for both sides. Rather than a
liability, Kant is indeed a conceptual resource. Though many conceive of Kant’s philosophy as
environmentally problematic, I argue that underappreciated evolutionary, aesthetic, and holistic
sides of Kant’s philosophy can provide conceptual resources for issues in climate change and
environmental ethics. Some aspects, such as the pre-critical view of nature, are quite green and
merely require an application, while others, such as Kant’s philosophy of history, require a green
appropriation to be relevant. The theoretical foundations I develop in these texts will allow
Kantians to articulate duties regarding nature and duties for sustainability. This re-thinking of
Kant redresses the complaints environmental thinkers hold against Kant. By means of a
philosophical interpretation, defense, and application of particular texts from Kant’s works such
as Universal Natural History, Critique of Judgment, and Idea for a Universal History, I show
how the greening of Kant is not only helpful for contemporary issues, but also defensible. This
will make the green Kant agreeable to Kant scholars yet all the while relevant for today with
regard to environmental ethics and, more importantly, climate change.

iv

INTRODUCTION
THE CASE FOR THE GREEN KANT
Environmental philosophers have argued that Kant’s philosophy offers little for environmental
issues. Furthermore, Kant scholars have traditionally approached the question of our moral
relation to the environment from a narrow interpretation of very specific texts in Kant’s works,
such as Groundwork and Critique of Pure Reason.1 Because the moral and existential impacts of
climate change remained a distant concern for mainstream Kant scholars from the 1970s and
1980s, the question of the environment was broached merely with aesthetic appreciation and
human interests in mind.2 Since then, however, the intellectual backdrop has changed drastically:
numerous scholars such as Allen Wood, Paul Guyer, Christine Korsgaard, Holly Wilson, and
Toby Svoboda have challenged this traditional interpretation, focusing on the ways in which
Kant can be re-read as a moral and theoretical asset for environmental issues regarding nonrational nature. In my dissertation, I take a similar approach and attempt to integrate and build
upon these contemporary findings in order to answer the following questions: What kind of
insights can Kant’s philosophy provide for environmental ethics? Will Kant prove to be helpful
and relevant as a theoretical asset for the climate crisis and the shift toward sustainability? Is
the greening of Kant possible? Besides corroborating these contemporary findings and showing
how Kant’s thought is indeed relevant for issues in environmental ethics, one of my major

1

For the citation method of Kant’s works in this dissertation, see the Abbreviations section on pages ii-iii.

2

By mainstream, I have primarily in mind Anglo-American Kant scholars. One unifying thread of this
mainstream approach involves an analytic and historically-inclined orientation.

1

contributions in this dissertation is to draw from underutilized texts in Kant’s works in order to
show how climate change is just one—albeit an important one—of the many possible
environmental issues for which Kant may be relevant.
My overarching thesis is that, though many conceive of Kant’s philosophy as
environmentally problematic, the neglected evolutionary, aesthetic, and holistic side of Kant’s
philosophy can provide conceptual resources for pressing issues in climate change and
environmental ethics. On the surface, an attempt to read Kant in this green manner looks
misguided since Kant strictly distinguishes rational from non-rational nature, claiming we only
have direct duties to the former. I will consider this problem and make the case for the green
Kant at the intersection of Kant scholarship, environmental ethics, and climate ethics through an
exploration of undervalued aspects and texts of Kant’s philosophy. Some aspects, such as the
pre-critical view of nature, are already quite green and merely require a defense and application,
while other aspects, such as Kant’s philosophy of history, require a green re-reading to
demonstrate their environmental relevance. My use of the term “green” is intentionally aesthetic,
as the aesthetic elements of Kant’s thought will help unify his evolutionary and holistic vision.
Despite aesthetic appreciation of nature being an "old" concern in environmental ethics, I hope to
show how one way to relate Kantian thought to the ethics of climate change involves aesthetic
views of nature, since evolutionary and holistic views are essentially aesthetic in the Kantian
framework.3

3

I am not taking a wholly radical position when I make use of aesthetic holism as a guiding thread to
Kant’s philosophy across his intellectual development. On Yirmiahu Yovel’s view, the aesthetic (and in
particular the cosmic sublime) undergirds and unifies the entire Kantian philosophy; the aesthetic is the
core of Kant’s philosophy, pervading the pre- and critical works (Yovel 1980, 130-131); Terry Eagleton
also sees the aesthetic in Kant’s philosophy to have a central role: “for Kant, the aesthetic holds out a
promise of reconciliation between Nature and humanity (Eagleton 1990, 1). Admittedly, these thinkers
are not “orthodox” Kant scholars by any means. But, then again, neither is my aspiration of greening
Kant.

2

Each main chapter will show how aspects of Kant’s thought—when interpreted in the
context of Kant’s evolutionary and holistic philosophy—have environmental significance or give
us reasons to value nature from different perspectives (e.g. ontological, aesthetic, scientific,
historical)4 and act in accordance with sustainability. To attain this goal, I draw upon a number
of Kant’s works, many of which are neglected in the literature with regard to environmental
ethics, such as his historical essays and early works. In particular, I focus on two of Kant’s
anthropological essays, since Kant’s collective, teleological understanding of humanity can be a
resource for climate ethics: Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Aim and Conjectural
Beginning of Human History. I also rely heavily on Critique of Judgement in my discussion for
relating aesthetic and teleological judgment to holistic and moral views of nature. Finally, I draw
upon many of Kant’s early dynamic works, such as Universal Natural History, since they
highlight Kant’s focus on systems, naturalism, and aesthetics. As a general rule of thumb, I will
either highlight the specific holistic5 elements of a given work that have been underappreciated
with regard to environmental ethics or utilize evidence from a work to reconstruct a Kantian
argument that shows how Kant’s thought is an environmental asset for climate change.
Philosophy and figures from the philosophical canon can help address the
epistemological and normative problems presented by climate change. As scientists, engineers,

4

Harry van der Linden, as I do, notes the structural affinities of the aesthetic, scientific, and moral in
Kant’s philosophy (1980, 140, 323f2).
5

Environmental holism is a contentious issue in the environmental ethics literature; typically, it concerns
the debate between individualistic approaches in ethics and a moral and epistemic focus on collectives,
such as colonies, hives, species, or societies. Unless I specifically discuss it in relation to these debates in
environmental ethics (e.g. on Leopoldian holism), I use “holism” in a rather general way to signify
elements of Kant’s thought that resist or look beyond the limited purview of discrete individual objects,
instead focusing on structures, processes, or systems (where the whole is conceived as greater than the
sum of its parts). For example, I will consider what I take to be Kant’s holistic understanding of
humanity; in his philosophy of history and anthropology Kant views humanity in terms of the entire
species, evolving its predispositions toward morality through many generations of collective, interactive
struggle.

3

and politicians (uncontroversially) play a role in pushing for sustainability, so also (more
controversially) I maintain that philosophy has an essential part to play in the paradigm shift of
humanity. With regard to this dissertation, it is not the case that I am simply applying climate
change to Kant, or that I claim there is some hidden, climate-friendly reading of Kant in the text.
For the former, I do indeed attempt to think of Kant’s thought as being applicable to present
climate issues, and for the latter, I avoid such an implausibly misguided approach. I will,
however, show that some aspects of Kant’s philosophy are more green than initially supposed. If
this dissertation is successful, I will have shown that Kant teaches us something about climate
change, and that climate change in turn teaches us something about Kant. Apropos of climate
change, I claim that Kant’s evolutionary6 vision of humanity can be a much needed wake-up call
that teaches us how to orient ourselves as stewards for a sustainable, cosmopolitan future. And,
by viewing the relevance of Kant for today, I claim that climate change obliges us to reconsider
thinkers in the philosophical canon and the transhistorical depth of their genius. In this case,
thinkers hitherto have had little reason to investigate the relevance of Kant’s holistic vision,
especially from works such as the pre-critical and anthropological writings: the pre-critical
writings are usually approached by commentators today with regard to Kant’s philosophy of
science or intellectual development—not for his contemporary moral relevance. In addition,

Similar to my use of “holism” in a general sense regarding approaches to systems and collectives, by
“evolutionary” I do not refer to Darwinian natural selection; rather, I mean developmental (in the sense of
Bildung) in both its organic (biological and romantic) and cultural (enlightenment) senses. For example,
in Chapter 3 I discuss the evolutionary views in Kant’s cosmology, where Kant articulates the formation
of spiral galaxies as an immanent and natural unfolding process according to laws of nature. And in
Chapter 5, I discuss Kant’s view of humanity as he sees it evolving on a pathway of perfection toward an
enlightened cosmopolitanism. As with before, the context will dictate the sense of this term in the various
chapters.
6
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though the anthropological writings are often challenged to problematize7 the universal
consistency of Kantian ethics, they have been utilized very little for environmental issues.8
The first two chapters are preparatory and set the foundation for the project of the green
Kant. I review, critique, and integrate findings in the secondary literature of Kant scholarship
vis-à-vis environmental ethics. The primary goal of Chapter 1 is to survey the literature in both
Kant scholarship and environmental ethics in order to argue that, despite the virtue of previous
interpretations of Kant, there remains a need for a re-reading of Kant, to be developed and
supported throughout this dissertation. After evaluating “traditional” readings of Kant in the
literature of both Kant scholarship and environmental ethics, in Chapter 2, I examine and align
myself with contemporary Kant readings to defend the view that Kant is a conceptual resource,
rather than an environmental liability. In particular, I look into contributions made by Holly
Wilson, Allen Wood, Christine Korsgaard, and Toby Svoboda. I commend them for their
strengths and comment on two possible limitations that this dissertation seeks to rectify—first,
with regard to the restricted purview of Kant’s work from which they draw and second, with
regard to the more pressing concern today with which they fail to grapple, namely climate
change. I show that, despite the ubiquity of the traditional reading, a recent shift is happening in
the literature. Putting this shift in the context of climate change, I claim, helps the reader to

For example, Pauline Kleingeld discusses the pressing question of Kant’s racism and sexism that are
prominent in the anthropological writings and considers whether they are consistent with his more
“neutral” writings (e.g., Groundwork). See Kleingeld “The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral
Language in the History of Philosophy: The Case of Kant” (1993) and “Kant’s Second Thoughts on
Race” (2007). Though I am aware of Kant’s sexist and racist comments, my discussion of Kantian
anthropology is primarily concerned with a constructive reading of Kant’s holistic view of humanity as a
species, not his idiosyncratic (and lamentable) views of race and women.
7

To my knowledge, there is only one exception to this: In “Rethinking Kant from the Perspective of
Ecofeminism” (1997), Holly L. Wilson undertakes to show how Kant’s philosophical anthropology can
be an asset for environmental issues. She draws from the Anthropology, however, and I draw instead from
Kant’s more historical writings such as Conjectural Beginning.
8
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understand why the traditional reading was plausible, why the new environmental reading is
possible, and why this dissertation is a helpful step in facilitating the greening of Kant. It is my
hope that the remaining chapters of this dissertation will fortify and contribute to their insights
on the green Kant.
The meat of this dissertation is contained in Chapters 3 through 5. I draw from numerous,
overlooked aspects of Kant’s philosophy to make the case that a green reading of Kant is not
only possible, but helps Kant out to be an environmental ally. I present Kant’s early ontology to
develop an ecological view of nature compatible with environmental holism. Then, I draw from
Kant’s critical aesthetics to develop a teleological view of nature with moral implications for our
treatment of flora, fauna, and ecosystems. Finally, I utilize aspects of Kant’s anthropology and
philosophy of history in order to present a progressive view of humanity in nature conducive to
Kantian duties for sustainability. The following outline will help orient the reader:
In Chapter 3, I explore the pre-critical ontology of nature in order to show its
environmental relevance and compatibility with environmental ethics. In particular, I examine
Living Forces, Physical Monadology, New Elucidation, and Universal Natural History with an
eye to the ecological potential of Kant’s holistic vision of nature. I argue that these texts—which
have been largely overlooked with regard to environmental philosophy—can provide an
ecological view of nature conducive to environmental praxis and compatible with ecocentric
views by facilitating scientific, aesthetic, and practical cognition of the environment as a
dynamic system. In addition, I claim that an adoption of Kant’s dynamic view of nature can be
even more helpful than Spinoza’s for considering nature in a moral sense through its framing
potential, not unlike that of Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis. When adopted today, the framing

6

potential of Kant’s view of nature can aid humanity in protecting and conserving nature in the
face of climate change.
Chapter 4 shifts from the pre-critical ontology of nature to the Critique of Judgment. In
particular, I utilize Kant’s aesthetics and teleology to further emphasize the holistic aspects of
Kant’s philosophy in order to support indirect duties toward flora and fauna and the cultivation
of “moral” views of nature. This chapter shows how Kant’s philosophy can be a valuable
aesthetic and pedagogical aid for environmental ethics. It is argued that Kantian natural
aesthetics and regulative teleology can prepare humanity for appreciating nature morally and
fulfilling its duties, promoting protection of flora, fauna, and ecosystems, and grappling with
climate change. Focusing Kant’s ethical sphere with climate change brings together the aesthetic
and scientific in my application of these works, as the natural is tied up with the aesthetic and the
aesthetic is always wrapped up with the moral. Thus, by working through the holism of Kantian
aesthetics and regulative teleology, it is argued that even Kant’s critical teachings have
significant environmental implications for us today.
Chapter 5 draws transitions from nature and the environment to humanity and
sustainability. This chapter reinterprets Kant’s philosophy of history and understanding of
humanity as a collective, progressing, evolutionary species to generate blueprints for
sustainability. By underscoring the evolutionary side of humanity in Kant’s philosophy of
history, this chapter shows how Kant’s philosophical anthropology can be useful for dealing with
the particularly difficult collective issue regarding climate change and future generations; offers
much needed hope in an age of ecological despair; helps us cultivate sustainable virtues; and
teaches us of our moral vocation as cosmopolitan stewards. It is also argued that Kant’s
philosophy, when seen from its less-examined historical perspectives, is opposed to capitalist

7

exploitation. As such, Kantian anthropology can be of assistance in developing social duties for
sustainability.
In the final analysis, climate change helps us to understand philosophers, like Kant, in
new ways, teaching us the significance of philosophizing as a creative, adaptive process. I
conclude this dissertation by highlighting my exploration’s relevance for today and pointing to
future directions for applied ethics. In a word, I argue that this dissertation is important for
distinct yet overlapping spheres: philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic. First, this thesis makes a
philosophical contribution to Kant scholarship by unifying and expanding upon the work of other
prominent Kant scholars on the subject of the environment by introducing a Kantian dialogue on
sustainability. Second, this project underscores the compatibility of environmental ethics with
Kantianism and opens the space for a Kantian approach to applied environmental ethics.
Kantians no longer need to hold their tongues when environmentalists enter the room. They have
ammunition to engage meaningfully in the moral debate. Moreover, an integration of Kant’s
natural, aesthetic, and moral philosophy provides a clue for how one ought to live in the
Anthropocene, namely, with an appreciation of our rootedness in the complex system of nature
and our responsibility as its final end. This implies a change in the way we value nature, relate to
others, and conceive of ourselves. By framing climate change as an issue of morality—as I have
attempted with Kant’s holistic and evolutionary thought—this dissertation is a unique take on a
burgeoning subject in philosophy. In addition, the fact that it is tied to something as terrifyingly
real as climate change makes my project, it is hoped, compelling and relevant. If I have done my
job adequately, the fate of the green Kant will be secure.

8

CHAPTER 1
KANT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE OLD
In this chapter, I provide a provisional characterization of what I take to be the mainstream or
traditional view of Kant vis-à-vis animal and non-rational nature.9 The traditional view can be
understood as one of the most formidable impediments to my case for the green Kant. My task in
this chapter is to address the traditional view in order that I might, in Chapter 2, comment on four
newer Kantian approaches that view Kant as an environmental ally.10 I shall align myself with
these approaches and suggest how this dissertation builds upon and contributes to the growing
interest in Kant for environmental ethics by focusing on alternative aspects of Kant’s philosophy.
This chapter is divided into two parts. In Part 1, I characterize and evaluate the traditional
view of Kant as a staunch anthropocentrist and humanist prominent in both specialist and nonspecialist circles including Kant scholarship and ethics pedagogy. The traditional reading of Kant

For the sake of convenience, I will use “animals” to refer to non-human animals, although it should be
clear that I typically do not have humanity in mind unless I explicitly say so. “Non-rational nature”
and “nature” will also be used in a rough-and-ready way to refer either to individual non-human animals,
collectives such as species, or environments and the land.
9

10

Though the literature on a green Kant is quite small, it is nonetheless growing. I address only Wilson
(1997), Wood (1998), Korsgaard (2004), and Svoboda (2012, 2015). I limit my discussion to these four
for three reasons. First, they present influential and important new readings of Kant. Second, though I
take issue with aspects of their readings, I align myself with their views. Finally, I limit myself to these
four for the sake of brevity. For other readings that challenge the traditional interpretation of Kant vis-àvis the environment, see: Matthew C. Altman, “Animal Suffering and Moral Character” and “Kant’s
Strategic Importance for Environmental Ethics” in Kant and Applied Ethics (2011); Scott M. Roulier’s
chapter, “Kantian Character and the Environment” in Kantian Virtue at the Intersection of Politics and
Nature (2004); Pierfrancesco Biasetti, “From Beauty to Love: A Kantian Way to Environmental Moral
Theory?” (2015); Emily Brady’s chapter, “The Kantian Sublime II: Nature and Morality” from The
Sublime in Modern Philosophy (2013); Patrick Kain’s “Duties Regarding Animals” (2010), and Paul
Guyer’s “Natural Ends and the End of Nature: Naturalizing Kant’s Teleology” (2007).

9

is, unsurprisingly, the dominant interpretation. This reading has much in common with
theological and early modern views of non-human nature. Among other things, Kant is thought
to deny that we have any reasons for considering the interests of animals or natural systems.
Ostensibly, this reading is maintained by the apparent dualisms in Kant’s philosophy, especially
with regard to Kant’s emphasis on the distinction between rational and non-rational nature in the
critical philosophy and his denial of direct duties to non-rational nature. In Part 2, I investigate
the reception of Kant in environmental ethics, including a lengthy discussion and critique of
Christina Hoff’s influential objection to Kantianism for non-rational nature. I conclude by
showing why the traditional reading has merits given the perspective of the critical view, textual
evidence, and historical context. The implications for the greening of Kant on this view are
shown to be decidedly grim.
Part 1: The Traditional Interpretation of Kant apropos of Nature
In both Kant scholarship and ethics in general, Kant has been characterized as an anthropocentric
thinker of limited, if any, use for environmental problems in both Kant scholarship and in ethics
in general.11 Concern for nature from a Kantian perspective is often ignored, presumably because
many readings do not accept that Kant is concerned for nature. This mainstream characterization
has a number of features that I sketch below under the umbrella term of the “traditional” or
Onora O’Neill unapologetically asserts that Kant’s moral philosophy is indispensably anthropocentric
(O’Neill 1998, 217), though she thinks his speciesism isn’t necessarily problematic for environmental
problems. Lewis White Beck in A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason notes how, on his
(traditional) interpretation, Kant views humanity as separated from and standing over nature (1960, 125).
The view of Kant as anthropocentric (indeed, as viciously so) is pervasive in the environmental ethics
literature. For just a few examples, see Tom Regan’s critique of Kant in The Case For Animal Rights
(2004, throughout, but especially 174-185); Peter Singer’s disavowal of Kantian anthropocentrism in
Animal Liberation (2009, 203); Holmes Rolston III’s anthropocentric dismissal of Kant in Environmental
Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (1988, 62-63); John O’Neill, Alan Holland, and
Andrew Light’s doubt about the merit of a Kantian view for environmental ethics in Environmental
Values (2008, 34); and Ronald Sandler’s pedagogical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of
Kant’s moral philosophy on the traditional reading in Environmental Ethics: Theory in Practice (2018,
109-110).
11
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“classical” view of Kant on non-rational nature. I highlight in broad strokes the standard view of
Kant from both the theoretical and practical side in an attempt to show why Kant is thought illsuited for helping us address contemporary issues in environmental ethics and climate change.
This, of course, includes a discussion of Kantian duties (or lack thereof) to non-rational nature. I
summarize the traditional view from three standpoints: as it is presented in Kant scholarship
(using O’Neill and Guyer), as it is perceived in ethics and pedagogy more generally (drawing
from James Rachels), and finally, as it is dismissed in animal and environmental ethics (using
Singer, Regan, Hoff, and Jamieson). Across all three domains, commentators note the division of
reality into two fundamentally different and unequal spheres: reason and nature. This
philosophical schism entails a number of dualisms with implications for morality, ones that are
prima facie problematic for an environmental ethic.12 These dualisms include distinctions
between noumena and phenomena, the supersensible and the sensible, duty and inclination,
activity and passivity, mind and body, form and matter, human and animal. The former sides of
these various dualisms tend to be associated with the distinctively human (and the only concern
for morality). On the typical view of Kantian ethics, for example, morality concerns only rational
beings or, what it ultimately amounts to, human beings. The conclusion drawn is that humanity
not only has no obligations to animals or nature, but that we should remain indifferent to the
suffering and welfare of such entities (Hoff 1983, 67). Accordingly, on the traditional view Kant
is perceived as an impediment to environmental ethics, rather than a potential philosophical

Besides Kant’s failure to concede direct duties to non-rational nature, this is a central concern of
environmental ethicists with respect to Kant. However, Kant is not the only philosopher who is attacked
for splitting nature into two realms. For a critique of the dualistic schism of humanity from nature in
monotheistic traditions, see Lynn White’s influential, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis”
(1967). For a critique of the problematic nature of dualisms for both environmentalism and feminism, see
Karen J. Warren, “The Power and Promise of Ecofeminism” (1990) and Val Plumwood, Feminism and
the Mastery of Nature (1993).
12
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resource from which to draw. In the following, I provide some evidence to support the
dominance of the traditional reading in Kant scholarship, ethics/pedagogy, and environmental
ethics.
The Traditional Interpretation in Kant Scholarship
Before I delve into the way in which the traditional view of Kant vis-à-vis non-rational nature is
expressed in Kant scholarship, it is perhaps more helpful to begin our inquiry with a negative
observation. In some of the most important works in Kantian ethics, the relationship of rational
nature to non-rational nature for Kant is left virtually untouched. For example, in Acting on
Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics (1975), Onora O’Neill—one of the most influential
defenders of Kantian ethics—fails to address the moral question of non-rational nature anywhere
in over 140 pages of incredibly careful, nuanced argumentation and exegesis. She pursues
questions surrounding the meaning, intelligibility, and applicability of the categorical imperative
as developed by Kant, defending it against competing normative theories. And yet, she treats
Kantian obligations (if there are any) to animals, ecosystems, or environments as a non-issue.13
This omission is, I take it, a symptom of the dominance of the traditional reading of Kant (in
which Kant’s ethics is seen as fruitless for non-rational nature), even during a time in which the
beginning seeds of the animal and environmental ethics movements began to take root (with, for
example, Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation in 1975 and Naess’s inaugural essay in deep ecology
in 1973). What is striking is that moral questions of the environment became prominent in this
time and yet top scholars of Kantian ethics largely failed to entertain these questions until the

Years after this important text, Onora O’Neill would respond to Allen Wood’s essay on the question of
the security of Kantian ethics for non-rational essay in an essay entitled, “Necessary Anthropocentrism
and Contingent Speciesism” (1998). She defends Kant as an anthropocentrist but argues that his theory is
not as speciesist as thinkers like, for instance, Peter Singer, make it out to be. Possibly, the environmental
attack on the traditional reading of Kant during the 1980s incentivized top Kant scholars such as O’Neill
and Wood to defend a less insidiously anthropocentric Kant.
13
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1990s, focusing instead on our duties to humanity. If the question of nature were broached, it
would be mostly with regard to aesthetic appreciation of beauty or with regard to more abstract
questions on normativity rather than concrete duties. What are the reasons for this Kantian
evasive maneuver regarding central debates in animal and environmental circles?
First, those in Kant scholarship didn’t dare venture beyond the critical works into the precritical lectures on ethics (where Kant offers a less-than satisfying empirical proscription of
animal cruelty) and the post-critical Metaphysics of Morals (where Kant characterizes only
indirect duties regarding non-rational nature). The pre-critical works were often seen as
dogmatic, undeveloped, and unsystematic. After all, Kant had not yet awoken from his dogmatic
slumber. And the post-critical works have often been treated mockingly, as the unsystematic
ramblings of a senile mind. In short, mainstream Kant scholarship regarded the early and late
works as falling out side the sphere of the legitimate critical period. Second, the objections raised
by animal and environmental ethicists during this time also missed the mark, as environmental
philosophy in general has only recently attained a respected position in academic philosophy. If
they were heard at all, they would likely have been dismissed out of hand.
On the traditional reading, Kant was viewed as an anthropocentrist whose ethical
grounds, though strong and defensible from the perspective of human rights, might appear to
“license (or even require) a ruthlessly exploitative attitude toward humanity’s natural
environment and all nonhuman things in it” (Wood 1998, 189-190). By anthropocentrism here, I
mean a view according to which only humanity deserves consideration in the sphere of morality,
often to the extent that non-human nature gets treated as a tool to be used and exploited as one
wishes. Defenders of the traditional view tend to endorse this form of anthropocentrism. From
this omission we can reasonably suspect that Kant scholars at this time felt an attempt to green
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Kant would be a fool’s errand—better to stick with the humanistic strengths of Kantian ethics
against utilitarianism than get dragged into a losing game of making Kant out to be an
environmental ally. As I will show in the course of this dissertation, the seriousness of climate
change now and the relatively unconcerned attitude toward it in the ‘70s and ‘80s can help
explain the fact that nature was a non-issue for Kantians; and the rise of green interpretations
makes sense now, since climate change is an issue that makes sense even from a strictly
anthropocentric perspective. In subsequent chapters, I will show how an anthropocentric
Kantianism still can be a helpful resource for environmental ethics and climate change, pace the
perceived limitations of the traditional view. I will also show how the pre-critical view of nature
presents a less anthropocentric view of nature, which helps us rethink the status of nature today
in the Anthropocene.
Guyer’s Early Articulation of Duties Regarding Nature and the Cruelty-Thesis
Interestingly, one of the first attempts to defend Kant against the traditional view despised by
animal welfarists and environmental ethicists simultaneously reinforces the traditional view but
also plants the germs for its re-evaluation. In Kant and the Experience of Freedom (1993), Paul
Guyer criticizes the predominant view. In “Duties Regarding Nature” Guyer draws from works
in the critical period such as the Critique of Judgment and its connections to Metaphysics of
Morals in order to articulate how the traditional view of Kant—though still decidedly
anthropocentric—still can defend duties with regard to non-rational nature. Guyer argues that a
Kantian can defend a general attitude of nonmaleficence toward animals and nature on the
grounds that one has a duty to oneself to develop a disposition (or attitude) favorable to morality
which aesthetic appreciation of nature fosters, and on the grounds that cruelty toward animals
violates one’s duty toward oneself and others. Drawing from the Critique of Judgment’s Analytic
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of the Beautiful and Kant’s characterization of beauty as a symbol of morality where Kant links
aesthetics and morality, Guyer underscores how for Kant the aesthetic appreciation of beautiful
nature is instrumental—or, as Allison puts it, preparatory (Allison 2001)—for developing this
moral disposition. This is because aesthetic appreciation itself is disinterested and not undertaken
from the standpoint of utility or prudence (Guyer 1993, 305-306, 310). Therefore, though we
have no direct duties to nature, we should be stewards who conserve beautiful nature on both
aesthetic and moral grounds, in accordance with imperfect duties to oneself (Guyer 1993, 328).14
Also, harming animals or beautiful flora makes one less morally perfect, so we have a duty to
prevent harm to nature so long as it does not conflict with our other duties, such as duties to other
ends in themselves.15 Guyer works largely within the confines of what Kant himself writes in
Critique of Judgment and Metaphysics of Morals. He does not delve into the anthropological or
historical works, as I do in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Moreover, Guyer does not try to modify
or appropriate Kant for environmental ends, as do Korsgaard and Wood, whom I discuss in the
subsequent chapter. In any case, Guyer’s account of Kantian duties regarding nature is a good
starting-point for thinking about where the traditional view ends (along with its limitations), as
well as where the new green reading might begin. Before considering how the traditional view is
perceived outside of Kant scholarship, I will conclude this section with an aside regarding the

Guyer in “Natural Ends and the End of Nature” (2007) continues this train of thought with regard to its
ecological implications for a system of nature, claiming that Kant has arguments suggesting that
domination and exploitation of nature is impermissible if it is “without regard to the ecology of nature as
a whole as an arena fit for continuing human habitation” (Guyer 2007, 93). Thus, though this is an
anthropocentric defense of ecological preservation, it is still more environmentally resourceful as a
position than what proponents of the traditional reading of Kant might have us believe.
14
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Svoboda (2012, 2015) develops the interpretation of perfect duties to oneself as indirect duties to nature
in greater depth. I discuss these aesthetic-moral Kantian arguments in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this
dissertation. For now, I aim only to provisionally characterize one of the earliest attempts at thinking
beyond the traditional reading.
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“cruelty-thesis” (Biasetti 2015, 142) or the so-called “brutalization argument” as a standard
though unsatisfactory rejoinder to the moral question of animals.
The brutalization argument, according to Kain, is a popular supplement of Kantian ethics
that is usually appealed to in Kant scholarship in relation to the topic of Kant on animals. When
pressed about how a Kantian should deal with animals, he or she could appeal to some of his
statements from his lectures on ethics, where Kant says, in short, that those who are cruel to
animals become cruel to humans through empirically conditioned desensitization. That is,
inhumane treatment of animals habituates us to respond inhumanely to humans. Such a defense,
however weak,16 was and still is a standard maneuver of proponents of Kant who adhere to the
traditional reading. In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant says
Any action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or otherwise
treat them without love, is demeaning to ourselves…we stifle the instinct of humaneness
within us and make ourselves devoid of feeling ([LE 710]; cited from Altman 2011, 17).
The basic idea behind the brutalization argument is that rather than attending to the suffering of
animals, we are concerned with the effect that animal cruelty has on ourselves. In other words,
inhumane actions toward animals aren’t in themselves wrong. Rather, they simply tend to
desensitize us with regard to our feelings and duties toward other humans and, hence, should be
avoided (Kain 226, 2010). According to Guyer, this type of argument was widespread during
Kant’s time, and in many ways it is similar to approaches in a long tradition from theologians
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For a particularly strong critique of the traditional view of Kant vis-à-vis the cruelty-thesis, see James
Skidmore, “Duties to Animals: The Failure of Kant’s Moral Theory” (2001). The brutalization argument
is weak for a number of reasons, one of which is that it relies on a plausible though contingent empirical
premise. For example, suppose one individual tortures animals as catharsis. In this case, the individual
who would first discharge anger on animals would then be kinder to other humans. Accordingly, on this
argument “[t]here is no necessary connection between cruelty to animals and a reduction in one’s
sensitivity to human suffering” (Svoboda 2012, 147). Not only is it problematic for Kant to base moral
claims on empirically conditioned ones, but surely this is not what Kant means when he discusses the
reasons for treating animals humanely. See Kain (2010, 225-226) for more on problems associated with
this argument.
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such as St. Thomas Aquinas and early moderns like Locke and Hume (Guyer 1993, 304-306).
Despite this argument being problematic, it is usually the only recourse that many Kantians think
they have when confronted with the problem of non-rational nature in Kant’s philosophy. For on
the traditional reading, Kant is perceived as an unapologetically anthropocentric thinker who
elevates humanity above and beyond the natural. Fortunately, the brutalization argument need
not be the only one that can be considered for thinking about how Kant may be a resource for
environmental ethics. I discuss alternative options in Part 2. For now, I suggest we look outside
the narrow scope of Kant scholarship to see how the traditional view maintains itself as the
dominant one in philosophy more generally and in ethics pedagogy.
The Traditional Interpretation in Ethics and Pedagogy
For more evidence that the traditional reading of Kant is the mainstream one, I suggest looking at
a common pedagogical text for undergraduates. Considering this more general level will help
articulate the standard reception of Kant outside of specialist circles. Of course, a warning is in
order: undergraduate textbooks often, as is well known, present caricatured-versions of the
philosophers that they deign to represent. This is understandable—for it is no easy task to present
a clear and comprehensive picture of a philosopher’s position in a short space. Despite the
caricatured form that textbooks often unfortunately present, they can be of use to see the
mainstream way how a philosopher is perceived, even by researchers specializing in other areas
of philosophy. With the hyper-specialization of academic philosophy, no one has time to master
every thinker. Thus, for instance, if one works on the history of the philosophy of science, one
may in fact have acquired knowledge of the scientific significance of Kant’s theoretical
philosophy. Even this specialist possibly has a limited view of Kant’s moral philosophy (unless,
of course, said specialist has a personal interest outside one’s research focus). The non-specialist,
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pedagogical perception of a philosopher can be a useful resource for seeing how he or she is
perceived by non-specialists, and it also shows how he or she is received in the wider culture of
those educated in the arts and sciences.
James Rachels’ presentation of Kant, I suggest, is a good pedagogical representative of
the traditional view of Kant. Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy17 has been a strong
staple in undergraduate ethics courses, and his presentation of Kant is a good indicator of how
Kant has been received outside specialist circles. There are two chapters on Kant in The
Elements. The first is primarily a foil from a previous chapter on utilitarianism; Rachels shows
how a rule-based normative theory (with Kant’s as the prime example) differs from a
consequentialist one. After briefly characterizing the categorical imperative, Rachels begins his
discussion of the philosophical importance of Kant in Chapter 10’s “Kant and Respect for
Persons.” Curiously, this single substantive chapter devoted to Kant in an introductory ethics
textbook opens by asserting how for Kant “human beings occupy a special place in creation”
(Rachels 1999, 132). This is immediately followed by a quote from Kant’s early (1779) Lectures
on Ethics: “‘Animals…are there merely as means to an end. That end is man’…Thus, on Kant’s
view, mere animals have no moral importance” (Rachels 1999, 132). Given Rachels’ traditional
characterization of Kantian ethics—defined negatively through an apparently dismal portrayal of
its view on animals—the possibility of a Kantian environmental ethic is easily dismissed.
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The Elements of Moral Philosophy was originally published in 1986 and has been continuously
republished for classroom use (now with an 8th edition published in 2014, long after Rachels’ death in
2003). Rather than providing abridged excerpts from primary texts, Rachels discusses—among other
things—relativism, egoism, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, contractarianism, virtue ethics, and feminist
ethics. Rachels’ book betrays itself as dated with regard to the climate crisis, as he only covers
anthropocentric theories. Besides a few passing notes to Peter Singer in the utilitarianism section, there is
hardly any reference to environmental issues and certainly no mention of climate change, despite the
newest edition being only a few years ago. This is, perhaps, why Rachels’ anthropocentric perspective
tracks the traditional reading of Kant quite well and one reason why I chose it as an exemplar for this
section.
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Though Kant himself argues for indirect duties to animals, proponents of the traditional view
often assume that a Kantian approach removes non-humans from the moral picture. This
assumption is one that proponents of the new, environmental reading of Kant have criticized, as I
shall show later.
In sum, the very first pages of this pedagogical text betray the traditional vision of Kant
as a strict anthropocentrist who disregards animals morally. And, though Rachels mentions
animals, he doesn’t discuss the environment because (I take it), on the traditional view the
environment is a non-issue. Why has the environment been received as a non-issue or a nonstarter for Kant? Looking at how environmental ethicists have criticized Kant should help to
answer this question. For they have lodged the most direct assaults on Kant. Examining their
complaints illuminates how these environmental ethicists have been unwittingly targeting a onesided, strawman Kant, namely, the ubiquitous traditional reading.
Part 2: Environmental Ethics and Kant’s Invidious Humanism
The following sections discuss the views of proponents of diverse approaches to environmental
ethics, broadly construed,18 and their respective critiques of Kant on the traditional reading. By
showing how the traditional reading is not the sole reading we can draw from, I intend to disarm
the concerns of these environmental ethicists in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. I
begin by briefly looking at how Kant has been received in animal ethics circles, as animal ethics
is a subfield of environmental ethics and was, historically, one of the first approaches to question
the merit of Kantianism for non-rational nature. Thus, looking briefly into how Peter Singer and
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Environmental ethics, though a relatively new field in philosophy, has a variety of different approaches.
Historically, most approaches began with concerns for animals (animal ethics), the aesthetic appreciation
of nature, and wilderness. Present offshoots include biocentrism, ecocentrism, ecofeminism, indigenous
and Eastern approaches, as well as more anthropocentric perspectives, including those dealing with the
philosophical and moral concerns of population and climate ethics.
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Tom Regan understood Kant through the traditional interpretation will be useful before
considering how he is usually received in environmental ethics. Many of these concerns, such as
the lack of direct duties, have been noted in the foregoing. Then, I consider one of the most
important attacks on the traditional view from the standpoint of environmental ethics by
Christina Hoff. Hoff is usually considered to be the first person to bridge Kant to environmental
ethics, albeit in a critical rather than constructive fashion. Finally, I consider how Kant is
typically received in the relatively new area of climate ethics, focusing on prominent climate
ethicists Dale Jamieson and James Garvey and their dismissive attitude toward Kant.
Peter Singer and Tom Regan—perhaps the two most influential contemporary
philosophers for animal ethics—lodge some of the earliest complaints against Kant. These
complaints are directed not only at Kant, but at the long tradition of Western philosophy,
especially since Descartes. They take issue with Kant’s apparently strong anthropocentrism; they
infer that on this view humans are authorized to dominate and exploit animals in any way they
see fit; and finally they take issue with Kant’s failure to acknowledge direct duties to animals. In
Animal Liberation, Singer in 1975 contrasts Kant with Bentham, implying that the
anthropocentric speciesism of the former “justifies” lamentable treatment of animals not
dissimilar to how the racism of Europeans “justifies” slavery (Singer 2009, 203).19 And as Regan
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Singer, like Regan, notes how Kant appears to be inconsistent (and hence speciesist) with regard to
duties to non- or pre-rational humans. We lack direct duties to animals since they are not rational, but, so
the speciesist line of reasoning goes, we still have direct duties to so-called marginal cases such as infants
and humans with mental deficits who are less rational than adult animals. How, questions Singer and
Regan, can Kant justify duties to these humans but not seemingly more rational animals, like horses,
unless he is being arbitrary and speciesist? Wood in his modification of Kant’s theory, argues that a
rejection of the “personification principle” of the traditional reading of Kant allows for a Kantian to value
beings with “fragmented” rationality, which includes marginal-case humans and a large swathe of sentient
animals. This logocentric approach, it might be thought, obviates the apparent speciesism of Kant.
Though Kant defines humanity as a rational being, marginal human cases lack (or have a fragmented)
form of rationality. Even without such a modification as Wood’s, I submit that the claim of speciesism is
misplaced, since in numerous places such as Universal Natural History and Anthropology Kant suggests
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articulates in The Case for Animal Rights in 1983, the lack of direct duties in Kantian ethics not
only conflicts with commonsense moral intuition, but is also theoretically problematic, since
Kant’s “attempt to restrict inherent value to moral agents is arbitrary” (Regan 2004, 183, 239).20
This complaint against Kant is common, though to be sure a Kantian need not concede such
arbitrariness. Indeed, Korsgaard—despite her attempt to modify Kant in a way that makes him
more animal-friendly, as it were—makes the case that Kant’s argument for the absolute value of
ends in themselves is rationally grounded. Nonetheless, the standard complaint against Kant
from the standpoint of animal ethics is that his anthropocentrism is ignorant, invidious, and
speciesist. Therefore his arguments for the absolute worth and dignity of humanity in contrast to
the limited or relative worth of animals are either specious, biased, or else reflect his early
modern, human chauvinist tendencies. And of course, if Kant is inept in dealing with the moral
problems associated with non-human animals, it would seem that he would only fare worse
regarding the moral problems of ecosystems or environments.

that nonhuman intelligences would also be ends in themselves. Another way Kant attempts to address
why marginal-case humans are owed direct duties but not animals has to do with what I call the holistic
vision of humanity developed in Kant’s anthropology and philosophy of history, wherein the moral
predispositions of humanity that require numerous generations to cultivate are given focus. Thus, though
the human species as a totality is favored from a moral standpoint in these texts, it is not for what Regan
and Singer see as simply “arbitrary” reasons but is rather reasoned out in line with the idea of morality (in
terms of cultural development as a distinction from animals).
Regan finds Kant’s position arbitrary because he takes the capacity for rationality (characteristic of
moral agents) to be a baseless criterion for moral consideration. Regan’s argument (2004, 183-185) is
lengthy and complex, but the basic idea is that Regan thinks either Kant is being speciesist, or else he is
denying moral consideration to moral patients (namely, those capable of suffering) on arbitrary grounds
(namely, that they are being denied moral status because they do not have the capacity to legislate the
moral law). According to Regan, both the moral agent and the moral patient (human or not) are capable of
suffering: “The issue concerns their shared capacity for suffering, not their differing [rational] abilities. If
the duty not to cause moral agents gratuitous suffering is a duty owed directly to them, the same must be
true of the duty not to do the same to human moral patients. Otherwise, we flaunt the requirement of
formal justice: we allow dissimilar treatment of relevantly similar cases. Kant’s position does violate this
requirement, and the violation of it…is an unavoidable consequence of the moral arbitrariness of his
theory” (Regan 2004, 183). One worry of this analysis is that the capacity for suffering is potentially just
as arbitrary as a criterion for moral status ascription.
20
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In contrast to the more indirect critique of Kantianism found in Singer and Regan, other
environmental commentators have engaged with Kant in a more direct fashion. In the following
section, I sketch complaints against Kant’s philosophy from the traditional reading, using an
essay by Hoff, who is perhaps the first commentator to criticize Kant from the standpoint of
environmental ethics. In 1983, Christina Hoff published a short but scathing essay on Kant in the
journal Environmental Ethics, and in this essay she takes up most of the same concerns that
Singer and Regan do. Hoff’s critique is historically important for making sense of the traditional
reading of Kant and its more recent shift in a green direction since her publication is the first, to
my knowledge, to connect the issues raised by animal ethicists to the field of environmental
ethics. She raises a number of issues with Kant’s ethics, noting how his seemingly noble
humanistic tendencies—with their capacity to justify universal human rights—have on their
insidious obverse an ability to justify human indifference to animal suffering. Because of the
influence of this essay against the greening of Kant in my project, I shall address her objections
in greater detail. Hoff took the early insights in animal ethics21 and placed them in the larger
context of environmental ethics, for which Kant (like Descartes) has now—thanks to the myopia
of the traditional reading—been transmogrified into an ecological bogeyman. In Chapter 3, I
make the case, to the contrary, that Kant’s philosophy of nature is indeed ecological, expanding
moral horizons beyond the merely human.

The first edition of Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights was published during the same year as Hoff’s
essay “Kant’s Invidious Humanism”; I am not aware whether either of these philosophers corresponded
on these issues, though it is at least clear that both would have been familiar with Singer’s radical book
published only eight years earlier.
21
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Kant’s “Invidious Humanism” regarding Animals
The first and (perhaps) best representation of both the traditional reading of Kantian ethics and
the environmental complaint against Kantianism can be found in the succinct essay by Christina
Hoff, entitled “Kant’s Invidious Humanism.” Hoff makes a number of strong claims in this
paper. The three main claims are as follows: first, she argues that Kant affords no moral
consideration to non-rational beings (i.e., non-humans), entailing that the theory requires that we
remain indifferent to animal suffering; second, she contends that Kant’s moral theory is
“impoverished” since it conflicts with common moral intuitions; third, Hoff argues that the
attempt to ground the categorical imperative’s formulation of universal respect for persons
(which she thinks is a key source of Kant’s invidious treatment of non-humans) is unsystematic
and poorly supported by the formulation of universal law. Below, I offer a reconstruction of her
overarching argument that Kant’s moral theory is an invidious flavor of humanism. Her actual
paper is divided into four parts and the argument she pursues is not necessarily presented in the
order in which I present.
In support of the claim that Kantian ethics is indifferent to animal welfare, Hoff cites
explicit passages in Groundwork and Kant’s Lectures on Ethics where Kant argues that the
capacity for autonomy and the self-legislation of the moral law makes one a moral person and
end in itself, not to be used as a mere means (Hoff 1983, 64). The negative component of Kant’s
claim that Hoff focuses on is that those beings who cannot self-legislate are reduced to things or
beings whom it is permissible to use as mere means. This is all very much supported by textual
evidence that Hoff rightly notes from Kant’s ethical theory in Groundwork (4:428) and Lectures
on Ethics (Hoff 1983, 63-64). Since non-rational beings are mere means, Hoff infers that
indifference to their suffering is permitted on Kant’s normative framework. In Groundwork,
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Kant supports his rational humanism with a variety of arguments defending the
incommensurable superiority of rational nature…Kant’s position on animals in the
Lectures on Ethics is clear against the theoretical background of the Groundwork. The
moral domain consists exclusively of beings to whom we have direct duties…so far as
animals are concerned we have no direct duties. Animals are not self-conscious and are
there merely as a means to an end. That end is man (Hoff 1983, 64-65).
Thus, from Kant’s views that animals can be used as means and that cruel actions toward them
are only self-damaging from the moral standpoint, Hoff reads Kant as the champion of human
rights at the cost of an impoverished view of the moral status of animals.
This leads to Hoff’s second major charge, namely, that Kant’s ethical theory is
inadequate because it conflicts with our moral intuitions. Here, she appeals to commonsense in
order to show how the logical requirements of Kant’s view lead, as she claims, to a position
where animals are reduced to mere things and that, second, this view conflicts with a deeply held
moral intuition as to the wrongness of animal suffering. That animal cruelty is opposed to moral
commonsense is hardly debatable, and there are strong associations between individuals with
histories of animal cruelty and mental conditions such as anti-social personality disorder
(Gleyzer et al. 2002; Vaughn et al. 2009). Moreover, recent laws restricting inhumane treatment
of animals—in particular, the use of battery cages for chickens, hunting of dolphins, and killing
of great apes—are upheld in most developed countries today, suggesting a legal convergence
with evolving moral intuitions of society. According to Hoff, “the view that we have moral
duties to all, but only, rational beings is incompatible with common moral intuition…the wellbeing of an animal appears to be an intrinsically valuable state of affairs, and attempts to view it
otherwise are unconvincing, unsatisfactory, and finally, perverse” (Hoff 1983, 67-68). Despite an
obvious problem with begging the question, we might charitably construe this second claim as a
reductio ad absurdum of Kant’s moral theory: in order to remain systematic, Kant must deny
direct duties to animals, and this in turn conflicts with commonsensical moral views. If we
24

granted that the commonsense intuition about animal cruelty has moral grounds (for without it,
we risk begging the question), it would be absurd for a normative theory to either permit cruel
treatment of animals, or else stake the location of the moral harm on the cruel agent and not the
animal abused; therefore, so it goes, something must be either impoverished with Kant’s theory
or else it has a logical deficiency (or both).
She uses this reductio to transition to her final major claim: that the categorical
imperative’s formulation of respect for persons is supported weakly by the formulation of
universal law. Instead, she thinks the formulation of respect for persons is based on an axiomatic
premise in Kant’s argument that rational nature exists as an end in itself. After thinking she has
already demonstrated the impoverished nature of Kant’s ethical theory through her first two
claims, Hoff intends to show that not only is it morally deficient, but it is also theoretically inept.
Essentially, she wonders why Kant denies direct duties to animals. What are his reasons? Her
answer, as she sees it, lies in the categorical imperative’s formulation of respect for persons:
“rational nature and only rational nature exists as an end in itself.” Hoff claims that Kant derives
this formulation from the formulation of universal law. She reconstructs Kant’s argument that
rational nature exists as an end in itself in three short steps:
(i) A man necessarily conceives of his own existence as an end in itself (Kant calls this a
“subjective principle of action”).
(ii) But every other rational being thinks of himself in the same way.
(iii) Thus, it must be an objective principle that “Rational nature exists as an end in itself”
(Hoff 1983, 65).
Hoff fails to cite Groundwork in her reconstruction (though it is clear that she is looking at GW
4:429). A charitable reading of her argument can be drawn from Korsgaard’s interpretation
regarding these passages. Here, Kant is drawing from his distinction between relative and
absolute ends. Relative ends are hypothetical and typically prudential ones: if I desire to eat, I
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will seek to obtain some food. Absolute ends are those ends that are good for their own sake.
That is, they are not conditioned on some prior end. When we assign value to ourselves by
realizing we are an unconditioned source of value, we conceive of ourselves insofar as we are
capable of setting ends as absolute ends (Korsgaard 2017, xxiv). Humans are the subjective
principles of their own actions. They treat themselves as absolute ends as a necessary condition
for pursuing any other relative ends, since all conditioned ends require an unconditioned source.
Because the end-setting capacity for Kant—as Hoff notes—is a rational capacity, and only
humans are rational,22 only they exist as ends in themselves. Kant’s humanism can thus ground a
moral conception of human rights on the one hand, but on the other hand denies the status of
ends in themselves to all non-human entities: “Kant’s theory is attractive insofar as it provides a
theoretical foundation for human rights. Unfortunately, the theory which gives to human beings a
preeminent moral status altogether excludes animals from the moral domain” (Hoff 1983, 63).
Hoff’s paper is well-researched and succinctly summarizes the general outlook of Kant’s
ethical views vis-à-vis humans and non-humans. Accordingly, her paper is a good representative
of what I have called the traditional reading of Kant’s ethics. I will now briefly express a few
reservations I have with Hoff’s reading. With regard to her first claim, Hoff is indeed right that
we have no direct duties to animals from the standpoint of Kant’s ethical theory, but other

The empirical question of whether non-human animals are rational is an interesting one. In Kant’s time,
this question was hardly interesting, though he did entertain the possibility of extraterrestrial rational
beings (e.g. UNH 1:358-359; Anthropology 7:331-332). With recent research on animal cognition and
ethology, the question becomes less whimsical. For a defense of Kant’s claim that only humans are
rational, one could (as Korsgaard does, 2004, 85-86) distinguish between intelligence and rationality.
Many animals are intelligent—capable of adapting to novel environments, learning new strategies for
satisfying their natural ends, etc. When rationality is interpreted as not only a prudential faculty for
deliberating on actions but, in addition, understanding the reasons for which one has made a
determination for action, it is questionable whether non-humans have such a capacity. To be charitable to
Hoff, let us maintain Korsgaard’s distinction between intelligence and rationality and suppose that only
humans are rational in this sense.
22
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commentators such as Toby Svoboda (2012, 2015) have convincingly dealt with and resolved
this problem with respect to Kantianism and environmental ethics: despite lacking direct duties
to flora and fauna, a robust Kantian environmental ethic is still possible. While it is true that
Kant argues that we have no direct duties to animals—even in the later Metaphysics of Morals—
the case can still be made that animals still deserve moral consideration23 on a Kantian
framework. While direct duties are owed only to moral agents, there is still room for non-rational
nature to be included under the sphere of moral consideration: the Kantian moral sphere is just
more complex than Hoff makes it out to be, and we certainly have duties in regard to flora and
fauna; the traditional reading of Kant is a decidedly absolutist view: either a being is owed direct
duties (an esteemed rational being) or it is not owed them (it is a mere thing); this view is
mistaken, for Kant’s brief discussions of children in his pedagogical/anthropological writings
and his discussions of the continuity between human and animal cognition in his geography belie
this faultily rigid distinction.
Young children are clearly not rational (in the sense discussed by Korsgaard 2004, 87, as
capable of deliberating on the grounds of their actions), but they nonetheless deserve our moral
consideration. They also develop intellectual capacities similar to many complex animals (e.g.
dolphins and primates) that require education and discipline to foster. Unlike animals, with
education the vast majority of children will eventually cultivate their rational capacities for moral
agency (Pedagogy 9:442-444, cf. Anthropology 7:127-128).24 In any case, it may be thought that
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Animals deserve consideration from us when we deliberate on actions because they can be harmed and
benefitted, and when they are harmed, we become morally worse off; when they are benefitted, we
become more morally perfect. By being morally considerable, I do not mean having intrinsic value.
Instead, I mean that the welfare of the morally considerable entity in question matters from the standpoint
of ethics in a more general sense.
24

In fact, in Critique of Practical Reason Kant mentions that the faculty of judgment, requisite for the
exercise of humanity’s rational faculties, is a faculty that requires discipline and practice over time (CPrR
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we only have indirect duties to young pre-rational children, akin to animals, since pre-rational
children are not persons in the Kantian sense.25 Moreover, in Kant’s lectures on Physical
Geography,26 Kant remarks how, in particular, dogs and elephants, are rational-logical analogues
of human agents:27
[dogs] seem to be the most perfect animal, and to manifest most strongly the analogue of
rationality…They carefully look after their responsibilities, remain with their master; if
they’ve done something wicked they become disturbed; and if they see their master
angry, try to win him over with a submissive posture (from “Kant on Animals” Kain
2018, 217).
[an elephant] is an animal worthy of admiration (Kain 2018, 218).
An elephant is a gentle animal, and seems to be an analogue of morality. It understands
jokes, but cannot be duped (Kain 2018, 218).
5:159). Moreover, Kant claims that humans aren’t fully rational (and hence agents) until after the age of
20, when their ends and interests converge (Anthropology 7:201; Jaesche Logic VI 43). If we follow Hoff
in arguing that we only have duties for rational agents, a large proportion of humanity would be excluded
from the moral sphere as well (most children, adolescents, and young adults), which surely isn’t what
Kant has in mind. One might object that Kant can squeeze non-rational potential humans into the moral
sphere because they are part of the larger collective species of humanity, but this conclusion might appear
to succumb to the charge of speciesism, and Kant’s moral philosophy is primarily logocentric, not
anthropocentric, since it concerns all rational beings. Thus, in order to provide a charitable reading of
Kant when he says all humans—even non-rational ones—are owed direct duties, it should be understood
to obtain insofar as they have a proto-rational or fragmented sense of rationality based on their cognitive
faculties (e.g. a capacity for representation, imagination, judgement, will), which is how Wood (1998)
argues for including proto-rational beings in the moral sphere. An objection to this line of reasoning can
be garnered from Singer’s argument against potential personhood in abortion, “Taking Life: The Embryo
and the Fetus” from Practical Ethics (Singer 1993,152-156). Wood can militate against this objection by
emphasizing how disrespecting potential persons (such as in those with developing cognitive faculties)
disrespects rational nature in the abstract, which is a moral failing. Hence, we ought not to treat protorational beings such as pre-rational children or sentient animals wrongly. If Wood’s position is able to
overcome Singer’s potential argument, it only does so by severely modifying Kant’s.
25

In Metaphysics of Morals (6:442-443) Kant explicitly discusses our duties with regard to (in Ansehung)
animals. He says though we have no direct duties to animals, we should treat them humanely and
benevolently. This passage could be used to interpret our duties to young children, as (as Kant himself
tells us in Anthropology) they are not yet rational and they are incapable of forming concepts of objects or
having determinate experiences. In this passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that personhood is
required for direct perfect duties, and children are not persons in the moral sense. But we still have to
include them, like animals, in the moral sphere for Kant. Hoff is thus mistaken in her reading of Kant’s
ethics being so black and white.
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Kant’s Vorlesungen ueber physischen Geographie are currently unpublished and untranslated.

In the Collins Lectures on Ethics, Kant also regards animals as “an analogue of humanity” for which we
have mediated duties in regard to (LE 27:459).
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Kant fails to draw moral implications from these statements, but this is understandable, as these
assertions are delivered in non-philosophical lectures. Contrary to Hoff’s reading, it seems
reasonable to infer from Kant’s constant use of moral-language28 with regard to elephants and
dogs29 that they have a moral status that is at least comparable to young children, and thus
deserve membership in the moral sphere of consideration. To be morally considerable isn’t
synonymous with being an end in itself; nonetheless, the welfare of an entity can matter,
morally, despite us not owing it direct duties. For Kant, in moral praxis we need to carefully
consider animal welfare rather than remain indifferent to animal suffering. Again, this evidence
obviates Hoff’s black and white reading of Kant’s “invidious humanism.” Hence, complex
animals are not to be used as things since they are no less rational than young children (where
rationality is understood as the capacity for normative self-governance, Korsgaard 2004, 87), and
many animals such as cephalopods and primates exhibit at the very least a form of “protorationality” which surely makes them out to be moral analogues of humanity deserving of moral
consideration.30 Hoff denies of Kant the proto-rational form to animals since they are not selfconscious (Hoff 1983, 65). This can find further support in the Collins Lectures on Ethics (LE
27:459). However, in his lectures on metaphysics and anthropology Kant does indeed claim that
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The moral-language that Kant uses with regard to elephants is perhaps closest to the language used in
Groundwork with regard to ends in themselves, which is the text Hoff appeals to to argue that Kant
suggests we remain indifferent to animal suffering. Indeed, Kant describes elephants with these
normatively loaded words without reservation; these include “prudence,” “good-natured,” “patience,”
“discipline” (Kain 2018, 218).
Amusingly, Kant sees monkeys as only having an “analogue of reason (analogon rationis)” but not an
“analogue of morality (analogon moralitatis)” as he believes elephants and dogs do (Kain 2018, 217;
Physical Geography 9:336-337, 217). Likely, Kant thinks this because field reports he had access to
depict monkeys engaging in deceptive activities, such as theft (Kain, “Duties Regarding Animals” 2010,
217).
29

Cf. to Wood’s discussion of potentially-rational nature in “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational
Nature” (1998).
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animals have the intellectual capacity for representation and reflection (Schönfeld 2018, 28:274;
Anthropology 7:141; Wilson 2008, 8). Though perhaps not self-aware in the sense of rationally
setting ends in accordance with the categorical imperative, Kant at least views animals in these
texts as self-conscious and sentient. Additionally, the case can be made that Kant thinks animals
have a faculty of choice (Willkür). As Holly L. Wilson notes, “A will [Willkür], Kant writes in
the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘is purely animal (arbitrium brutum), which cannot be determined
save through sensuous impulses, that is, pathologically” (Wilson 2008, 7; CPR A802/B830). In
sum, Hoff’s reading is implausibly black and white and fails to note the striking cognitive and
moral continuities Kant sees between humans and animals. One might object that Hoff could
avoid this problem by admitting that humans and animals share certain aspects of their nature—
for example, insofar as they are sensuous beings—but that nonetheless, the sensuous-nature in
both humans and animals is irrelevant to the proper ends of morality. Though initially plausible
(especially with regard only to Groundwork), this objection fails to account for the stronger
relevance Kant gives to feeling in Metaphysics of Morals31 and the claims Kant makes regarding
the impermissibility of cruelty to animals. Regarding the latter, when we harm animals we do not
properly do them a wrong (since duties to animals for Kant are duties to oneself), but we
nonetheless engage in activities that are clearly relevant to the sensuous nature of animals. In
other words, that animals can be harmed or benefited matters for Kant in deciding what we can
and cannot do to animals, despite us not owing them direct duties. As Patrick Kain asserts in
defending Kant against a Hoff-like complaint,
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For example, Kant argues that we have duties to oneself to cultivate a good disposition (that is
instrumental to morality) through the appreciation of beautiful nature and the benevolent treatment of
animals. As Guyer puts it, “duties to oneself can be duties to have—or preserve and develop—certain
kinds of feelings” (Guyer 1993, 320). For more on the specifics of Kant’s arguments in Metaphysics of
Morals, see Guyer’s “Duties Regarding Nature” (1993).
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there is indeed something about the animals in question that grounds Kant’s demands to
treat them decently: because of their nature or behavior, animals are the proper object of
one’s sympathy and love. Again, proper treatment of animals is a necessary condition for
and perhaps a constitutive part of one’s moral well-being, rather than a mere
‘instrumental’ means to it…part of what Kant insists upon is the fact that a selfrespecting person is directly concerned with the fate of animals (Kain 2010, 226-227).
Thus, pace Hoff, for Kant morality isn’t black and white (regarding mere rationality); rather,
(and especially when accounting for Kant’s latter remarks on virtue), the sensuous aspects of
human and animal nature matter to morality. Kant’s thought isn’t merely humanistic. It can be
pushed beyond Hoff’s reading as a resource for fostering and justifying real concern for nonrational nature from the standpoint of morality.
Likely, Hoff arrives at her environmental condemnation of Kantianism because she relies
solely on Groundwork and the early Lectures on Ethics to support her case. Though important
works, these are not the only works one can (and should) draw from in order to show how Kant’s
moral philosophy regards non-rational nature. Although Svoboda doesn’t address Hoff directly
in his recent work, he tackles similar objections to Kant on the moral status of animals, arguing
that there is textual evidence to support an environmental reading and application of Kantian
ethics. My main point here is to show that the traditional yet prominent reading of Kant best
exemplified in Hoff is not necessarily the best reading; though drawing from specific passages in
Kant, it is not nuanced and faithful to more general holistic tendencies in Kant’s thought.
With regard to the third claim that Kant’s philosophy is unsystematic, we need only
question Hoff’s reconstruction of Kant’s argument (Hoff 1983, 65). Her failure to properly cite
Groundwork and alternative interpretations in Kant scholarship at the very least raises suspicions
with regard to its plausibility. Korsgaard in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (2000) offers a much
more thorough and complex reconstruction of Kant’s argument in Groundwork, citing passages
in Kant very carefully. On Korsgaard’s reading, Kant’s argument, insofar as it unifies the
31

formulations of universal law, respect for persons, kingdom of ends, and autonomy—while by no
means perfect in terms of presentation—is indeed systematic and consistent as a philosophical
argument. Other commentators, such as Wood, have questioned the assumption that the
formulation of universal law is the foundation of the formulation of autonomy and respect for
persons.32 Hoff simply assumes this to be the case since it is the order in which Kant presents the
formulations of the categorical imperative, and a stronger argument is needed to defend this
assumption since Kant’s approach in Groundwork is complex and multi-faceted. Though not
prima facie outlandish, any approach that attempts to reduce Kant’s argument to a few simple
steps that rely on (unjustified) axiomatic premises at the very least must be examined critically.
There are plenty of other reasonable interpretations of Kant’s argument that appreciate its
complexity. This is not to say that Hoff’s simple presentation is necessarily wrong (in fact, a
clearer argument is, all things considered, to be preferred to a turgid one), but that Hoff should
have at least mentioned contrary interpretive avenues in her exposition. Otherwise, she is liable
to be accused of presenting a straw man argument.
Finally, Hoff’s claim that Kant moral philosophy is morally repugnant (that is, that it
conflicts with our commonly held moral beliefs and intuitions) since it seems to disregard the
suffering of non-humans appears more to be an exercise in rhetoric, since it largely appeals to
sentiments of suffering rather than a systematic refutation of Kantianism. Even if we accepted
her conclusion that Kantians cannot adequately grapple with the morality of animals, her appeal

In Kant’s Ethical Thought (1999) Allen Wood makes the convincing case that this standard view—that
the formulation of universal law is the primary or fundamental foundation of the categorical imperative—
is itself mistaken, on good textual grounds. Though the formulation of universal law is presented first in
Groundwork’s argument, it already, Wood claims, logically presupposes the later formulations (Wood
1999, 81-82). If he is right, then not only does Hoff fail to show how Kant “unsystematically” connects
the formulation of universal law to the formulation of respect for persons, but she also begins with a
faulty assumption, namely that the former formulation has some kind of special axiomatic status.
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to moral intuitions33 rather than argumentation seems at best to be more of a meta-philosophical
complaint against Kant’s methodology rather than to his moral arguments themselves. At worst,
it is blatant begging of the question. She laments that on Kant’s view, animals are not deemed
worthy to be happy (Hoff 1983, 67); this makes no sense, as worthiness requires autonomy (and
culpability) and thus, of course, non-rational animals cannot be worthy of happiness. Hoff also
thinks Kant maintains that we should be indifferent to animal suffering (Hoff 1983, 67). Quite
the contrary! (see, for example, MM 6:443-444 and CJ 5:380, pace Hoff). Notwithstanding the
problematic passage in Conjectural Beginning where Kant asserts that humans may use animals
without any qualms (CB 8:114),34 there are plenty of passages in Kant suggesting animal
suffering matters for morality. Korsgaard summarizes Kant’s decidedly anti-indifference stance
with regard to animal suffering:
Kant does think we have the right to kill the other animals, but it must be quickly and
without pain, and cannot be for the sake of mere sport… He does not think we should
perform painful experiments on non-human animals “for the sake of mere speculation,
when the end could also be achieved without these” [MM 6:443]. He thinks we may
make other animals work, but not in a way that strains their capacities. The limitation he
mentions sounds vaguely as if it were drawn from the golden rule: we should only force
them to do such work as we must do ourselves [MM 6:443]. And if they do work for us,
he thinks that we should be grateful. In his course lectures, Kant at this point sometimes
told his students a story about G. W. Leibniz carefully returning a worm he had been
studying to its leaf when he was done [LE 27:459]. And both in his lectures and in
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant has hard words for people who shoot their horses or dogs
when they are no longer useful [MM 6:443; LE 27:459]. Such animals should be treated,
Kant says, “just as if they were members of the household” [MM 6:443]. He remarks
with some approval that “in Athens it was punishable to let an aged work-horse starve.”
He tells us that “any action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress,
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Though Kant is quite systematic in general—and especially in his moral philosophy and the primacy of
the practical, I in no way mean to downplay or disregard the fact that Kant also often appeals to moral
intuition. Indeed, in Roussean fashion in Groundwork, Kant claims that the categorical imperative is
implicitly operative in the average person (GW 4:403-405). And, in Critique of Practical Reason, Kant
appeals to the axiomatic status of a moral “fact of reason” supported by what appears to be a strong moral
intuition that he believes all humans harbor in the conscience of their hearts (CPrR 5:42-47).
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I address the this problem in the conclusion of Chapter 5.
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or otherwise treat them without love, is demeaning to ourselves” [LE 27:710] (Korsgaard
2004, 89-90).
Despite not being able to set rational ends, animals can still suffer and be made unhappy. Yet
Hoff reasons that suffering is irrelevant to the moral question for Kant. This objection (and other
similar contentions that Hoff raises against Kant) fails because happiness (which concerns,
among other things, a fulfilment of sensuous desire and maintenance of well-being) becomes an
important theme in Kant’s post-Groundwork moral writings. This is especially true in Kant’s
discussion of the highest good, which amounts to the promotion of a world in which the
harmonization of our moral ends coincides with a maximization of human welfare.35 Suffering
and welfare are both clearly a concern for Kant in his moral philosophy; this concern just isn’t
sufficiently dealt with (or, perhaps, developed yet in Groundwork). And, if the non-rational
welfare of humans is morally relevant for Kant, why would not the welfare of non-rational
animals be important as well? Failure to care about the suffering of animals is indeed a moral
failing for Kant.
In addition to these potential difficulties with Hoff’s particular reading of Kant’s
invidious humanism, Holly L. Wilson in her paper “The Green Kant: Kant’s Treatment of
Animals” (2008) further undermines the traditional view of Kant on non-rational nature
presented by Hoff. Though Hoff presents a decent case against Kant’s treatment of animals
utilizing a general framework from Kant’s philosophy, Wilson’s paper looks more into the
specifics: in Groundwork when Kant says that animals may be used as a means, what exactly
does he mean? Can Kant be a resource for animal or environmental ethics, contrary to the
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For areas where Kant discusses the highest good and the moral importance of happiness—e.g. when
Kant states that one should make “the well-being and happiness of others my end (MM 6:452)—see CPrR
5:110-111, 146-148; CJ 5:450, 453; Religion 6:134-135; MM 6:448-457.
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traditional view? Wilson argues that Kant’s discussion of animals as “mere means” because of
their incapacity to self-legislate the moral law doesn’t imply that they are mere things. She
maintains—drawing largely from Kant’s use of teleological judgment and his assertions in
various lectures—that organized beings are ontologically distinct from things. The latter are to be
understood in mechanistic terms, whereas animals are organized and have formative inner forces
(Wilson 2008, 7). Much like Paul Taylor’s attribution of non-human animals as being
“teleological centers of life,”36 Kant views organized beings as animated through spontaneous
inner principles (Wilson 2008, 6; 28:275); not only does Kant claim that animals have souls in
his Lectures on Metaphysics, but that they are capable of self-determination (understood, of
course, in a weaker sense through this principle of animation, rather than agential selfdetermination by means of the moral law). By focusing on Kant’s general conclusions in
Groundwork that animals are mere means and shouldn’t be treated as ends in themselves, Hoff
ignores some of the important details of Kant’s philosophy of non-rational nature. Wilson’s
analysis, by contrast, can be seen as a good response to the Hoff-inspired traditional reading of
Kant that is anathema to the greening of Kant.
Perhaps a more sophisticated defender of the traditional reading could obviate my
contentions with Hoff’s case.37 It was never my intention to present a knockdown argument

See Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature (1986), which I discuss in relation to Kant’s pre-critical
ontology in Chapter 3.
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For a more systematic, traditional reading of Kant, see Pepita Haezrahi’s “The Concept of Man as Endin-Himself” (1967). In this paper, Haezrahi argues that the “unsystematic” foundations of the formulation
of respect for persons that Hoff would later point at can be salvaged by appealing to the postulates of the
Critique of Practical Reason. Once the dignity of humanity is assured through such a postulate, the
“domination and determination of the irrational part by the rational”—both in humanity itself and against
other non-rational beings—is secured. Haezrahi’s older paper doesn’t concern the animal debate
explicitly, but it does indeed have implications for it and shows one that a more sophisticated reading of
Kant against the environment is possible. There have been recent attempts to criticize Kant in the vein of
Hoff. For one example, see Jens Timmermann’s “When the dog wags the tail: Animal welfare and the
indirect duty in Kantian ethics” (2005). I focus on Hoff because she is, historically, the first person in the
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against the traditional view, as it does indeed have much textual evidence in its favor. Rather, my
main purpose in focusing on Hoff’s astute essay is twofold: first, it is important to see how this
traditional objection to Kantianism is both widespread and contentious, especially from the
standpoint of Kant versus the environment. And second, my objections to Hoff’s paper reveal
that there is still a fertile space for the greening of Kant. That is, there are alternative Kantian
texts and strategies one could choose for defending a less invidious environmental reading of
Kant. Looking beyond Groundwork and understanding the historical context from which Hoff
has crafted her critique is a good starting point. This larger context—and an attempt at mediating
between Hoff, Wilson, Kant, and environmental ethics, is discussed below.
Squaring Hoff’s Critique and Wilson’s Defense in the Anthropocene
Though I reject most of Hoff’s criticism of Kant with regard to environmental ethics, her essay is
very important because it is the very first attempt to bridge Kant scholarship and environmental
ethics. Historically, this is because the early concerns of environmental ethics—beginning in the
mid-1970s—were primarily about the aesthetic appreciation of nature, preservation of
wilderness, reduction of pollution and environmental degradation, and humane treatment of
animals (Brennan 2015).38 Set in the context of this early environmental framework, Hoff’s
critique of Kant sticks. For environmental ethicists at this time, Hoff deals a scathing blow to any
potential Kantian approach in this field.39 And it is true—if one intends only to defend an

literature to critique Kant with regard to animal and environmental ethics. For objections to Timmermann,
see Kain (“Duties Regarding Animals,” 2010, 226-227).
Brennon, “Environmental Ethics,” cited from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/. Date accessed: 22 October 2018.
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Of course, Paul Taylor (1986) and Tom Regan (1983) present quasi-Kantian deontological accounts for
biocentrism and animal rights, respectively, but both of these philosophers clearly articulate how their
accounts are only broadly Kantian. In fact, they criticize Kant for his “invidious inhumanity” view of nonhuman animals in a similar way as Hoff, and these studies were published only shortly after Hoff’s essay
in the 1980s.

36

environmental ethic, Kant’s philosophy in Groundwork is perhaps not the strongest work in the
philosophical canon to which one can appeal since Kant appears only concerned with individual
human persons in that text. So, it must be acknowledged that her criticisms are indeed well taken
and historically important, especially given the philosophical debates she was engaged with at
this time.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the contexts, issues, and debates have changed
since the inception of environmental ethics and the early critique of it by Hoff; with the rise of
human-caused climate change and a foreboding sixth mass extinction, the Anthropocene places
humanity in a new and precarious predicament. Instead of worrying about aesthetic concerns,
wilderness, or animal welfare, many environmental ethicists have now begun turn to the problem
of climate change, since it is a collective challenge capable of unifying previous environmental
and human concerns.40 Instead of focusing on the (possibly) limited assistance of Kant’s
Groundwork in regard to the treatment of animals, as Hoff does, with the changing perspectives
now required in the age of the Anthropocene, Kant can be of more assistance for environmental
ethics through sustainability. And of course, Hoff’s initial concerns about the inhumane
treatment of animals will be discharged indirectly, for fighting climate change also is a means for
evading the looming sixth mass extinction. In the end, then, Kant’s humanistic cosmopolitanism
may turn out to be one of the philosophical keys for transitioning to sustainability, rather than an
invidious impediment. Understood in a historical context where climate change and its collective
challenges remained (mostly) off the moral radar; and, where normative theories primarily aimed
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In response to this challenge, a whole new sub-field in environmental ethics has been formed: climate
ethics. This field tends to be dominated by consequentialist approaches, and thus my discussion of Kant
here can be seen as perhaps a first important step toward making Kantian approaches plausible in this
field.
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at being defensible with regard to individual human moral agents, Hoff’s general critique of Kant
makes sense. In the foregoing, I have shown how aspects of her argument are problematic, but
the general concern about Kant’s views on animals in Groundwork is worrying.
Thus, Hoff’s position is understandable when viewed in the historical context of her time.
And, Wilson’s objections also stick better if Kant is read more carefully, read beyond the limited
confines of Groundwork, and viewed through the lens of our current predicament with climate
change. It must also not be forgotten that Hoff’s important essay was one of the first attempts—
even if only negatively—to bridge the disparate fields of Kant scholarship and environmental
ethics. My project, then, takes inspiration from her approach in bridging the two but from a more
positive angle, viz., for the greening of Kant with an eye toward his dynamic holism and the
moral implications for sustainability that follow from it.
A Short Aside on Kant and Climate Ethics
Climate ethics is a rather new subfield of environmental ethics. It generally draws more from
traditional normative theories such as utilitarianism and other analytic approaches rather than
calling for an entirely new paradigm shift in normative thinking.41 In addition, with climate
ethics—since we are on the path for a sixth mass extinction—the older concerns of animal
welfare that Singer and Regan raised in the ‘70s and ‘80s have to be reframed in terms of climate
change and biodiversity loss. With regard to the ethics of climate change, we need to take a
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For the provocative argument that environmental ethics requires a completely new approach because of
the “last man” problem, see Richard Routley, “Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic?” (1973).
Stephen M. Gardiner makes a similar point with regard to the limitations of standard ethical theories for
climate ethics in A Perfect Moral Storm (2011). Though I am sympathetic to his view—especially with
regard to reconsidering the moral vocation of humanity in light of climate change—I do not think we
need to totally abandon the ethical wisdom of thinkers in the canon (such as Kant, as is obvious). Indeed,
it seems perfectly fine to overcome Routley’s “last man” problem by appealing to Kant’s notion of perfect
duties to oneself not to wantonly destroy nature. This is discussed further in my survey of Svoboda’s
account of duties regarding nature.
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broader approach and think in terms of the earth-system. Later, I intend to work this claim out in
light of Kant’s view of systems and our current plight with climate change. For now, however, I
would briefly highlight how Kant is usually received in these circles in order to show how there
is much need for a green revisiting of Kantian thought. Despite the tendency of climate ethicists
to be more open to figures from the canon, on the whole Kant has remained marginalized. This is
likely due to the perception of his thinking as one that only regards abstract, discrete moral
subjects and because of the perceived weakness of a strictly non-consequentialist approach to
ethics for dealing with collective issues.42 For instance, prominent climate ethicist Dale Jamieson
in Reason in a Dark Time dismisses the moral resourcefulness of Kant for climate change:
There is also the question about the philosophical basis for collectivizing duties. Some
accounts claim to be inspired by Kant but they can find no real foundation in his work.
He was interested in the conditions under which our actions have moral worth, not in
solving collective action problems. There may be many things that are wrong with Paris
Hilton flying to Rome on a shopping trip but a contradiction in will is not among them
(Jamieson 2014, 173).43
When the problem concerns collectives like ecosystems, entire nations, and future generations
rather than individual subjects; when it concerns large time-scales spanning generations rather
than particular situations and their maxims: it becomes obvious why Kant has been left behind.44
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Since many approaches in climate ethics make use of utilitarian-esque tools such as cost-benefit
analyses and accounts of expected utility (and these are, of course, important for the intergenerational
discussion), it is no surprise that apparently non-consequentialist approaches like Kantianism get as it
were left in the dust.
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Obviously, there is no logical contradiction in flying to Rome (which is what I take Jamieson to be
noting in this passage). Though, of course, there is a practical breakdown in the categorical imperative
when one wills an action for the sake of enjoyment that undermines the conditions of human life on the
planet. For more on how the categorical imperative can be understood as a conceptual underpinning of
sustainable behavior along these lines, see Schönfeld, “The Kantian Blueprint of Climate Control” (2007).
44

In The Ethics of Climate Change, climate ethicist James Garvey devotes about two full paragraphs to
the resourcefulness of Kant’s philosophy for climate change (Garvey 2008, 149-150). However, he
considers only the formulation of universalizability and how it might be helpful for thinking about how to
live more sustainably; he does not consider others aspects of Kant’s thought, presumably because they—
on the traditional reading—are too problematic for a thorough-going environmental ethic.
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I hope to show that these presumptions about the limitations of Kant’s thought for these
problems are mistaken and that Kant can indeed be a theoretical asset capable of assisting with
issues in climate ethics.
Merits and Limits of the Traditional View
Notwithstanding the potential difficulties that the traditional reading holds for a viable
environmental ethic, this reading does have several elements, including historical and textual
evidence, in its favor. I would like to briefly highlight these elements to show that we should still
consider this view seriously—not only because it is the mainstream view but also because it is
plausible. By doing so, it can later be seen why this view, reframed through the lens of climate
change, must be superseded by the new, green one. With regard to its historical context, those
who malign Kant’s anthropocentric normative dualisms are right to point out that his philosophy
developed out of a long tradition of human exceptionalism, both from secular and theological
lines. The problem of what to do with the moral status of non-human animals has been a concern
of theologians since at least Aquinas, with the solution to this problem being that our duties to
animals are simply a mediate way for thinking about our duties to others or to God; the
rationalist Alexander Baumgarten would take up a similar line of reasoning with regard to our
duties toward animals (Guyer 1993, 304). In addition, because of Kant’s empiricist influences
and general fascination with the natural world, Kant would frequently consider experiential
knowledge of travelers, researchers, and foreigners. As is well known, Kant was interested in and
taught physical geography45 throughout his life, and the lack of any empirical evidence in Kant’s

Kant’s interesting views on physical geography, which includes “animal ethology, comparative
morphology, and natural history,” is discussed by Patrick Kain in “Duties Regarding Animals” (Kain
2010, 217). Kain makes the case that Kant’s discussion of the nature and similarity of animals with
humans not only has clear moral implications, but also undermines the standard view of Kant regarding
animals as mere machines.
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time suggesting that animals had have languages or cultural practices was good evidence that
they were not rational in the same sense as humans (which, of course, would mean that they
would be unable to self-legislate the moral law).46
Finally, Kant inherited much from the early modern tradition, and this tradition—made
famous by Descartes—was in the business of separating humanity from the rest of nature,
understood mechanistically.47 Much of the first and third Critique as well as the Metaphysical
Foundations is concerned with developing and modifying this early modern mechanistic
tendency in philosophy. Though it is important to consider the intellectual context in which Kant
thinks (as well as his philosophical influences), the general early modern strands of thought upon
which the traditional reading is often based—such as the belief that animals are mere
machines—obscure Kant’s more idiosyncratic and potentially green views.
With regard to textual evidence, there is certainly plenty to suggest that Kant maintains
what is characteristic of the traditional reading. I quote several passages from various works
below, boldfacing aspects that stand out as problematic from an environmental standpoint. I do
this in order to show: first, that the criticisms of environmental ethicists regarding direct duties
and Kant’s apparently dualistic anthropocentrism are often well-founded; second, that the lack of
discussion in Kant scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s regarding the moral status of non-rational

See Schönfeld, “Animal Consciousness: Paradigm Change in the Life Sciences” (2006) for evidence of
animal cognition, language, and culture as well as a historical discussion of how the Cartesian paradigm
of animal consciousness was only partially accepted until only recently.
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Though Kant’s debt to the Cartesian and early modern tradition is solid, it should be borne in mind that
Kant rejected several of Descartes’ ideas, including the view that animals are mere machines (CJ 5:464n),
favoring the more Leibnizian view of nature as a holistic, organic system of entelechies. Kant’s rejection
of Cartesian dualism and its environmental significance is discussed in fuller detail in Chapter 3. For now,
it’s important to know that those who rely on the traditional reading of Kant would likely never stumble
upon Kant’s rejection of animals as mere machines, which is absent in Critique of Pure Reason.
47
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nature is not unsurprising given these statements; and finally, that ethics pedagogy rightly
focuses on Kant’s humanism while either ignoring or lamenting his views on animals:
Now I say: a human being and generally every rational being exists as an end in itself, not
merely as a means for the discretionary use for this or that will, but must in all its actions,
whether directed towards itself or also to other rational beings, always be considered at
the same time as an end… Beings whose existence rests not indeed on our will but on
nature, if they are non-rational beings, still have only a relative worth, as means,
and are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons, because
their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e. as something that may not
be used merely as a means, and hence to that extent limits all choice (and is an object of
respect) (GW 4:428).
The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him
infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by
virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the
same person—i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such
as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes (Anthropology 7:127).
Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself;
because it is possible only by this to be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends.
Thus morality and humanity, in so far as it is capable of morality, is that which alone
has dignity…Autonomy is thus the ground of the dignity of a human and of every
rational nature (GW 4:435-436).
As far as reason alone can judge, a human being has duties only to human beings
(himself and others), since his duty to any subject is morally constrained [moralische
Nöthigung] by that subject’s will. Hence the constraining (binding) subject must…be a
person (MM 6:442).
[W]hat elevates a human being above himself (as a part of the sensible world), what
connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can think and that at the
same time has under it the whole sensible world…It is nothing other than personality,
that is, freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature…
(CPrR 5:87).
This is how the genuine moral incentive of pure practical reason is constituted; it is
nothing other than the pure moral law itself insofar as it lets us feel [spüren] the
sublimity of our own supersensible existence and subjectively effects respect for
their higher determination [Bestimmung]48 in human beings… (CPrR 5:88).
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Following Joshua Rayman (2012), in this dissertation I typically prefer the translation of Bestimmung as
determination rather than vocation. The latter has become a predominant way to render the term. It makes
sense as a translation choice, as the idea of a moral calling or task often fits with what Kant has to say in
relation morality, but at the same time it obscures associations with other words in Kant’s German
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At first glance, these statements would seem to imply that a Kantian environmental ethic is a
dead end. If we only relied on these passages or these texts this might be the case, and the
traditional view would hold sway. The merit of the traditional view, besides locating Kant in his
intellectual context, is to home in on these problematic passages and underscore how they may
be serious impediments not only to a Kantian environmental ethic, but to any ethic concerned
with non-rational nature. Hence, we can make sense of why environmental ethicists often push
against Kantian anthropocentrism as a resource for environmental issues. Kant is not always
consistent; his views often are in tension,49 he commonly qualifies his statements,50 and he
sometimes changes his mind.51 A new plausible reading of Kant with regard to animals and the
environment must delve more deeply into Kant’s works, understand the contexts of these
passages, and be very careful about Kant’s technical language and argumentation in order to
square later modifications, qualifications, and changes with those in the above passages. This is
often the strategy of proponents of the new environmental interpretation of Kant, to whom I turn
next.

(Rayman 2012, 57), and also carries religious connotations that Kant had never intended. For more on
this, see Rayman, Kant on Sublimity and Morality (2012, 57-65).
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For instance, commentators have questioned the role of the power of imagination across the Critiques.

Some argue that Kant’s aesthetic account of the imagination in Critique of Judgment has a stronger role
for cognition itself. See David Bell, “The Art of Judgment” (1987) and Hannah Ginsborg, “Lawfulness
without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of Imagination and Understanding” (1997) for more on this.
Whether this is a problem is beside the point—what matters here is the acknowledgment that Kant may
not always be consistent, though he continually strives for systematicity.
The best example of such a qualification, for our purposes, might be seen by contrasting Kant’s
statements in Groundwork that non-rational beings are mere means (GW 4:428-429) and his statements in
Metaphysics of Morals about the moral requirements for being humane to animals, which includes not
making them do work that one would not consent to do oneself (MM 6:443).
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For one salient example of how Kant changes his mind, consider Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second
Thoughts on Race” (2007), where it is argued that Kant abandons his racist hierarchical views in the later
works such as Perpetual Peace and Metaphysics of Morals.
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CHAPTER 2
KANT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE NEW
Now that we have taken a look at how Kant is typically perceived (and attacked) on the
traditional interpretation with regard to non-rational nature, this chapter will consider how this
view has been challenged and revised. I set my sights on some influential alternative readings of
Kant—commentators who argue that Kant has more to offer with regard to animals and nature
than the traditional reading would have us believe. Though the new, green interpretation of Kant
is growing, I will limit my focus in Part 1 on four main but diverse proponents of this view. Part
2 of this chapter will wrap up my survey of literature on the new view of Kant by reframing the
traditional interpretation and the green one in terms of climate change, which will be one of the
focal points of this dissertation.
I shall begin by commenting on Christine Korsgaard’s constructivist interpretation of
Kantianism. She attempts to make Kant’s philosophy more amenable to animal ethics. Then, I
shall examine Allen Wood’s logocentric defense of a Kantian approach to valuing non-rational
nature and environmental systems. Wood’s modification of Kant’s practical philosophy includes
proto- and “fragmented” instantiations of rationality within the moral sphere. Next, I discuss
Toby Svoboda’s articulation of a Kantian environmental ethic. Svoboda’s defense relies on
Kant’s oft-neglected virtue-theoretic and teleological teachings. And finally, I look into an older
but, I claim, quite relevant paper by Holly Wilson on Kant and ecofeminism. Wilson attempts to
investigate Kant’s moral and ecological potential for environmental ethics from his naturalistic
writings in teleology and anthropology. Korsgaard and Wood’s accounts can be seen as
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modifications of Kant’s view (Kain 2010, 228), and Wilson and Svoboda’s accounts can be seen
as attempts at being exegetically faithful to the original texts in their defense. Discussions of
pseudo-Kantian approaches to environmental ethics, such as Paul Taylor’s biocentrism and Tom
Regan’s strong animal rights view, are largely reserved for later chapters in this dissertation. By
referring to them as “pseudo-Kantian” approaches, I mean that they only obliquely draw from
Kant’s philosophy rather than use it or build upon it in any systematic way, as do proponents of
the new, green reading of Kant. In other words, Regan and Taylor’s positions are merely
deontological and sometimes draw from Kant’s moral language, whereas the proponents
discussed in this chapter present themselves as genuine Kantian positions.
Part 1: The New, Environmental Interpretation of Kant
In the following sections, my strategy in characterizing the new wave of greening Kant is to
survey the four commentators’ positions, consider their strengths in making Kant conceptual
resource for environmental ethics, and appraise their possible shortcomings—especially with
regard to the limited purview of Kant’s works from which they draw and the more pressing
concern we face today, namely anthropogenic climate change. I aim to show that, despite the
pervasiveness of the traditional reading, a recent shift is happening in the literature. Reframing
this shift in the context of climate change, I claim, helps the reader to understand why the
traditional reading was plausible, why the new environmental reading is burgeoning, and why
the reframing in this dissertation is a helpful step in facilitating the greening of Kant.
Korsgaard’s Constructivist approach to Kantian Animal Ethics
In “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals” (2004), Korsgaard offers a
modification of Kant’s moral theory. She appeals “to an Aristotelian account of the final ends (or
natural good) of animals and insists upon the centrality of our animal nature to our practical
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identity” (Kain 2010, 231). In short, she argues that, on Kant’s view, value is conferred
(“legislated”) onto the world by autonomous agents, rather than it being a part of their essential
nature. On her reading, there is no value without a valuer. Humans just happen to be the sorts of
creatures that are capable of doing such valuing, given their autonomy (Kosgaard 2004, 95). By
virtue of their capacity to confer value onto other entities in the world, humans have intrinsic
value as ends in themselves. And, because of the way in which we rationally constrain each
other’s wills by our legislation of the moral law, humans are afforded moral rights and esteemed
as ends in themselves. Nonetheless, argues Korsgaard, value need not be limited to ends in
themselves.
Korsgaard begins by looking into the relevant similarities and differences between
humans and animals: Animals are, on her reading of Kant, just like humans to the extent that
they are
self-maintaining entities…capable of perception and voluntary motion. Animals maintain
themselves in part by forming representations or conceptions of their environment and
guiding themselves around in the environment in accordance with those representations
(Korsgaard 2004, 83).
The main distinction from humans is that animals navigate this cognitive framework by means of
instinct rather than deliberation according to principle. On her reading, then, animals are
intelligences, but they are not rational in the robust Kantian sense of the term since they cannot
reflect on and assess the grounds of their actions (Korsgaard 2004, 85-86). Despite not being
capable of normative self-governance, Korsgaard wonders whether being a source of value is
essential for beings to be valued (Korsgaard 2004, 87).
By considering so-called passive citizens (such as children and those who have not
attained “maturity”), Korsgaard objects to Kant’s claim that value is only to be afforded to those
who are sources of value. Because children are not fully rational, is it reasonable to suppose that
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our duties to them are only indirect duties owed to other rational agents (like their parents)?
Korsgaard rejects this traditional interpretation of Kant, instead opting for her own reading.
Because passive citizens are capable of being harmed and benefitted by virtue of their sensible,
animal nature, we as rational agents and conferrers of value can simply extend value and direct
moral consideration to them. As Korsgaard puts it,
The argument for the Formula of Humanity appeals to the fact that we take our choices to
confer value on their objects. In that sense, I have suggested, we take ourselves, and our
own interests and concerns, to matter, that is, to be the source of normative claims on
ourselves and other rational beings. But we do not take our interests and concerns to
matter only because they are the interests and concerns of an autonomous rational being.
The fact that I am autonomous enables me, and many other things equal, to legislate (to
myself and other people) against what I take to be bad for me. But it does not follow that
I legislate against it only because it is bad for an autonomous being. Think again about
the case of passive citizenship. Only an active citizen can help to vote for a law against
murder. But he need not vote for it merely because he considers the unwilling death of an
active citizen to be a bad thing. If the citizens of a state can vote certain protections for all
human beings, why couldn’t citizens of the human moral community, the Kingdom of
Ends, vote certain protections for all animal beings? For instance, one might suggest, we
demand that they not be tortured, injured, hunted, or eaten, not because of the assault on
our autonomous nature, but because of the assault on our animal nature; therefore we
should not treat our fellow animals in those ways. Autonomy puts us in a position to
make the demand, but is not the reason for the demand (Korsgaard 2004, 99-101).
Rather than placing the source of value in our animal nature (as someone like Singer would
do),52 Korsgaard’s constructivist argument—which relies on the fact that we, as autonomous
value-conferrers, place value upon our own animal nature—allows us to consider directly the
moral interests of analogously-constituted animal natures. To remain consistent in our valuing,
we should also value the animal nature of similar pre- or non-rational intelligences such as
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From a Kantian standpoint, the idea that our animal nature is a source of moral value would be
heteronomous. This is, I take it, one of the main complaints Kantians have against sentientist proponents
of animal ethics. It is not clear that Korsgaard escapes this complaint, as others in the literature have
noted. Wilson, for instance, warns: “We ought not to treat animal nature as an end-in-itself, as Christine
Korsgaard proposes, however, because animal nature is pursued by animals heteronomously,
pathologically, and reactively. To treat animal nature as an end-in-itself would mean having to cooperate
in the ends that animal nature pursues, and that would make our actions heteronomously motivated”
(Wilson 2008, 11-12).
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passive citizens, infants, and sentient animals. She appeals to a thought-experiment: consider that
you were robbed of your rationality (say, from a car accident) and were reduced to a mere animal
nature. Now, imagine reflecting upon your rationality-deficient self: you would not wish to be
treated as a mere means even in such a state (for instance, as a test-subject). By the same token,
we can reflect on other animal natures and consider that the valuing of our own sensuous side
could be extended to them.
Korsgaard’s position is attractive for a number of reasons, but the most relevant one for
our purposes is that it allows for a Kantian defense of duties regarding animals capable of
satisfying those who reject the brutalization argument (that is, that though the value of animals
depends on our valuing them, it need not be done for the sake of oneself or other humans, but
that animals can be valued by humans for their own sake). At the same time, Korsgaard’s
account avoids the perils of radical egalitarianism found in Regan’s strong rights position.53 On
Regan’s position, because humans and animals have equal intrinsic value, it becomes quite
different to handle ethical dilemmas involving conflict between the two. For Korsgaard’s
constructivist account, value is contingent on the valuers doing the valuing; her approach,
accordingly, leaves room for communities of valuers to decide for hierarchical principles in cases
where animal and human rights conflict. Of course, this position runs into a number of
difficulties, such as the seeming arbitrariness in constructivist positions regarding value. If Kant
is a constructivist, isn’t his position one which mirrors the voluntarism of Plato’s Euthyphro,
though with a secular flavor?54 Even though there is a difference between God as chooser and

For Regan’s pseudo-Kantian deontological position, any being that is an “experiencing subject of a
life” is afforded equal intrinsic value and, hence, absolute rights that parallel Kant’s with regard to ends in
themselves.
53
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A deeper worry, I take it, is that this approach makes Kant much closer to postmodern and historicist
approaches for which he is usually seen as their rational antidote.
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humanity as chooser, in either case one worry is the arbitrariness of that which is valued on a
voluntarist account. Korsgaard’s interpretation, as a form of “broadly voluntarist constructivism”
(James 2007, 324) might be thought susceptible to such worries. Moreover, the worry of
speciesism (as, on her account, humans are the only obvious rational valuers and the capacity to
value entities in the world is the source of normativity) is not readily dealt with on this account,
and perhaps could be exacerbated on this reading. This is because Korsgaard depends on human
valuation, human choice, and human commonality with animal nature to ground animal rights.
Since humans share similar sensible natures with many animals and, moreover, humans confer
value upon the world insofar as they are a source of value, the extent to which Korsgaard can
ground animal rights depends on the extent to which humans will in fact choose to value the
animal-nature in other animals similar to humans that they value in themselves. And, of course,
this valuing is quite contingent both in terms of cultural values and human-centered prejudices.
For example, some communities might not value animals at all, and others might only value the
cute and fuzzy ones or the ones that most closely resemble humans.
Korsgaard is aware of many of these difficulties. For instance, she addresses the
alternative Kantian view that intrinsic value is a feature of rational beings by virtue of what a
rational being essentially is. She worries that this approach to value from a Kantian perspective is
a metaphysical commitment that is unjustified (indeed, prohibited) by the critical teachings
(Korsgaard 2004, 101), since it would posit value as a real theoretical entity that transcends
possible experience. This reply, however, relies on the assumption that Kant is indeed a thorough
anti-metaphysician. This anti-metaphysical reading is itself contentious since though Kant does
reject traditional metaphysical ideas, he reinstates his own ones (e.g., in Prolegomena and
Metaphysical Foundations) and makes use of traditional metaphysical ideas such as immortality
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or God regulatively, for practical purposes. Notwithstanding the merits and potential problems
with Korsgaard’s approach, it is limited insofar as it is only capable of extending value to
discrete, sentient beings (since the similarity of our animal nature with non-human animals is key
to her argument).55 As Biasetti notes,
[F]rom Korsgaard’s Kantian direct duties to animals we can only build an animal ethics
focused on the needs and interests of individual animals. While her interpretation is
surely a step forward towards a more ‘green’ version of Kant’s philosophy, it does not
allow for annexing into the moral realm the multifaceted concept of the environment,
which includes both animate and inanimate entities, individuals and groups, static events
and processes (Biasetti 2015, 143).
This inadequacy for moral considerations regarding collectives seems to be an initial stumblingblock for thinking through the issue of climate change and the moral status of ecosystems. I help
resolve these limitations when I discuss Kant’s holistic pre-critical view of nature in the
following chapter. Is there a way to articulate a less contentious reading that can also consider
non-sentient or holistic entities such as flora, environments, and ecosystems? Allen Wood’s
approach may be just the sort of thing to meet such demands.
Wood’s Logocentric reading of Kantian Duties to Non-rational Nature
Allen Wood’s approach in “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature” (1998) is similar to
Korsgaard’s greener reading of Kant insofar as he also modifies Kant’s philosophy to meet the
demands of environmental ethicists who object to the traditional reading. Referring to Kant’s
philosophy as “logocentric” rather than “anthropocentric,” Wood makes the case that a much
greener reading of Kant is possible if his position is tweaked by abandoning what he calls the

Korsgaard’s constructivist strategy, in short, is to argue that “moral value arises when the natural good
is made the object of legislation” (Korsgaard 2004, 105). I leave the nuances of this argument unstated for
the sake of brevity, though it should at least be fairly obvious how Korsgaard modifies Kant’s account by
appealing to an Aristotelian variant on natural value. In addition, though Korsgaard defends that her
account aids in duties to animals, she only speculates in a lengthy footnote at the end of her paper on how
it might or might not be applied to non-sentients creatures such as plants (Korsgaard 2004, 106). This
suggests that she is aware of the difficulties and potential limitations of this account.
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“personification principle” embedded in the formulation of respect for persons. Pace antianthropocentrists and critics of the traditional reading, Wood thinks that Kant’s logocentric
account is adequate for addressing environmental concerns such as the status of non-rational
animals and ecosystems. On his reading, rational beings can be afforded respect and dignity as
ends in themselves not simply because they are moral persons, but rather because they are
particular instantiations of Reason in the abstract. According to Wood,
where Kant goes wrong regarding his theoretical defense of our duties regarding
nonrational nature is not in accepting his logocentric principle but in accepting what I
have called the personification principle. This principle says that rational nature is
respected only by respecting humanity in someone’s person, hence that every duty must
be understood as a duty to a person or persons (Wood 1998, 194).
Much in line with Singer, Regan, and Hoff, Wood worries that an indirect approach to
environmental duties may be inadequate or even “downright repugnant” (Wood 1998, 195).
Hence, Wood’s desire to modify Kant’s theory. Wood recognizes that a rejection of the
personification principle has some difficult consequences that would require a reworking of the
moral system of duties in Metaphysics of Morals, but he insists nonetheless that if we want to
secure a Kantian environmental ethic, we need to reject the idea that individuated personhood is
necessary for direct duties. In rejecting this claim, he does not think that personhood is irrelevant
for moral considerations:
Of course we should respect rational nature in persons, and this means respecting the
persons themselves. But my main argument here depends on saying that we should also
respect rational nature in the abstract, which entails respecting fragments of it or
necessary conditions of it, even where these are not found in fully rational beings or
persons (Wood 1998, 198).56
It might be plausible to ground a Kantian environmental ethic by merely looking toward Kant’s
universalization imperative to support environmental duties (i.e. to not do actions that undermine the
conditions for ecosystem services on which we rely in order to survive). In that case, Wood’s claim (that
we should consider morally the fragments of rationality in nature) is superfluous. I have two words of
caution for such an approach. First, such a blatantly anthropocentric position hardly justifies consideration
of flora and fauna except, possibly, for keystone species requisite for maintaining the services humanity
uses. Second, this sort of environmental ethic would hardly give us reason to consider preserving
56
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On Wood’s account, since the formulation of respect for persons requires us to respect
personality (i.e., Reason in the abstract), and personality is instantiated in nature as components
of (e.g. sentience) or necessary conditions (e.g. consciousness) for personality in the concrete (in
actual persons), then we have moral obligations to respect the value of rational nature even in
non-persons, which includes many flora and fauna. Not only does Wood’s alteration assist in the
difficult question of marginal case humans (e.g. children and those with mental deficits), but it
also can evade the charges of speciesism, since being an instantiation of Reason is key, not being
a member of the human species. In addition, Wood reasons,
Once we see that a reasonable interpretation of the principle of humanity as an end in
itself requires us to respect the value of rational nature even in human beings who are
literally nonpersons, it becomes less difficult to see that there might be an issue about
whether respect for rational nature limits our conduct in the case of nonhuman nature in
general (Wood 1998, 199).
Sentient beings like animals have what Wood calls the “infrastructure” of rationality, since Kant
believes that for humans, sensibility is a necessary component of our nature (Wood 1998, 201).57

environments in which humans do not or need not dwell. Wood’s account, by contrast, since it observes
that we have obligations to partial instantiations of rationality, gives us reasons to protect areas in which
humans have no intention to live.
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Some might object that sensibility is not a necessary component of rationality in general, since Kant
often makes reference to the intellectual nature of God as a non-sensible rational nature. We can also
imagine non-sentient AI as an instance of a rational, non-sensible being. Two things can be said against
this claim. First, when Kant discusses the non-discursive intellect of God in the Critique (e.g. how God
operates by means of intellectual intuition), he is not making theoretical claims but is rather using the
example of a purely non-sensible intellect as a contrast to our own nature, in order to bring out more
clearly how human cognition works. Second, if one focuses on Kant’s moral philosophy outside the
narrow scope of Groundwork, one will readily see how Kant sees sensibility and feeling as key elements
for the infrastructure of our capacities for autonomy. Animals have proto-autonomous capacities, and
these are the evolutionary “underpinnings of our rationality which we share with animals (Wood 1998,
201). Much akin to Taylor’s biocentric position, Wood’s would seem to entail that even evolutionarily
primordial entities such as amoebas are, in a very minimal sense, proto-instantiations of rational nature.
Unlike Taylor, who asserts that all living entities have equal and intrinsic moral value, Wood’s position
can override the worry of intractable moral dilemmas because he can argue that a fully-instantiated
rational nature’s essential needs override the interests of a minimally-instantiated rational nature. Still,
Wood’s position needs further development in order to show where the line can be drawn with regard to
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One of the particular advantages of Wood’s reading of Kant is that it can include more
environmental entities than Korsgaard’s, since the notion of proto- or “fragmented” rationality
can be found not just in sentient, well-developed animals, but in other aspects of nature for which
environmental ethicists are typically concerned, such as less neurologically-developed animals or
possibly flora.58 For example, plants—just like humans—are also goal-directed entities that
strive to flourish and survive. Though plants do not experience pain and pleasure like humans
and animals, plants “communicate” to each other by means of airborne signals to warn neighbors
of hostile intruders. Communication in plants has been shown to be stronger in close kin than
strangers, which is a capacity previously thought only found in complex social animals.59 In
addition, Wood thinks that Kant’s notion of a “harmonious teleological system” satisfies our
contemporary usage of the term “ecosystem”60 and that the responsibility we take in shaping our
environment so that it is capable of facilitating our own rational ends includes—when the
personification principle is abandoned—an injunction for us to act as “preservers and guarantors
of that system” rather than lords and masters over it (Wood 1998, 204). For if we operate in a
destructive, unsustainable way, not only do we thwart the ends of other rational humans, but we
also disrespect those entities in nature who are fragmented instantiations of rational nature in the
abstract. This very much echoes the stoic injunction to see nature as the embodiment and

what constitutes a proper, morally relevant instantiation of rationality, or else it would seem that
everything in nature would fit the bill.
Wood’s account can, I think, better grapple with Korsgaard’s apparent weakness noted astutely by
Biasetti in “From Beauty to Love: A Kantian Way to Environmental Moral Theory?” (Biasetti 2015,
143).
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For a recent summary of literature on how plants “talk” see Heil and Karban, “Explaining Evolution of
Plant Communication by Airborne Signals” (2010). For a discussion on plant kin communication and
how it mirrors animal behavior, see Karban et al., “Kin Recognition Affects Plant Communication and
Defense” (2013).
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In the subsequent chapter, I make the even stronger case that Kant’s early ontology is fundamentally
ecological from a theoretical perspective.
60
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instantiation of the logos, and for us to direct our own ends to be in accordance with the
flourishing and harmony of nature (and, unsurprisingly, it has been argued that Kant’s moral
philosophy owes a great debt to Roman stoicism).61 Wood’s approach is thus more advantageous
than Korsgaard’s account of duties to animals insofar as it is more broadly relevant for the
central challenge of the Anthropocene, namely to understand how we ought to act with regard to
climate change and how we need to shift our roles from lords over nature to environmental
stewards (Folke 2013). This is an implication of Kant’s approach that is largely underdeveloped
or implied in Wood’s essay that I develop and build upon in the course of this dissertation.
Wood’s approach has a number of strengths. First, like Korsgaard it remains Kantian in
its foundations, evading the standard problems of utilitarian and sentientist approaches (like
Singer’s animal welfare position) such as the concern that the ends justify the means. By the
same token, Wood’s approach allows us to avoid ethical dilemmas such as those that radical
egalitarians (like Regan’s strong rights position) are committed to, for individuated personality
can have more moral weight in dilemmas with our duties toward non-, proto-, or fragmented
instantiations of rationality. Second, it shows how Kantians can still be committed to Kant’s
view that we ought to respect rational nature while avoiding the charges of speciesism, since
humanity is not the sole instantiation of rationality in nature. Finally, it makes it more plausible
for us to consider our duties to non-humans and ecosystems, since these are instantiations or
“analogues” of rationality (Kain 2010, 228). Because Wood does away with the so-called
personification principle, he is able to argue from a Kantian standpoint that we have obligations
to respect the rational in nature, whether it appears fully in a person or in a proto-rational
organism, as in an evolutionarily similar animal or plant capable of feeling pain or
For a discussion of the importance of stoic thought in development of Kant’s moral philosophy, see
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism” (1997)
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communicating. In addition, ecosystems are the conditions for the flourishing of rational natures
and, moreover, they are analogues of such organisms by virtue of their capacity for selfregulation. If the analogy of ecosystems to rational organisms is too loose for defending direct
duties, at the very least the fact that such ecosystems are the material grounds for respecting
rational natures obliges us to ensure that these ecosystems are maintained, as indirect duties.
Despite these advantages, Wood’s approach runs into the difficulty of mucking up Kant’s
careful and systematic architectonic of duties in Metaphysics of Morals. Environmental ethicists
and some Kantians would probably have no problem with this, as many argue that the
enumeration of particular duties in that text (as well as Kant’s seemingly anomalous—when
contrasted with Groundwork—discussion of virtue) is problematic. Nonetheless, if it is believed
that the Metaphysics of Morals (and its taxonomy) is important for Kant’s moral and political
philosophy, Wood’s modification might need to be taken with a grain of salt. Is there an
approach to a Kantian environmental ethic that is more faithful to Kant’s texts, functioning not as
an appropriation or modification, but, rather, as a careful exegesis for the ends of environmental
ethics? Indeed, it has been argued that Kant’s virtue theoretic approach and account of indirect
duties is not only not “morally repugnant” but when carefully laid out, is both in line with our
moral intuitions and defensible as a solid foundation for an environmental ethic. This is where
we turn to next.
Svoboda’s Virtue-theoretic Kantian Environmental Ethic
If we do not follow Wood’s lead and abandon Kant’s personification principle (along with the
taxonomy of duties that Kant articulates in Metaphysics of Morals from it), would it be possible
to value non-human nature from a Kantian perspective? Toby Svoboda tries for precisely this
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route in his “Duties to Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic” (2012).62 Svoboda argues that it
is possible to establish a solid foundation for an environmental ethic from a Kantian standpoint if
Kant’s virtue-theoretic considerations and indirect duties in the Doctrine of Virtue are carefully
fleshed out. Not only does Kant’s notion of duties toward oneself evade Routley’s problem of the
“last man,”63 but they can—when conjoined with Kant’s view of teleological judgment—be used
to defend an environmental ethic that both proscribes cruelty to animals and destruction of flora,
and “prescribes kindness toward animals and aesthetic appreciation of flora as optional but
nonetheless effective ways to strengthen one’s virtuous dispositions and hence fulfill one’s duty
to increase her own moral perfection” (Svoboda 2012, 161). Unlike Wood and Korsgaard’s
accounts, Svoboda’s reading has the benefit of being scholarly tight as regards its legitimacy as a
Kantian approach, rather than being a modification or alteration to Kant’s views given the
pressure placed against the traditional reading.64 That is to say, Svoboda offers a reading of Kant
that shows how—if the limited confines of the Lectures on Ethics and Groundwork are
abandoned— Kant’s moral system can adequately grapple with the difficulties raised by animal
and environmental ethicists. An indirect account of duties to animals and nature such as Svoboda

Svoboda’s first attempt at defending a Kantian environmental virtue ethic is found in “Duties
Regarding Nature: A Kantian Approach to Environmental Ethics” (2012). This would later, in 2015, be
expanded into a full study including a discussion of the relevance of Kantian teleology for environmental
ethics, as well as its compatibility with Darwinian natural selection.
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The thought experiment of the “last man” is supposed to show how standard anthropocentric normative
theories cannot account for the moral intuition that non-rational nature has value independent of human
needs. Suppose, so the experiment goes, you were the last human in the world; all nature and manner of
creatures remain. Now, would it be morally wrong for you to kill these creatures or damage nature out of,
say, boredom? Since Kant’s account—as Svoboda develops it in greater detail—suggests that we have
duties to oneself that proscribe damaging beautiful nature and cruelty toward animals, it would still be
morally wrong to perform such acts—even if one were the “last man” on earth.
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Svoboda suggests that the fact that Wood and Korsgaard “are motivated by the belief that Kant’s own
position in the Doctrine of Virtue is incapable of grounding adequate moral concern for non-humans,”
shows why they think a modification to his theory is necessary to grapple with the objections raised by
animal and environmental ethicists (Svoboda 2012, 149-150).
64
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pursues is not, on his reading, an admission that Kant’s anthropocentrism is inadequate for an
environmental ethic. Instead is better capable at addressing the challenges of environmental
ethics than theories like biocentrism, which problematically extend intrinsic value to all beings.
Svoboda pursues his indirect virtue-theoretic approach to a Kantian environmental ethic
by first articulating the traditional reading of Kant regarding nature. His view of the traditional
reading is more specific than the one I pursue here (which concerns Kant’s relevance—whether
instrumental, indirect, or theoretical—for environmental issues and climate change in particular).
He homes in on the traditional reading’s emphasis on the problematic nature of the crueltythesis, which was previously discussed. In short, Kant is viewed as inadequate for animal and
environmental ethics by virtue of his empirically flimsy reading of how cruelty toward animals
tends to desensitize human beings to suffering regarding other humans (Svoboda 2012, 146-150).
This view is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the fact that Kant’s brutalization
argument makes the moral connection between cruelty and sensitivity to human suffering as
contingent, rather than necessary (Svoboda 2012, 147): “[s]ince a moral agent could be cruel to
animals while fulfilling all her direct duties to humans, there is nothing morally problematic with
animal cruelty itself” on the traditional reading (Svoboda 2015, 148). Second, there are passages
in Kant on the strict impermissibility of cruel treatments toward animals that suggest that Kant’s
proscription of inhumane actions is stronger than what the cruelty-thesis could justify. The
following lengthy quote encapsulates this inconsistency between Kant’s stronger proscriptions
regarding animals and the contingency of the cruelty-thesis:
“If a master turns out his ass or dog because it can no longer earn its keep, this always
shows a very small mind in the master” (LE, AA 27:460). This claim that such an action
“always” exhibits a small mind suggest that turning out one’s dog is morally problematic
even if doing so does not cause one to violate any direct duty to other human beings. In
later lectures, Kant claims, “Any action whereby we may torment animals, or let them
suffer distress, or otherwise treat them without love, is demeaning to ourselves” (LE
57

27:710). Kant’s description of such actions as “demeaning to ourselves” is instructive.
Although humans have only indirect duties regarding animals, this passage suggests that
humans have some direct duty to themselves that proscribes animal cruelty. The problem
with cruelty to animals is not simply that it has a tendency to make us cruel to humans—
rather, there is something morally problematic with such cruelty itself. Otherwise, it
would not be the case that “any” action of tormenting an animal would be “demeaning”
to oneself (Svoboda 2012, 151-152).
Svoboda follows Guyer in exploring Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue as a way of justifying these
stricter proscriptions. In short, Svoboda appeals to Kant’s account of the imperfect (or wide) duty
to increase one’s own moral perfection (Svoboda 2012, 153). He sees Kant’s duty of selfperfection as capable of justifying these stronger claims. This duty is not merely instrumental
but, in fact—from the standpoint of Kant’s account of virtue—requires one to strive for moral
perfection and avoid that which makes one morally worse (which is, of course, a regulative ideal
of reason to strive to “be perfect” MM 6:446):
Both cruelty to animals and wanton destruction of flora are morally problematic, but not
only because such actions make one more likely to fail in one’s duties to oneself and
other humans [e.g. as per the cruelty-thesis]. More importantly, such actions decrease
one’s moral perfection and thus are directly opposed to one’s duty to increase that moral
perfection. Actions that weaken one’s virtuous dispositions are morally proscribed
because they are incompatible with the maxim commanded by this direct duty to moral
perfection. On this interpretation of duties regarding non-humans, Kant’s position entails
that animal cruelty or wanton destruction of flora violates a direct duty one has to
oneself…[which is] much stronger than the traditional interpretation recognizes (Svoboda
2012, 161).
One obvious strength of this account for Kantians is that they may be satisfied with a stronger
and more defensible account of our duties to non-humans, as the cruelty thesis is indeed weak.
Environmental ethicists, however, may still find this reading problematic since it may be thought
that, because flora and fauna are only considered indirectly (because one’s moral perfection is
what is really at stake), then the actual welfare of those entities is irrelevant morally-speaking. In
his expanded study on Kantian duties regarding nature, Svoboda utilizes Kant’s regulative
account of teleological judgment to think through these sorts of problems. For instance, because
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flora and fauna, as organized beings, are viewed with teleological judgments as capable of being
harmed and benefited, we have reasons to value the flourishing and “natural goods” of such
beings, even for their own sake (Svoboda 2015, 107). By appealing to Kant’s regulative account
from Critique of Judgment, Svoboda can garner additional support for a Kantian account of
environmental duties regarding organisms while at the same time avoiding the metaphysical
entanglements encountered by views that attribute intrinsic value to organisms. In other words,
Svoboda appeals to Critique of Judgment to strengthen his case, yet avoids conflicts with
contemporary theories of natural selection, field ecology, and Kant’s critical teachings by the use
of regulative rather than constitutive judgment about the teleology of nature (Svoboda 2015,
113). I take Svoboda’s cue in Chapter 4 when I discuss Kant on aesthetic and teleological
judgment regarding flora, fauna, and climate change. Then in Chapter 5, I appeal to Svoboda’s
account of Kantian duties to oneself and place them in the context of sustainability and the
impending sixth mass extinction. This shows that, besides being defensible as an environmental
ethic, it also has valuable application today for the climate crisis. Since Svoboda draws from the
environmentally underexamined Metaphysics of Morals to make his case, I propose looking into
one final advocate of a green view of Kant: Holly L. Wilson also draws outside the usual texts
from Kant, namely from his anthropology. As Wilson shows, the greening of Kant requires not
only a defensible account of duties to non-humans, but also a reconsideration of Kant’s holistic
view of humanity.
Wilson’s Ecofeminist approach to Kantian Ecological Naturalism
Holly L. Wilson’s green approach to Kant in “Rethinking Kant from the Perspective of
Ecofeminism” (1997) is interesting for a number of reasons, but one that stands out in particular
is its freshness; her article appeared even before Wood and Korsgaard, and is perhaps even more
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radical since it argues for a Kantian naturalistic view compatible with ecofeminist environmental
ethics. Not only is a naturalistic reading of Kant contentious in the literature, but Kant’s sexist
views are well known; thus, Wilson is provocative to argue in the face of the traditional view that
Kant is not only a green resource, but that he also holds insights for thinking about the
connection between environmental exploitation and the domination of women in a progressive
way. Her naturalistic reading of Kant coincides with my later argument for an ecological Kantian
view of nature. Additionally, her use of Kant’s anthropological views sets the stage for my later
chapter on Kant’s view of humanity and sustainability.
First, Wilson highlights how ecofeminists take issue with “normative dualistic thinking,”
according to which the root of the domination of both nature and women can be found in the
hierarchical binaries etched into social consciousness (Wilson 1997, 377). In short, man has been
associated with reason, strength, goodness, and mind, whereas nature and women have been
associated with the “lower” contraries of inclination, passivity, sin, and body. These dualistic
tendencies in society preclude the cultivation of a kingdom of ends on earth, for “[d]ualistic
thinking separates human beings from the ecological community; a nondualistic thinking
requires that we view human nature as intrinsically connected to nature” (Wilson 1997, 378).
Contrary to most readings of Kant from the standard interpretation, Wilson argues in this paper
that “Kant explicitly connects women to nature in a positive sense: he uses the purposive view of
nature to understand human nature as belonging in regional areas, and he is not a normative
dualist” (Wilson 1997, 380). Wilson uses as her point of departure Kant’s Anthropology to
articulate Kant’s naturalistic view of women and Kant’s Critique of Judgment in order to sketch
his purposive view of nature in framing an ecofeminist approach. To connect these two texts,
Wilson argues that Kant’s regulative teleological judgment is the essential standpoint of
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Anthropology. By means of teleological judgment, Kant views nature as a systematic,
interconnected whole:
It is in this interconnected whole that Kant understands natural sexual and gender
difference. Women not only reproduce the human species, they also fear for the
preservation of the human species. This position does not appear to be inconsistent with
some positions in feminism… Now if women take as their primary end the preservation
of the human species, then they will also naturally care about the means necessary for
that preservation; as Kant argues with respect to the hypothetical imperative, it is
irrational to will the end, but not the necessary means to that end. Unlike other species,
Kant maintains, the human species has to be educated to its destiny; hence the necessary
means for the preservation of the human species includes education…[W]omen have a
greater natural tendency toward developing the refined qualities that make for
civilization, for civilization is directly contrary to the use of physical force and
disharmony (Wilson 1997, 382-384).
According to Wilson, humanity for Kant is embedded in nature, and men and women hold
complementary roles for facilitating the progress of the species. Education, it turns out, will be
one of the keys to securing a kingdom of ends according to Kant in Anthropology. Now, with
climate change, we can extend Kant’s insight about the importance of education for ensuring a
sustainable world in which we can flourish.65 On Kant’s view, suggests Wilson, women and
naturally feminine traits are more conducive to a cooperative and sustainable outlook than the
competitive and unsustainable tendencies of men and masculine traits, though both complement
each other in humanity’s striving for progress. An unbalanced, overemphasis on masculine traits
such as competition have, it could be argued, helped justify the view of nature qua limitless
resource rather than nature qua dwelling of concern. It is important to cultivate this civil balance
between the masculine and feminine traits in order to ensure reason can be realized to its fullest,
healthiest potential by means of education, enlightenment, and morality.

Kant appears less optimistic about the “bottom-up” potential of education for social evolution in Part 2,
Section 10 of the Conflict of the Faculties (7:92-93), favoring instead a strong political vanguard for
cultural progress. Despite Kant’s vacillation on the role of education for humanity’s progress between
Conflict and Anthropology, it is still clear that Kant maintains that education will play an important role
with regard to humanity’s moral determination.
65
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In Anthropology, though Kant makes a number of sexists statements suggesting that he
views women as inferior, Wilson shows how Kant thinks women and men differ in natural, albeit
equal, ways. The natural differences between men and women, she claims, complement each
other which—through the use of teleological judgment—allows us to see how humanity is a
naturalistic and collective species progressing toward moral perfection. Instead of viewing
women as inferior, as the standard normative dualisms maintain, “[w]omen propagate and
preserve the species and… naturally rule men through their more refined feelings… and their
shrewdness” (Wilson 1997, 381). Ecofeminism, contrary to many other postmodern flavors of
feminism, is not timid with regard to claims of essentialism with respect to sex and gender. Like
Nel Noddings’ Ethics of Care, the essentially feminine-associated traits of women are viewed by
ecofeminists as worth cultivating. For instance, feminine traits of care, empathy, and patience
are, claim ecofeminists, critical for fostering a sustainable, non-exploitative view of nature. Since
Kant naturally associates women with these views but does not demean them—instead viewing
masculine and feminine traits as complementary (akin to the Daoist yin-yang)—he can offer a
plausible ecofeminist approach, argues Wilson.
Wilson’s approach has a number of strengths, one of which is showing how alternative
texts in Kant need to be commissioned for the greening of Kant for animals and nature:
Much of the feminist criticism of Kant depends on establishing that Kant’s theory of the
rational subject is defective in a number of ways, but most primarily because the rational
subject is isolated and autonomous. This criticism can only stand if we continue to ignore
the enormous amount of literature Kant has on physical and pragmatic anthropology. In
these works, it is the whole human species that is central and the individual must orient
herself or himself from that perspective (Wilson 1997, 391).
We have a responsibility to other animals because we have feelings toward them, because
they can be harmed, and because they care for the preservation of their own young. 66 We
66

Feelings are an unsecure basis for morality for Kant, so I take Wilson here to be suggesting that they
nonetheless have an important indirect role to play in moral action. The ground of these feelings might be
mistaken (cf. Kant’s discussion of our mistaken view of direct duties to animals based on an “amphiboly
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have a responsibility to larger wholes, or ecosystems, because it is in these wholes that
human beings can develop into rational beings by reproducing themselves, preserving
themselves and their progeny, maintaining themselves safe from harm, having feelings
for each other, and relating to one another morally (Wilson 1997, 394-395).
With respect to sustainability, I find her statements here prescient. I aim to take her example in
the following chapters of this dissertation. In addition, she is very clear to present Kant’s nonmechanistic views about nature; they are not the standard ones found in the Critique of Pure
Reason, but are instead views of nature as interconnected and ecological; humanity is a natural
species unfolding along an evolutionary pathway. Rather than discrete, disconnected rational
beings, we are in fact embedded in nature in a significant sense for Kant.67 Because of this, we
need to care about nature, our place in it, and the prospects of our future generations. Finally,
Wilson hints at the relevance of Kant for sustainability, but leaves this largely undeveloped in
her early though provocative essay (Wilson 1997, 394). Regarding limitations, Wilson’s
approach is perhaps too Kantian or essentialist to be taken seriously in most feminist circles, but
is also perhaps too radical and provocative (at least, at the time she published this essay) to be
widely accepted in Kant scholarship. In this way, she offers prophetic insight for how the
greening of Kant can be taken up, but like most prophets, she comes long before her time.
Part 2: Reframing of the Green Shift in Kant Literature: Climate Change
At the end of Chapter 1, I examined Paul Guyer’s account of duties regarding nature as the first
step toward the new, green movement in Kantian ethics, followed in Part 2 by a survey of four of

in moral concepts of reflection” MM 6:442), but their connection to duties to oneself are secure (Svoboda
2012).
It might be objected that without individual rational agents, a moral theory makes little sense. Wilson’s
point in drawing out the species-specific, non-individualistic elements of Kant’s thought is not intended to
suggest we abandon the necessary features for ethics. Rather, her point is, I take it, to underscore how the
overemphasis on discrete moral agents (typical of Groundwork analyses) misses out on other important
aspects of Kant that might be helpful for our current predicament vis-à-vis environmentalism and
feminism.
67
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its most influential and innovative proponents. These proponents, as we have seen, have all
looked at the greening of Kant from different angles—whether this amounts to a slight
modification of Kant’s ethical theory, or with a closer examination of some of his texts that are
not considered on the traditional reading, such as Kant’s discussion of virtue or his views on
philosophical anthropology. In this dissertation, I align my own approach with these four
thinkers in varying ways. Laying this out should be helpful for the reader to make sense of the
chapters to come and how they build upon or contribute to the new environmental reading of
Kant. First, I align myself with Svoboda insofar as I think we need to shift our focus to different
aspects of Kant’s work, although I do not focus on virtue ethics; nonetheless, aspects of virtue
and a concern for humanity’s perfection and moral vocation will be discussed in Chapter 5; I
align myself with Wood insofar as I think the logocentric view of Kant—in which we read Kant
in terms of collectives instead of persons—is an important step for thinking about climate change
and ecological systems from a Kantian perspective. These are topics taken up in Chapter 3’s
discussion of the pre-critical ecological view of nature and Chapter 4’s discussion of climate
change, biodiversity loss, and reflective judgment; I align myself with Korsgaard, insofar as I
think that it can be both philosophically interesting and practically helpful to appropriate and
modify aspects of philosophers from the canon rather than merely remain at the level of
scholarly exegesis. Her constructivist approach for valuing ecosystems could be strengthened if
she would make further use of Kant’s teleological judgment, as I do in Chapter 4. Finally, I align
myself with Wilson insofar as I think that we should look into other avenues of Kant’s thought
for sustainability, in particular seeking out what can be appropriated philosophically from his
philosophy of history and anthropology, as I do in Chapter 5. Climate change will also be a way
in which I draw together my chapters that build upon the above readings.
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As we have seen, a likely reason for the neglect of Kant’s environmental potential can be
better understood if we consider the issues that were prominent during the 1970s and 1980s
when animal and environmental ethics were in their infancy. At this time, the main areas of
concern involved the moral status of animals, the aesthetic considerations surrounding the
preservation of “wild” nature, and issues surrounding pollution. Now, the second two could be
addressed by a Kantian by reference to his account of natural aesthetics and indirect duties
toward nature, respectively, but on the traditional reading, Kant’s view of animals is decidedly
lacking.68 In the ‘90s Kantians attempted to address this challenge, beginning with Korsgaard
and Wood as discussed above. At the same time, climate change was not yet a central concern in
environmental circles, and hence Kantians had little incentive to engage these issues. In the last
20 years, however, much has changed; most of the old environmental issues have been
superseded by the climate crisis.
As Ed Ayres puts it, climate change presents itself as a unique challenge because there
are four primary factors or “megaphenomena” that drive it. Accordingly, climate change can be
understood as one of the most pressing, major environmental tasks we face today; for instance, it
is one-sided to tackle pesticide pollution or attempt to preserve endangered species if we do not
at least pay attention to the underlying roots of environmental degradation and biodiversity loss
(Ayres 2000). Local issues in pollution and conservation are, of course, important ethical
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For instance, on the traditional reading a Kantian environmental aesthetics case could be made for
preserving wilderness, insofar as a lack of wild nature would be a lack of beautiful and sublime nature. A
lack of wilderness would then be a missed chance for the appreciation of nature, which is useful as moral
preparation for valuing something without interest. A Kantian on the traditional reading could also make
the case against excessive pollution, insofar as pollution near human communities could harm (and
thereby disrespect) ends in themselves. In addition, polluting nature undermines the aesthetic-moral
potential of aesthetic nature, discussed above. Both approaches are limited however. For example, on the
traditional reading, we would have no obvious reason to protect “ugly” wilderness or polluted nature
isolated from human societies.

65

considerations. However, in the age of the Anthropocene humanity needs, in addition, to develop
a broader, more holistic perspective. Climate change, now, needs to be a fundamental topic for
environmental ethics since it unifies the roots driving our ecological crisis.69 And not
surprisingly, as climate change has gained more traction as a pressing issue, Kantian
environmental accounts have been on the rise.70 We have Wood, Korsgaard, and Wilson to thank
for setting the foundation for the new green reading and showing how it is possible. But now
with climate change, both old and new readings of Kant vis-à-vis the environment can be
reframed in light of humanity’s plight in the age of the Anthropocene. This dissertation, then,
attempts to build upon and address the insights and challenges of proponents from the new
reading by looking at how a defense and application of a Kantian approach to environmental
ethics can address climate change, the stages of which I signpost below.
The Task for Greening Kant: Ontology, Aesthetics, and Anthropology
Thus far, we looked at the central features of the traditional reading of Kant’s philosophy. We
have seen how the traditional reading is pervasive in Kant scholarship, undergraduate ethics
approaches, and in animal and environmental ethics. Then, we then examined some of the newer
approaches that defend how Kant’s moral philosophy has more to offer for environmental
concerns than is usually supposed. It was argued that both readings have merit, but that the
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Climate ethics, as a distinct discipline under environmental ethics, is on the rise in the literature.

70

For some examples of Kantian approaches to climate change from various perspectives see Casey
Rentmeester, “A Kantian Look at Climate Change” (2010), Schönfeld, “The Kantian Blueprint of Climate
Control” (2008), Matthew C. Altman, “Kant’s Strategic Importance for Environmental Ethics” (2012),
Mads Greaker et. al., “A Kantian Approach to Sustainable Development Indicators for Climate Change”
(2013), Michael Thompson, “Climate, Imagination, Kant, and Situational Awareness” (2011), Patrick
Frierson, “Kant, Individual Responsibility, and Climate Change” (2014). Many (but not all) of these
approaches consider the relevance of Kant for climate change by way of the categorical imperative or
Kant’s political philosophy. My contribution will be to think about these issues from alternative
standpoints such as the pre-critical ontology of nature or the anthropological writings.
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tension between the two approaches is best resolved if we reframe the debate in terms of the
contemporary problem of climate change. We can understand why the environment was a nonissue for early proponents of the traditional reading, since climate change was not yet on the
radar. And with the increasingly more urgent sense of climate change’s relevance, greener
readings of Kant have become more prominent. Kantians certainly wish to be able to assist in
humanity’s existential plight. In the next three chapters, I aim to home in on the game-changer
that is climate change in order to show how the greening of Kant is not only possible, but can be
a welcome philosophical and ethical resource for our current challenges. Thus, I pursue a threepronged approach that converges on the question of climate change with regard to our moral
responsibility and relationship to nature, biodiversity and ecosystems, and current and future
generations. This approach begins with an exploration of Kant’s dynamic, pre-critical ontology,
where I argue that Kant offers an ecological picture of nature compatible with ecocentric
approaches in environmental ethics and conducive to moral framing for conservation and climate
change mitigation. Then, I look into Kant’s aesthetic and teleological resources for the crisis
from Critique of Judgment in order to show how Kant’s views on reflective judgment give us
good moral and aesthetic reasons to protect animals and ecosystems. Finally, I investigate the
often-neglected historical and anthropological works with an eye toward Kant’s holistic vision of
humanity and argue how this vision is relevant for the heroic tasks of transitioning to
sustainability, pursuing environmental virtues, and securing a green paradigm shift toward
ecological stewardship. All three areas are underexploited in the new Kant literature; therein, I
maintain, lies my contribution for securing the fate of the green Kant.
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CHAPTER 3
KANTIAN ECOLOGY: THE EARLY, DYNAMIC VIEW OF NATURE
In this chapter, I explore the pre-critical ontology of nature in order to show its environmental
significance. In particular, I examine Living Forces, Physical Monadology, New Elucidation and
Universal Natural History with an eye toward the ecological potential of Kant’s holistic vision of
nature.71 In these early naturalistic works, Kant views nature as an energetic and interconnected
network; there is but one world and all its components are dynamically connected through a
complex web of natural relations, according to which the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. I argue that these overlooked texts can provide an ecological view of nature compatible
with and complementary to approaches in environmental ethics such as ecocentrism, deep
ecology, and climate ethics by facilitating a systems-oriented view of the environment. In
addition, I claim that an adoption of Kant’s early ontology can be helpful for considering nature
in a moral sense through its framing potential, not unlike that of Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis.
When adopted today, this framing potential can aid humanity in protecting and conserving nature
in the face of climate change. I aim to show how this ecological view makes Kant out to be more
of an environmental ally than is usually thought. This is especially pressing, given that
contemporary opponents of Kant focus on isolated moral or epistemological texts such as
Groundwork or the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally and perhaps most provocatively, I maintain

In a footnote in Biasetti, “From Beauty to Love: A Kantian Way to Environmental Moral Theory?”
(2015) it is suggested that an ecological reading of Kant—following the path opened by Wood’s essay on
duties regarding non-rational nature and Kant’s teleology—would indeed be quite fruitful to pursue.
However, neither Biasetti nor Wood intimates how the pre-critical philosophy might play an important
role in the development of such as reading, as I defend here.
71
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that Kant’s dynamic ontology of nature is even more useful for environmental ethics than Arne
Naess’s appropriation of Spinoza’s pantheistic monism.
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 is exegetical: it is a presentation and
interpretation of Kant’s early texts. I provide the historical context of Kant’s early naturalistic
works. Then, I outline Living Forces, Physical Monadology, New Elucidation, and Universal
Natural History to show how Kant’s early ontology of nature is holistic, dynamic, and
naturalistic. Here, Kant presents a view of nature that is unified, interconnected, and energized
through dialectical forces (or entelechies) that undergird reality, engender physical bodies, and
produce the structure of space. Kant’s view outlined here will then be developed in Part 2 to
show how Kant’s ontology of nature foreshadows approaches in environmental philosophy such
as ecocentrism and deep ecology and is more useful as an environmental resource than Spinoza.
Part 2 is theoretical: it explains how Kant’s view of nature can be interpreted
ecologically. Furthermore, it underscores the cognitive tools Kantian holism can provide
humanity for confronting anthropogenic climate change. As a foil for developing my ecological
interpretation, I briefly highlight literature in environmental ethics regarding the theoretical
importance of holism. Then, I make the case that Kant’s early ontology of nature can indeed be
interpreted ecologically through its affinity with ecocentrism. I submit that it is both compatible
with and complementary to views espoused by Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott. Finally, I
suggest that Kant’s view can be valuable for climate ethics because of his emphasis on systemsthinking. If adopted, the Kantian ontology can help facilitate theoretical cognition of the earth as
a single world-system, which is necessary for the practical challenges of climate change. On my
interpretation, Kant turns out to be much greener than environmental ethicists usually concede,
even more-so than the deep ecological, romantic appropriation of Spinoza. I conclude Part 2 by
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anticipating an objection regarding the split between the pre-critical and the critical works,
especially apropos of Kant’s supposedly vicious anthropocentric individualism in the latter.
Part 3 is practical: it explains the heavy-lifting that can be done once humanity is
equipped with the pre-critical ecological view. I argue that this view of nature can be applied as a
moral framing device for convincing humanity to protect nature. By conceiving nature as a
single interconnected organism that evolves over time, humanity is better able to understand how
it is embedded in and a part of the earth-system. It has been argued that Gaian framing can be
useful for conservation, as in, for example, the deep ecological injunction to self-identification
with nature.72 Kant’s holistic ontology, I claim, is an intellectual foundation or predecessor of
deep ecology; thus understood, deep ecology can then be seen as not completely radical in
philosophy,73 since its founder’s philosophical hero, namely Spinoza, has much in common with
Kant’s early views of nature. And Kant’s early views, because they are dynamic, multipolar, and
emergent, are also more ecological than the monistic ontology of Spinoza. Since deep ecology
has been helpful in facilitating conservation efforts as a theoretical base for environmentalism,
the Kantian view will also be capable of aiding in such efforts.

For a discussion of deep ecology’s concept of “self-realization” (that humanity is as it were an organ in
the organism of nature as whole) and its connection to conservation, see Freya Mathews, “Conservation
and Self-Realization: A Deep Ecology Perspective” from The Deep Ecology Movement (1995).
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Deep ecology strives for a radical paradigm shift with regard to humanity’s relation with non-human
nature. Though deep ecology maintains that extreme change is necessary, Naess means “radical” not only
in the contemporary political sense but also, paradoxically, in the etymological sense of “rootedness”
(radix as “root”); to adhere to the deep ecological philosophy means, for Naess, to return to one’s
philosophical roots. Similarly, by radical here I mean ostensibly alien to academic philosophy, but
actually a root of it. This section will show how deep ecology can be understood as having a solid, albeit
undeveloped foundation in Spinoza and Kant. Thus, for example, when analytic philosophers dismiss
deep ecology as mystic hogwash, they are mistaken since the central theoretical tenets of deep ecology
can be seen as rooted in the early Kant and Spinoza with systematic and theoretically defensible
foundations. Though radical in their political aims, the deep ecologists have a firm foundation in the
history of philosophy and deserve recognition.
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Part 1: Kant’s Early Ontology of Nature and Natural Science
As my survey in Chapter 1 suggested, a limitation of both environmental ethics and Kant
scholarship is a general neglect of Kant’s early views. With regard to environmental ethics,
opponents of Kant one-sidedly highlight the anthropocentrism of the critical works without
attending to the dynamic, pantheistic, evolutionary, and holistic views of the pre-critical ones. If
these elements are carefully articulated, many can also be appreciated in the critical works as
well—especially the Critique of Judgment (a subject of the subsequent chapter). Although
lamentable, this emphasis on the critical works is hardly surprising. Even in Kant scholarship,
little work is done on Kant’s pre-critical thought, except perhaps for making sense of his
“mature” shift in the first Critique. When Kant scholars do engage with these works, it is often
from a historical perspective in the philosophy of science. It is, to be sure, interesting to
understand the development of Kant’s Leibnizian-Wolffian beginnings in relation to the
Newtonian provocation of his time.74 Focus on these areas is also understandable, since Kant’s
early work is very scientific in nature. Yet, there are very few attempts to apply the pre-critical
works to contemporary issues, especially ones in ethics. In this chapter I aim to investigate such
potential; Kant’s pre-critical holism indeed has contemporary environmental significance. In the
ensuing sections I highlight the elements of Kant’s ontology useful for forging a new alliance
with ecocentrism. But first, I lay out some historical background is in order to contextualize
Kant’s thought.

There is considerable scholarship on Kant’s indebtedness to the physics and metaphysics of Descartes,
Leibniz, and Newton. For respective examples, see Massimi and Bianchi, “Cartesian Echoes in Kant’s
Philosophy of Nature” (2012), Marius Stan, “Kant’s Third Law of Mechanics: the long shadow of
Leibniz” (2013), and Michael Friedman, Kant’s Construction of Nature (2013). For extensive studies on
the foundations of Kant’s natural philosophy, see Friedman’s Kant and the Exact Sciences (1992), Martin
Schönfeld’s The Philosophy of the Young Kant (2000), and Watkin’s Kant and the Metaphysics of
Causality (2005).
74

71

Natural philosophy has always been one of Kant’s concerns, even since his earliest
writings. It is thus strange how scholars often underplay it in discussing Kant’s philosophy.75
Any reading of Kant should not be read in complete isolation; though Kant’s pre-critical works
on natural philosophy are often quite different from the critical teachings, they should not be
ousted from the Kantian philosophy wholesale. For the greening of Kant in particular, I
recognize such divergences but nonetheless maintain that they should be seriously considered.
As early as 1746, Kant in Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces intended to ground
sciences on firm metaphysical foundations. In order to resolve the vis viva controversy,76 Kant
mediates between Descartes’ principles in natural philosophy and Leibniz’s monadological
metaphysics, showing how both sides are inadequate for their description of nature (Kuehn 2001,
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This has been the general tactic of most Anglophone readers of Kant. For instance, P. F. Strawson in his
influential Bounds of Sense (1966) overlooks many aspects Kant’s natural philosophy in order to isolate
and appropriate general elements from the Analytic for his conception of realism. Most likely, this
tendency is due to such readers’ intention to show how Kant’s philosophy is still relevant despite new
innovations in natural science with relativity and quantum theory.
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The vis viva controversy was an infamous debate between Leibnizians and Cartesians that has its
origins in 1686 with the publication of Leibniz’s Discours de metaphysique (Iltis 1971, 32). In Principia
philosophiae (1644) Descartes defends the principle of the conservation of the quantity of motion (now
called “momentum”) as mv (Iltis 1971, 21). Leibniz objects in a number of subsequent papers that the
quantity of motion that is conserved is not mv, but mv²—what he calls “living force” or vis viva (Iltis
1971, 22). Leibniz’s living force is proportional to what we now call kinetic energy, or work when
applied to distances (Schönfeld 2013, 686). By “dead pressure” Kant refers to the Cartesian quantity of
matter, and “living force” relates to the dynamic Leibnizian concept (Schönfeld 2013, 687). Kant’s aims
to resolve the debate by first, arguing against what he takes to be the mathematically erroneous and
question-begging status of Leibnizian-Wolffian moving forces, or vis motrix (Kuehn 2001, 90; Watkins
2005, 106); and second, arguing that the Cartesians are correct but only from a mathematical standpoint.
The work was received poorly if at all, since Kant—who in provincial Prussia was far away from the
intellectual fray in England, Paris, and Berlin—was unaware of how Roger Boscovich and Jean
d’Alembert would articulate how both sides (vis viva and momentum) were right (Iltis 1971, 21). The
delayed publication did not help Kant’s case, as the issue was settled by the time he finally submitted it
for publication (Kuehn 2001, 94); both Leibniz’s and Descartes’ notions of force were later determined to
approximate different aspects of force later expounded by Newton in Principia Mathematica (Schönfeld
2000, 34). For a succinct discussion of the argumentative strategies of the controversy, as well as its
historical context in the Leibnizian tradition to which Kant would be more familiar, see Daniel Garber’s
“Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy” (1995) and Carolyn Iltis’ “Leibniz and the Vis Viva Controversy”
(1971).
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90-91). He finds the geometric method of the Cartesians convincing yet wants to preserve the
dynamic metaphysical foundations of Leibniz and Wolff. Kant’s strategy for mediating their
views is to acknowledge the logical validity of the mathematical sphere in Descartes, but to
argue that radicalized metaphysical principles are needed for dynamics (Schönfeld in Natural
Science 2012, 685). This foreshadows Kant’s later claims that the methods of philosophy and
metaphysics are distinct from those of mathematics in Critique of Pure Reason.77 The Cartesians
are correct with regard to the apodictic certainty of mathematics but wrong insofar as they
attempt to apply it beyond its proper scope, relying on dead or static forces to explain a dynamic
reality. Further, the Leibnizians are right to invoke forces or entelechies as the internal principles
that engender and structure reality (LF 1:17:16-23), but they are wrong insofar as they posit
moving forces to do so, which Kant believes fails to explain the phenomena, just as the “heating
force” of the Scholastics fails to explain the process of heat (Watkins 2005, 104). Kant amends
the Leibnizian-Wolffian view by appealing to living forces rather than moving ones (LF 1:18). In
short, he argues that both camps are correct and incorrect, depending on the perspective from
which they are viewed. Kant’s contribution in Living Forces is his positing of dynamic forces for
a novel physical influx causal theory in which there is real (not ideal) interaction between bodies
(LF 1:21:3-8).
In 1755 Kant publishes another large treatise: Universal Natural History and Theory of
the Heavens. In this text, Kant departs from the Cartesian-Leibnizian debate and draws from
Newtonian principles of attraction and repulsion in order to argue about the natural origins,
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E.g., see CPR A723/B751-A738/B766 for the methodological distinction between philosophical and
mathematical cognition.

73

evolution, and structure of the cosmos (UNH 1:226).78 Kant, as Martin Schönfeld puts it,
paradoxically allies himself “to the Newtonian model of physical nature and to the Leibnizian
doctrine of the best of all possible worlds” (Schönfeld 2000, 107). In Universal Natural History,
Kant uses Newtonian principles to explain the emergence of the cosmos from a dynamic
interaction of forces and bodies (UNH 1:230). Given initial chaos, a self-forming process of
swirling vortices leads to a systematically structured cosmos (UNH 1:264). Kant’s cosmos
appears akin to Leibniz’s best of all possible worlds since it is harmonious, law-like, and
beautiful (e.g. UNH 1:255). However, unlike Leibniz, Kant adheres to a holistic view of nature
as a self-regulating system in which substances dynamically interact; because of his
monadological idealism, Leibniz is forced to posit two static and metaphysically separate worlds
of minds and bodies or final causes and efficient causes. For Kant, “[t]he immanent cosmogony
of the Universal Natural History was an implicit repudiation of Leibniz’s separation” (Schönfeld
2000, 108). Not only does Kant take issue with Leibniz’s dualistic schism of nature, but more
startlingly suggests as an alternative his view of nature as an interactive nexus of dynamic
relations—a veritable ecology of nature.
Besides Living Forces (which utilizes metaphysical principles) and Universal Natural
History (which defends an empiricist approach to cosmogony by appealing to principles of
attraction and repulsion), Kant publishes the shorter treatise, New Elucidation. In this work, Kant
is concerned with the metaphysical foundations of his early views of dynamics and natural
philosophy. Kant attempts to, among other things, deduce the principle of sufficient reason and
various corollaries to uphold a metaphysics of natural science (focusing on succession and

The seeds of the “Kant-Laplace nebular hypothesis”—a scientific explanation for the origin of spiral
galaxies, is found in this text (Schönfeld 2000, 114-115).
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coexistence). Instead of defending a single basic metaphysical principle, Kant accomplishes this
by arguing that the building block of reality is a two-fold, dialectical principle (that of identity
and negation). Reality is dynamically constructed out of binaries, much like the attractive and
repulsive forces in Universal Natural History. Formally speaking, New Elucidation is a work in
the scholastic, Wolffian tradition, developing conclusions and scholia from a priori premises.
This method was commonplace at this time. What is uncommon, however, is the content of the
text as well as Kant’s evolving relationship to Newton.79 Still concerned with grounding natural
science and the physical views espoused in Living Forces, Kant defends an early compatibilist
view of freedom and solution to the mind-body problem. At this time Kant was still under the
spell of Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism, though he attempted to find middle ground between
Leibniz, Descartes, and Newton in the course of his development of a novel version of the
physical influx metaphysical theory of causality (Watkins 2014).80
In 1756 Kant publishes Physical Monadology. Kant is seeking a middle path between the
exact geometrical science of Newtonianism on the one hand and Leibnizian metaphysics, on the

Kant’s relationship with Newtonianism is a peculiar one, and seeing how Kant develops and orients his
thought in accordance with the importance he places on Newtonianism is key for making sense of his
later works in natural philosophy in the critical period. In short, with Living Forces, Kant is ambivalent
toward Newton; he tries to navigate between Cartesianism and Leibnizianism with regard to dynamics
and kinetics in the vis viva debate, and Newton is mentioned only a few times. This suggests that Kant
was not very familiar with Newton at this point (and in Berlin, Kant’s work was received poorly, if at all,
because the debate he wanted to mediate had already been resolved with Newton’s Principia). Then, with
Universal Natural History, Kant begins to pay lip service to Newton when he discusses attractive and
repulsive forces, but these qualitative forces are more a continuous development of the ones in Living
Forces and New Elucidation (Watkins 2003, 23) than the mathematized ones of the Principia. Finally
with the Metaphysical Foundations of 1786 Kant, having made the full regulative conversion to
Newtonianism, seeks to provide a justification of the concepts and definitions used in Principia in order
to show how they correspond with the a priori categories of Critique of Pure Reason.
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From Watkins, “Kant’s Philosophy of Science” (2014) from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-science/. Date accessed: 22 October 2018.
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other hand (in this case, Kant wishes to uphold the simplicity of monads). He does this by
arguing that physical monads are dynamic fields of force. According to Watkins,
simple substances fill space not by means of mere existence, but rather in virtue of their
spheres of activity. As a result, any division of the relevant spheres of activity does not
compromise the simplicity of the substances themselves, since the spatial properties of
substances (including the infinite divisibility of space) arise from the interaction between
their activities rather than from their intrinsic features (Watkins 2014).
More interestingly, this resolution leads Kant to argue for specifically Newtonian principles of
force. We witness here—twenty years before Metaphysical Foundations—Kant intentionally
arguing for and utilizing Newtonian principles in order to avoid the dogmatism of both sides, a
tactic he makes famous in the Critique. This continuity of Kant’s Newtonianism is important for
understanding how Kant’s holistic views of nature, despite their ontological status in the early
works, pervade the critical works. Though Kant will later make the distinction between
phenomenal and intelligible worlds, he still tacitly maintains a holistic, single-world view of
reality. This is, of course, most apparent in his intention to unify the realms of nature and
freedom in Critique of Judgment (CJ 5:176-177). This concludes the general contextual
background of Kant’s early works on natural philosophy and his intellectual motivations. In the
next three sections of Part 1, I highlight the ecological principles that underlie Kant’s early
ontology of nature: Living Forces presents a dynamic view of reality; Physical Monadology and
New Elucidation present a naturalistic and anti-dualistic view of the interface between mental
and physical nature; and Universal Natural History provides perhaps the best glimpse into the
emergent holism of Kant’s early view of nature.
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Living Forces and a Dynamic Nature
In Living Forces, Kant attempts to resolve the vis viva debate through the appropriation and
development of his own unique metaphysical principles.81 Kant claims that the foundation of all
motion results from the process of active forces82 (LF 1:19:2-4). “It was believed,” claims Kant
in the opening of Living Forces, “that Aristotle’s obscure entelechy is the secret of the action of
bodies…Leibniz, to whom human reason owes so much, was the first to teach that an essential
force inheres in a body and belongs to it even prior to extension” (LF 1:17). Kant likens his
living forces to the entelechies of Leibniz.83
The notion of an entelechy is often shrouded in obscurity. Thus, a brief digression on its
etymological, metaphysical, and environmental meaning will be helpful for seeing how Kant’s
pre-critical ontology is ecological in the wider sense. An entelechy is, in the most general sense,
that which is actual or energetic as opposed to potential and material. According to the Oxford

For the purposes of illuminating Kant’s early ontology and its relevance for environmental holism, I
will focus solely on Chapter 1 of Living Forces. This is because it is here that Kant presents his
metaphysical concepts (which are later expanded on and developed in the other pre-critical works like
Universal Natural History and Physical Monadology). Chapter 2 of Living Forces is an abstruse critique
of the dynamics of the Cartesians and other contemporaries of Kant, and the final chapter is Kant’s
dialectical synthesis of the Cartesian and Leibnizian sides of the vis viva debate (Schönfeld 2000, 54).
Though of historical significance, these chapters need not be emphasized here, as they are rather the
(failed) application of Kant’s dynamic metaphysical principles in Chapter 1 of Living Forces. For a more
detailed discussion of the argument of this work, see Watkin, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality
(2005) and Schönfeld, The Philosophy of the Young Kant (2000).
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wirkenden Kraft.
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In the history of ideas, Aristotle was the first to make use of the concept of entelechy in his
Metaphysics, where he utilizes it as the principle which makes potentiality into activity (and is associated
with energeia, or the putting of work into action through force), or making matter enformed (Cohen 2016,
“Aristotle’s Metaphysics” from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/. Date accessed: 22 October 2018). Later, it was
taken over and put to prime use by Leibniz in his Specimum Dynamicum and New System of Nature as an
explanatory principle for the unity and vitality of animal substance or monad. Kant is indebted to Leibniz
here, but he adds a dynamic twist to the old principle. Finally, a connection can readily be made between
Hobbes and Spinoza’s use of conatus (or “endeavor”) as the self-directing principle of desire in
organisms and the tendency-to-action in matter. This connection might be helpful to keep in mind when I
later discuss the connection between Kant and Spinoza.
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Dictionary of Philosophy, the term entelechy in Aristotle means “the realization of the potential
of a thing, or the mode of being whose essence is fully realized, as opposed to being merely
potential (Blackburn 2016).84 Etymologically, ἐντελέχεια can be broken into three parts: ἐν
meaning “in”; τέλος meaing “goal”; and έχειν meaning “to have.” Conceptually, this means that
an entelechy is a self-goal-directedness; or, a being whose goal is contained within itself by its
very nature. Metaphysically, the word “being” is misleading. By virtue of its goal-directedness
entelechies are, strictly speaking, a dynamic processes or activities; becoming rather than being.
Kant conceives of entelechies as self-regulating, self-realizing powers or drives at the heart of
nature. Organisms, ecosystems, and planetary-systems are all instantiations of the primitive
concept of entelechy understood as a goal-directed system.85 The cosmos, for Kant, is itself a
system. It is the emergent result of processes that are the dialectical basis of reality. Now, a selfregulating, interconnected dynamic system is the most basic sense of ecology. As Arne Naess
puts it, “intimate interconnectedness in the sense of internal rather than external relations
characterizes ecological ontology” (Naess 1977, 46). The first provocative sentences of Kant’s
Living Forces show how the pre-critical ontology of nature is indeed relevant to the
environmental ethicist. Ethicists will be interested to see how Kant conceives of nature in
fundamentally different ways from previous views in the early modern period. On Kant’s view,
nature isn’t a mechanical aggregate of objects, hanging together through the sheer will of God;
rather, nature is an interconnected network of active, self-directed internal powers unfolding in
accordance with its own conative purpose. These powers evolve through time, yielding the
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The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2016), cited from
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198735304.001.0001/acref-9780198735304-e1088?rskey=QChXVo&result=1. Date accessed: 28 September 2018.
As we will see later, the similarities of entelechies conceived as goal-directed systems to Paul Taylor’s
biocentric approach to environmental ethics are striking.
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diverse, complex, and beautiful network of nature. Ecology, in the most basic philosophical
sense of the term, refers to reality insofar as it constitutes interconnected systems. In short, an
ecological vision of nature is essentially network-oriented. Such is the ecological vision of nature
in Kant’s Living Forces to Universal Natural History that I will sketch, and the reason why
environmental thinkers need to reconsider the value of Kant’s philosophy as a potential
theoretical resource.
In Living Forces Kant does not rely on God to unify and harmonize the realm of monads
with the realm of physical nature (as Leibniz does). Rather than positing two separate realms—a
dualism between ideal and mechanical nature—Kant argues for a multipolar single-world view
of reality. Kant intends to discover the physical corollaries of the holistic view of nature built
upon dynamic, organic forces: “Since all connection and relation of separately existing
substances is due to the reciprocal actions that forces exert on each other, let us see what sorts of
truths can be derived from this concept of force [Kraft]” (LF 1:21). And in rejecting preestablished harmony, Kant defends an alternative theory of physical influx, similar to those of
Knutzen, Baumgarten, and others (Watkins 2005, 50). On this view, physical motion is explained
in terms of active (pre-physical) forces or powers (LF 1:21:3-8). For Kant’s pre-critical ontology,
“reality consists of non-spatial, non-temporal, unextended simple substances; space, time, and
motion are phenomena derivative from this underlying monadic realm” (Friedman 1992, 5).
Living forces are the dynamic or processual substratum through which space and bodies form.
As Schönfeld puts it in Natural Science, “space is a relational field generated by dynamic action”
(Schönfeld 2012, 692). Newtonian universal gravitation is a corollary of the activity within the
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field of entelechies (LF 1:24:19-26),86 and space is generated through the interaction of force,
weaving the network of reality. In short, in Living Forces all of nature’s substances are
connected dynamically and holistically because they are located in a spatio-temporal network of
forces: “the world is an actually composite entity, and so a substance connected with no thing in
the entire world will not belong to the world at all” (LF 1:22).87 Though other worlds are
logically possible, admits Kant, our world is a single, interactive network spun from the web of
primitive forces.
In addition, Living Forces presents the rudiments of a compatibilist view of human
freedom.88 I maintain that examining Kant’s compatibilist foundations in Living Forces and in
New Elucidation provides further evidence that Kant’s early view is holistic and naturalistic.
Through physical influx and a single-world ontology of dynamic interaction, Kant is able to
explain how bodies and minds interact. This explanation will, in New Elucidation, be used to
show the compatibility of freedom and nature without positing distinct metaphysical worlds.
Kant’s solution relies on the relational notion of location: as was noted, forces generate the
spatial network in which bodies interact. This interaction, of course, must take place in a

As scholars like Watkins, Friedman, and Schönfeld have noted, Kant’s understanding of Newtonian
mechanics is at this time sketchy at best. In Physical Monadology and Universal Natural History Kant
appeals to attractive and repulsive forces that are more explicitly in the Newtonian fashion, though it
would probably not be until Metaphysical Foundations that Kant would engage with Newton’s Principia
in attempting to show how his transcendental philosophy provides empirical instantiations and
metaphysical justifications of its principles (Friedman 2013, 15-17).
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die Welt aber ein wie eine Welt wirklich zusammen gesetztes Wesen ist, so wird eine Substanz, existiren
die mit keinem Dinge in der ganzen Welt verbunden könne ist, auch zu der Welt gar nicht gehören, es sei
denn etwa in Gedanken.
See Jeremy Byrd, “Kant’s Compatibilism in the New Elucidation of the First Principles of
Metaphysical Cognition” (2008) for an analysis of the argument that suggests how Kant’s early view of
freedom differs from both Leibniz and the critical Kant.
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determinate location.89 For a mental entity to interact with nature, it “must be able to act
externally by reason of the fact that it is in a location” (LF 1:20-21). Kant continues:
It is just as easy to grasp the nature of the paradoxical proposition concerning how it is
possible that matter, which one fancies can cause only motions, impresses certain
representations on the soul. For matter that has been set in motion acts on everything
that is spatially connected with it, and hence also on the soul; that is, it changes the
internal state of the soul insofar as this state is related to what is external to it. Now
the entire internal state of the soul is nothing other than the summation of all its
representations and concepts insofar as this internal state is related to what is external to
it, it goes by the name of status repraesentativus universi; thus, by means of the force that
it has while in motion, matter changes the state of the soul through which the soul
represents the world. In this way, we can understand how matter can impress
representations on the soul (LF 1:21, boldface emphasis mine).
Kant’s early holistic ontology avoids the determinism of early modern mechanism and the
anthropocentric hubris of Descartes by overcoming his dualisms. Matter doesn’t fatalistically
determine the soul; rather, the reciprocal motions of matter modify the soul’s interface (or
“window” to use Leibniz’s term in Monadology) with the world, as it were opening the windows
through which the soul sees and engages with reality. On this reading, then, Kant presents a
holistic view of the interaction between minds and the world, conceived in terms of primitive
forces. Minds and bodies do not inhabit metaphysically distinct locations in reality (as in both
Descartes and Leibniz); rather, the mind has an interface with the whole through its external
mode of representation and the location it finds itself in constrains the sorts of perceptions (and
self-determinations) that are possible for it. Kant is thus able to explain the interaction between
minds and bodies (and compatibility of freedom) with an interconnected world of efficient
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For Kant, even an immaterial soul must occupy a location by virtue of its external representational
capacity. This shows how Kant’s early ontology is metaphysically distinct from Descartes, who doesn’t
think minds occupy a place, since they are un-extended (cf. Discours de la Méthode Part 4). At best,
Descartes vaguely alludes to the “intermingling” of the mind with the body, but is unable to adequately
explain this possibility given the sharp metaphysical separation between mental and physical worlds that
he posits. For Kant, this is easier since mind and bodies are both ultimately conceived in terms of living
forces.
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causes without pre-established harmony, although both Kant and Leibniz make use of dynamic
inner principles, or entelechies, as the ontological substratum of nature. As Watkins puts it,
“Kant holds that characterizing force more abstractly as active rather than in terms of motion
solves the [mind-body] problem because it shows how to understand force in such a way that
there is no heterogeneity between the mind and the body at the relevant level” (Watkins 2005,
107). The environmental significance of Kant’s rejection of the heterogeneity between mind and
body—or, that is, Kant’s anti-Cartesian, anti-dualistic metaphysical framework—should not be
downplayed for the greening of Kant. In this early text alone, Kant can be viewed as an ally for
animal and environmental ethics. For thinking and extension are part of the same immanent
reality. Thinking beings like humans are not superior to animals for belonging to a higher
intellectual or divine reality. Rather, the immanent metaphysics of the pre-critical ontology
suggests a continuum view of organic beings. With regard to its evolutionary views on souls,
animals, and consciousness, the pre-critical ontology of nature can be seen as a theoretical
paragon for animal and environmental ethics.90 This strand of thought will be developed further
in Part 3.
Physical Monadology and New Elucidation: Freedom and the Dialectics of Nature
In New Elucidation and Physical Monadology, Kant supplies the rationalist principles and
physical entailments, respectively, required for and implied by his early dynamic ontology of

In “Rethinking Kant from the Perspective of Ecofeminism,” Holly L. Wilson argues that Kant’s
philosophy—drawing from the Critique of Teleological Judgment—can be utilized to sketch a Kantian
ecological view of nature (Wilson 1997, 385-386). However, she does not draw from the pre-critical
works, which I maintain are even better resources for making Kant out to be an ecological ally. It is also
relevant to note that Wilson highlights the anti-Cartesian aspects of Kant’s thought, citing for example his
dismissal of the Cartesian view that animals are mere machines (Wilson 1997, 387-388; CJ 5:464n).
Patrick Kain also highlights Kant’s anti-Cartesian stance in “Duties Regarding Animals”: “Kant insisted
that animals are not ‘mere machines,’ but have souls with a vis locomotive, because the mental
representations that guide their behavior cannot be realized in matter ([CJ] 5:457, 464n)” (Kain 2010,
215).
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forces. The ontology in Living Forces thus can be seen in more naturalistic terms by examining
Kant’s integration of freedom into his early holistic system of nature in New Elucidation and
Physical Monadology. Accordingly, sketching these two works is the aim of the following
section. In Physical Monadology, one of Kant’s tasks is to show how simple monads—
presumably, the entelechies, souls, or forces at the basis of his ontology, since “all
bodies…consist of absolutely simple fundamental parts, that is to say, monads” (PM 1:477:1617)—are compatible with the mathematical foundations of Newtonian physics. The problem lies
in their simplicity: if monads are simple, they cannot be divided. However, on the Newtonian
model of reality which Kant sought to defend, anything located in space must be liable to the
infinite divisibility of space, the plurality of which seems to contradict the simplicity of monads
(PM 1:480:4-13). Since monads actively preside in space by means of their perspectival interface
with other substances (PM 1:480:36-39; LF 1:21:18-25), they would also seem to be subject to
the infinite divisibility of space, thereby contradicting their simple nature (PM 1:477:5-7). Kant
wants it both ways: to preserve the plausibility of the Newtonian model (for its explanatory
power) while simultaneously upholding the importance of monadic simplicity (for maintaining
the primacy of living forces in nature). His solution in Physical Monadology involves the
postulation that both views are right: monads can be simple and yet space can be infinitely
divisible. The solution relies on Kant’s earlier dynamic or processual view of reality. Monads
aren’t merely static, un-extended points on an ideal plane. Rather, they are dynamic points that
fill out space through the sphere of their activity91 (PM 1:481:36-39). The monad properly
speaking is the center of this sphere, and hence is a simple energy point, while its field of activity
remains subject to the infinite divisibility of matter. Since the physical monad’s sphere of
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sphera activitatis.
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activity precludes the presence of other monads at the same location, Kant is able to preserve the
individuation of each monad through its external denominations: “The monad does not determine
the little space of its presence by the plurality of its substantial parts, but by the sphere of its
activity, by means of which it hinders the things which are external to it” (PM 1:480). Kant then
maintains that a dialectic of attractive and repulsive forces generates a stable and systematic
structure of nature. This dialectic is clearly a development from the earlier Living Forces. On
Kant’s early ontology, the fabric of reality can be likened to an elastic ether; this “primitively
elastic” medium is dynamic (PM 1:487:6-19), as Kant uses “elastic” in its Greek sense, viz., a
dynamic compression: “to drive, push out.” Not only is this ontology of forces key to solving the
classic philosophical problem, but it also shows how monads occupy the same realm as the rest
of nature. In short, physical monads are naturalistic, not otherworldly. They are the immanent
components of a holistic vision of reality. And since they are individuated, they leave space for
freedom of the will.
A key insight of New Elucidation is Kant’s use of a complex principle as the building
block of reality. In the pre-critical philosophy, Kant argues that reality must be understood
fundamentally as the constitution of two principles: the principle of identity and the principle of
contradiction (ND 1:389). This dual metaphysical foundation reveals Kant’s early philosophy as
multipolar and dialectical.92 Much like in Living Forces, where Kant sees the structure of nature
as a result of the dialectical interaction between entelechies striving for equilibrium in their
generation of space; and in Physical Monadology, where attractive (positive) and repulsive
(negative) forces generate the sphere of activity of the monads that constitute the primitive
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It would be interesting to investigate the extent to which Engels was influenced by Kant in his
dialectical materialism, where he goes beyond the merely human-historical claims of Marx and argues
that nature itself is the evolutionary result of a dialectical binary at the basis of nature.
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substance of reality; so also in New Elucidation Kant claims that a binary and dynamic
metaphysical ground lies at the ontological basis of nature. Unlike standard views in theology
where being is conceived as ontologically positive,93 Kant’s view of being is the interactive
synthesis of identity and negation, attraction and repulsion, good and evil: on Kant’s early
ontology of nature, then, being is processual: it is becoming at its core.
One of the issues that New Elucidation addresses is the mind-body problem and the
associated problem of human freedom. Can freedom be understood as compatible with such an
“interlinked, interconnected and interwoven”94 view of reality, understood as a dynamic nexus of
relations (ND 1:404:1-3)? If everything, including our perceptions and representations, is subject
to the reciprocal interaction of bodies according to laws of attraction and repulsion, how is
freedom possible? Kant’s solution to this problem is very similar to the Leibnizian resolution to
the puzzle of freedom, although Kant rejects pre-established harmony. In the middle of Section 2
of New Elucidation (ND 1:401-405), Kant presents a short dialogue in which he argues that not
only is his view of freedom compatible with the holistic ontology of nature presented above, but
also that the opposing problem of determinism and radical freedom (“indifference of
equilibrium” presented by the interlocutor Caius), is incoherent. 95
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Though Kant appeals to God as the sustainer of the two principles (ND 1:395-396), the fact that a dual
principle grounds reality seems suspiciously heretical, as being rather than becoming is primitive. From
an eastern philosophical perspective, this makes Kant’s early metaphysical foundations appear closer to
Daoism than orthodox Christianity.
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quä stabili rationum conserte contexteqü colligatarum nexu.
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Schönfeld suggests that Caius likely stands in as a representative of the mechanistic views of
D’Holbach or la Mettrie (2000, 155-156). In Kant’s dialogue, Caius laments that the order of nature
entails that freedom is an illusion, since spontaneity of the will is impossible (ND 1:401:22-28). Titius, a
representation of Kant’s early compatibilist view, corrects Caius by helping him to realize that freedom is
only illusory when it is assumed to be an absolute, ungrounded spontaneity of the will (ND 1:403).
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The main concern of this short dialogue is to square the concern of natural determinism
with moral responsibility. Kant’s interlocutor, represented by Caius, exclaims: “responsibility for
the misdeeds committed does not fall on me, for, bound as I was by the connected series of
grounds which have determined each other from the beginning of the world, I could not have
failed to have done whatever I did do” (ND 1:401). If nature is the emergent result of a series of
dynamic forces in accordance with laws of attraction and repulsion, the freedom of the will
seems either determined and hence illusory, or else impossible.96 And, of course, freedom is
required for moral responsibility. How does Kant (via Titius) respond to this concern? First, he
argues that every action must have a determining ground or reason (Kant’s version of the
principle of sufficient reason). An autonomous will, on Kant’s view, is a will that is capable of
acting spontaneously and consciously according to an inner principle of self-determination (ND
1:402:11-16; 404:7-10). A will can unfold its own nature within the larger web of nature without
the imposition of external forces; it is a self-determining inner force. Even free actions require a
determining ground. Absolute freedom and the “indifference of equilibrium” are absurd: freedom
requires a motive or desire to action with a conscious representation of a state of affairs.
Otherwise, it is mere chaos—i.e., not freedom in any meaningful sense (ND 1:403:1-5). An
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Indeed, Kant attempts to navigate safely between two different types of fatalism: the materialistic
Scylla of Hobbes, on the one hand, and the rationalistic Charybdis of Spinoza, on the other. His argument
for the existence of God as a guarantee to the foundations of the metaphysical principles—of identity,
contradiction, and determining grounds—that make possible the lawful interaction of forces (ND 1:395)
perhaps betrays his deep concern not to be read as an atheist like Hobbes or Spinoza. In the preface to
Universal Natural History (UNH 1:222-224) Kant reiterates this atheistic concern, though his
cosmological system thus construed certainly doesn’t need a God to explain the origin of the cosmos:
According to Friedman, “the order and harmony of the material universe can be completely explained by
the fundamental laws of material interaction… which determine an evolution of the structure of the
universe out of a primordial chaos. Yet this purely mechanistic explanation is itself the best proof of a
divine origin of the universe; for it is God, and God alone, who has established these fundamental laws of
interaction” (Friedman 1992, 11).
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autonomous being is a self-law-giving being embedded in the larger nexus of nature as a whole,
not an anarchic, discretely disembodied being cut off from this nexus.
To summarize: all events follow natural necessity because they are located within a web
or network of causal relations understood through a binary or processual metaphysics of nature.
The free will is able to act freely despite being engaged in this web by resisting the external
series of causes impinging on it (via inclination or external force) through a spontaneous inner
principle of self-determination. Both types of causality have a determining ground (because
absolute freedom is absurd), and both occupy the same metaphysical realm. On this view, then,
Kant (whether or not we believe his argument successful) integrates freedom, moral
responsibility, and the physical web of relations into a holistic, single-world view of nature
imbued with living forces.97 In this sense, Kant’s compatibilist solution is holistic (since there is
only one interconnected metaphysical world) and naturalistic (since everything is ultimately as it
were built out of the natural, energetic forces that are the building blocks of nature). This
metaphysical world is a natural world because Kant does not need to appeal to a transcendent
order in order to explain the possibility of free wills in nature. Freedom is immanent.
Universal Natural History: the Ecology of the Cosmos and Nature’s Systematicity
In New Elucidation Kant uses his ontology of dialectical forces to resolve the theoretical
challenge of freedom understood within a single metaphysical world. And, in Physical
Monadology, he solves the empirical problem of the presence of monadic forces in a nature
ordered by attractive and repulsive forces. Universal Natural History takes a similar route,
drawing from this dialectic of dynamic forces to show how the origin, development, and
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This defense of moral autonomy (e.g., rationality versus inclination) appears quite similar to the ethical
theory presented in Groundwork, but it is important to emphasize that here Kant does not distinguish
between the noumenal and phenomenal realms: there is only one realm, and it is the realm of nature.
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systematicity of the cosmos can be understood by means of this naturalistic ontology. Kant’s
ontology discussed thus far illuminates how his view of nature in Universal Natural History is
evolutionary and holistic: it is, I claim, a veritable evolutionary ecology of the cosmos.
Universal Natural History is one of the most interesting and important of the pre-critical
works for understanding Kant’s view of nature. Additionally, it is perhaps the best text to look to
simply because in it Kant synthesizes and unifies most of the key elements I have been
discussing in the previous works: Universal Natural History presents an emergent view of the
universe, built upon the energetic structures from the other early works, and argues for a holistic
view of nature’s systematicity that would later get taken up in the third Critique. Nature is a great
chain of being (UNH 1:365). All its members—from organisms to planetary systems—play a
part and contribute to the beauty, perfection, and functioning of the larger whole. This chain has
evolved from chaos into order. In a word, the view of nature I wish to highlight in Kant’s
Universal Natural History is emergent and dynamic, systematic and holistic.
Nature is a self-forming process. It isn’t simply the static consequence of a creator God or
the eternally standing whole of Spinoza, but is self-made98 (UNH 1:264). It is immanent rather
than transcendent; its origins are natural rather than divine (UNH 1:262; 344). Nor is nature the
work of a single act of creation. Rather, nature has evolved over time in accordance with
dialectical laws of attraction and repulsion to bring about “as it were, a continuous life in
nature”99 (UNH 1:264-265). Put differently, nature has “evolved from chaos” into a harmonious
nexus of order (UNH 1:313-314). The evolution of nature,100 beginning with the spiral formation
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bildenden Natur.
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Kräfte... welche sich... die gleichsam ein dauerhaftes Leben der Natur ist.
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Auswickelung der Natur.
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of the universe by means of attractive and repulsive forces “is effective throughout the entire
sequence of eternity with ever increasing degrees of fruitfulness” (UNH 1:312-314).
Differentiation, diversity, and complexity unfold from this process. The “sphere of formed
nature…has within it the seed of future worlds,” which on Kant’s view, “strives to evolve out101
of the raw state of chaos over longer or shorter periods” (UNH 1:314). And yet, nature evolves
not on a linear pathway (as perhaps might be understood in monotheistic creation cosmologies),
but rather emerges cyclically through processes of birth and rebirth, creation and destruction: 102
“Worlds and world-orders pass away and are swallowed by the abyss of eternities; by contrast,
creation is ever busy carrying out new formations in other regions of the heavens and replacing
what has gone with advantage [Vortheile]” (UNH 1:317). Kant uses the metaphor of the phoenix
to articulate how nature operates according to its own dynamic laws: nature begins with simple
polar forces that propel it toward self-organization; the phoenix of nature then evolves itself into
planetary systems sustaining complex organisms, only to decay back into its simple dynamic
starting point. In a word, the phoenix is Kant’s symbol for the cycle of nature and the way in
which it bounces between birth and death, creation and destruction.103 The phoenix of nature is
associated with the feeling of sublimity for Kant, since cosmic generation, evolution, and
destruction are profound:
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auszuwickeln .

It should thus be no surprise that one of Kant’s most innovative followers, Arthur Schopenhauer,
should find it plausible to synthesize the Kantian philosophy with Vedic teachings such as Atman and
Brahman.
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Rather than a singular big bang, some theorists argue that an endless series of bangs and crunches
alternate, as it were, in musical oscillation as the song of nature’s creation and destruction plays on unto
eternity, not unlike the fiery play of Kant’s phoenix of nature. For a discussion on how Kant’s symbol of
the phoenix of nature anticipates models in quantum cosmology such as the “big bounce,” see Schönfeld,
“Phoenix of Nature: Kant and the Big Bounce” (2009). For a discussion of the big bounce from the
perspective of theoretical physics, see Brown et. al., “The Phantom Bounce: A New Oscillating
Cosmology” (2008).
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If we follow this phoenix of nature, which burns itself only to rise rejuvenated from its
ashes to new life through all infinity of time and space; when one sees how, even in the
region where it decays and ages, it continues unexhausted with new appearances and on
the other border of creation it proceeds in the space of unformed raw matter with constant
steps for the expansion of the plan of divine revelation to fill eternity as well as all the
spaces with its wonders: then the mind that contemplates all this sinks into profound
astonishment (UNH 1:321).
The metaphor of the phoenix is of interest for the green Kant for a number of reasons. First, it
emphasizes nature’s self-standing role in generation and emergence: nature needs no
supersensible explanatory source of motion and organization, but rather unfolds and evolves
according to its own dynamic laws, as discussed in the foregoing. In addition, the phoenix
imagery highlights the naturalistic and even pantheistic aspect of Kant’s view of nature: As a
phoenix, nature is both creator and destroyer; it is immanent. A deity is superfluous.104 Creation
begins with a dialectical interplay of forces whereby entelechies unfold their natures, resulting in
the natural structures and regularities of planetary systems. Destruction is the natural process of
decay and entropy for which the phoenix of nature cosmically inclines. Indeed, on this picture,
Kant looks in many respects closer to Spinoza than Leibniz, contrary to what is usually thought.
Nature is for Kant organic, living, and constantly changing. It is a network of powers tending
toward birth, death, and rebirth: that is, it is dynamic and evolutionary; each micro-step in the
unfolding of nature evolves solar systems, animal life, and intelligences with more and more
complexity, all until the inevitable refolding of nature back into nothingness eternally returns the
rebirth of the Phoenix anew.
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Kant makes numerous passing references to God in this text, though it is clear (based on the
foundational principles of Kant’s argument; e.g., UNH 1:344) that the deity is neither required nor useful
in explaining the origin of the universe. If anything—much like Hobbes’s view (Jesseph 2002)—God is
explanatorily useless. One interpretive strategy, then, is to acknowledge that, regardless of Kant’s
idiosyncratic beliefs on religion, he must for prudential reasons pay lip service to the Church. For
orthodoxy is a requirement for sustaining an academic post in pietistic Prussia.
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An additional note worth mentioning is with reference to the final and third part of
Universal Natural History (UNH 1:351-368). In this section, Kant speculates about the nature of
other planets as well as alien intelligences. Whereas Part 3 is usually cited as (amusing) support
for Kant’s view that there are other rational ends in themselves besides humans,105 what I’d like
to briefly highlight is Kant’s rejection of human exceptionalism, his holistic view of nature as an
organic unity, and his view of planets as evolving, self-organizing ecological systems. Kant’s
rejection of human exceptionalism and his defense of a holistic view of nature is best expressed
in the following passage in Part 3 of Universal Natural History:
This insect [viz., lice] that expresses the disposition of most people very well both in the
way it lives and in its insignificance, can be used as a comparison with good reason.
Because in its imagination its existence matters infinitely to nature, it considers the whole
of the rest of creation as in vain as far as it does not have its species as a precise goal, as
the centre point of its purposes. The human being, so infinitely removed from the highest
stage of beings is so bold as to allow himself a similar delusion, to be flattered by the
necessity of his existence. The infinity of creation encompasses in itself, with equal
necessity, all natures that its overwhelming wealth produces. From the most sublime class
among thinking beings to the most despised insect, not one link is indifferent to it; and
not one can be absent without the beauty of the whole, which exists in their
interrelationship, being interrupted by it. Meanwhile, everything is determined by
universal laws which nature effects by the connection of its originally implanted forces.
Because it brings forth nothing but propriety and order in its processes, no single aim can
disturb or interrupt its consequences (UNH 1:353-354).
Humans often consider themselves the pinnacle of creation, but they are conceited, just as the
louse thinks its dominion of the scalp proves it to be the height of existence. What Kant deigns to

I favor Wood’s use of “logocentrism” rather than “anthropocentrism” when referring to Kant’s critical
moral system, since the former highlights how the foundations of Kant’s ethics are not speciesist, as
animal ethicists like Singer are wont to presume. However, in the pre-critical works discussed in this
chapter, Kant is even more radical than the logocentric view of the critical period, insofar as he views all
of nature in terms of evolving intellectual complexities. That there may exist other aliens with lesser or
greater degrees of rationality (for instance, the average intellect of certain aliens, ventures Kant, might be
comparable to Newton, UNH 1:358-360) could be a point worth exploring in order to support Kant’s
view of the evolution of organisms and their moral significance. For instance, on this view humans,
though worthy of respect, are not the end of nature as might be gathered from his statements in Critique of
Teleological Judgment. Rather, they are simply one middling species on the evolutionary ladder of being.
105
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express in this work is that both the human and the louse lack the greater perspective to realize
that they are merely one more, albeit important, organ in the functioning of the great system of
nature.
In addition, Part 3 can be help us toward a reading of Kant in line with a view of planets
as ecological systems. For Kant planets themselves evolve and form in accordance with
dialectical laws of nature yielding the conditions for the development of life (UNH 1:352-353;
360). They are, it may be inferred, the macro-instantiations of entelechies. They are organic,
interactive systems that self-regulate, evolve, and sustain animal life. And each planet, as a
potential life-sustaining ecological system, is interconnected and interlinked with the larger
cosmic system: “everything in the whole extent of nature is connected in an uninterrupted
graduated sequence by the eternal harmony that refers all links to each other” (UNH 1:365). This
view is quite dissimilar from the anthropocentric one that proponents of the traditional reading
garner from Groundwork and Critique of Pure Reason. When environmental ethicists avail
themselves of Kant’s ecological views of nature present in texts like Living Forces and Universal
Natural History, they arrive at a theoretical resource rather than an anthropocentric impediment.
It may appear as if I am pushing the organic metaphor of the phoenix of nature too hard
in Universal Natural History, but there is further support in an essay published around the same
time in which Kant argues that it is quite plausible to consider the reality of a world-soul: In
“The question, whether the Earth is ageing, considered from a physical point of view” (1754),
Kant considers how the age of the earth might be determined scientifically. He reasons that, just
as the best way for thinking about the age of an animal or person involves reference to its health
and stage of decay, so also the age of the earth can be determined if reflected through living
terms, like an organism:
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Indeed, it seems to be a subject worthy of enquiry to determine whether the Earth is
ageing gradually and whether it is not in its declining phase, or whether its constitution is
still in good health, or indeed whether the perfection to which it is to develop106 has not
yet been fully attained and it has perhaps not yet passed beyond its childhood (FE 1:
196).
In this text, published just one year before Universal Natural History, Kant frames the earth in
organic, Gaian terms. Earth has a state of health and can be harmed or benefitted; earth has a
lifespan for flourishing and currently is thought to be in its infancy. Most importantly with regard
to Kant’s views of religion and his views of nature, Kant not only accepts as plausible the view
“of those who presuppose a general ‘world-spirit’, an imperceptible but universally active
principle, as the secret driving force of nature”107 (FE 1:203), but he seems to endorse such a
view at the end of the essay. The “generation and the economy of all three realms of nature”
which is to say, the ecology of nature, can be best understood in terms of a world-spirit (FE
1:211). Kant is clear, however, that by such a “Proteus of nature” he does not mean to
anthropomorphize nature as a mind. Instead, he interprets the most reasonable source of the “life
of nature” to be “a subtle but universally active matter which, in the products of nature,
constitutes the active principle” of nature (FE 1:211). The active principle that Kant muses as the
heart of nature appears very much in line with the pre-critical living forces, entelechies, and
monads. Thus, the early works converge on a view of nature understood ecologically, as an
organic and emergent Gaia that pervades and connects all beings through dynamic, living forces.
Besides being emergent, dynamic, and evolutionary, Kant’s early ontology of nature is
decidedly holistic. Nature is seen by Kant as a complex and interrelated nexus of teleological
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überall wirksames Principium als das geheime Triebwerk der Natur.
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connections. Throughout the treatise, Kant never fails to underscore the systematicity of nature
as he conceives it, as the following passages evince:
How could it be possible that things of different natures in connection with one another
should aim to bring about such excellent harmonies and beauty…in which the essential
natures of all things were conceived in relation to each other?
Without the assistance of any arbitrary inventions, I enjoy the pleasure of seeing the
creation of a well-ordered whole by reason of established laws of motion which looks so
much like the system of the world we have before our eyes that I cannot help but regard it
as the same (UNH 1:226).
Multipolar forces of attraction and repulsion dynamically structure the cosmic edifice in
accordance with laws of motion into a determinate, harmoniously interconnected solar system in
which the diversity of life becomes possible. Nature’s holistic systematicity is, from the
standpoint of the philosopher or scientist who reflects upon it, beautiful, awe-inspiring, and
sublime.
The fixed stars, as we know, all relate to a common plane and thus constitute an orderly
whole, which is a world of worlds. One can see that in the immeasurable distances, there
are more such star systems, and that creation in the entire infinite scope of its size is
everywhere systematic and interrelated (UNH 1:255).
If the magnitude of a planetary system in which the Earth is a grain of sand and scarcely
noticeable puts our reason into a state of wonderment, then with what amazement are we
delighted when we contemplate the infinite magnitude of worlds and systems…There is
no end here but rather an abyss of a true immeasurability into which all capacity of
human concepts sinks even if it is raised with the help of mathematics (UNH 1:256).
By its immeasurable magnitude and by the infinite diversity and beauty that shines forth
from it on all sides, the universe puts us into silent astonishment (UNH 1:306).
The feeling of awe from sublimity evokes a feeling of admiration for nature as a totality; though
sublimity is associated with contrapurposiveness, formlessness, and infinite magnitude or
immensity in Critique of Judgment, for the pre-critical Kant even a judgment of sublimity can be
appreciated as beautiful within the context of nature as a whole in Universal Natural History.
When examined from an aesthetic, cosmic perspective, Kant claims that the world can be
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understood as a great chain of being (UNH 1:278; 319). Rational nature as found in humanity is
only one middle rung in the ladder of beings who have evolved as nature has unfolded from its
initial dialectical furls (UNH 1:330). Humans feel themselves to be superior since they take
themselves to occupy a higher stage in the evolution of rationality in nature, but this feeling is
misguided and shrouded with hubris, since they themselves are no exception to the laws of
creation and destruction (UNH 1:318). All seeming imperfections, evils, and death can be
understood intelligibly if conceived with a “total-field image”108 of nature as a whole:
Nature, by encompassing all possible stages of diversity in itself, extends its embrace to
all types of perfection up to nothingness and the defects themselves are a sign of the
superfluity in which its sum total is inexhaustible. (UNH 1:338).
Nature, despite having an essential determination to perfection and order, embraces all
possible changes in the extent of its multiplicity, even to failings and deviations. It is
precisely the same unlimited fertility of nature that has brought forth the uninhabited
heavenly spheres as well as the comets, the useful mountains and harmful cliffs, habitable
landscapes and empty deserts, virtues and vices (UNH 1:347, emphasis added).
Kant’s early view thus, in addition to its holism, presents a naturalistic view of morality: ethical
consciousness is natural and emerges in accordance with the harmonious unfolding of nature.
As I have shown, Kant’s early naturalistic works depict an ontology of nature that is
processual, dynamic, interconnected, and naturalistic. To put this more radically but succinctly,
Kant’s early view of nature is ecological. Part 2 of this chapter attempts to show how, precisely,
such a radical and seemingly anachronistic term could be attributed to Kant. I use the ecocentric
views of Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott to think through the ecological sense of Kant’s
theoretical vision (and sharpen what I mean by “ecological” in the first place). I also show how
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This term is used by deep ecologists to suggest the proper perspective for cultivating right
relationships with nature. I use it here in order to foreshadow my claim that Kant’s philosophy of nature is
an important philosophical predecessor to deep ecology, discussed in Part 3.
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Kant’s early views are more green than is usually thought; they not only have moral implications
for how we view nature, but also are compatible with ecocentrism and climate ethics.
Part 2: Environmental Holism and Kant’s Early Ontology
Aldo Leopold’s land ethic is perhaps the best starting place for thinking about what an ecological
view of nature looks like. The land ethic, a seminal essay from A Sound County Almanac (1949),
was an important and original contribution by Leopold, who was a trained conservationist rather
than philosopher. Leopold’s short essay became the foundation for an entire movement in
environmentalism as well as the ecocentric strand of philosophy in environmental ethics. Though
Leopold hardly fleshes out the ethical entailments of his ecocentric view in this essay, later
thinkers would expand upon it and provide the necessary philosophical sophistication to bolster
Leopold’s prescient insights.109 Leopold espouses a holistic understanding of nature and our
place in it; he views ethics itself as an emergent and evolving practice beginning with
anthropocentric individualism and culminating with ecocentric holism. But what is ecology,
philosophically-speaking, and how does Leopold’s land ethic provide the best conceptual
glimpse of ecological thinking? “Ecological thought,” states Callicott in his “Conceptual
Foundations of the Land Ethic” (2010)
has tended to be holistic in outlook. Ecology is the study of the relationships of organisms
to one another and to the elemental environment. These relationships bind the relata—
plants, animals, soil, and waters—into a seamless fabric. The ontological primacy of
objects and the ontological subordination of relationships characteristic of classical
Western science is, in fact, reversed in ecology. Ecological relationships determine the
nature of organisms rather than the other way around…The whole, the system itself, thus,
literally and quite straightforwardly shapes and forms its component species (Callicott
2010, 87).
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J. Baird Callicott is the most prominent defender of Leopold in academic philosophy. In Defense of the
Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (1989) is perhaps the best work in this regard.
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On Leopold’s view, nature is a vast and complex self-regulating system, whose parts are
mutually and reciprocally interconnected. This model of nature—one which is essentially
ecological—would later become the paradigm of Gaia presented in James Lovelock but presaged
by earlier thinkers such as Alexander von Humboldt, Arthur Schopenhauer, P. D. Ouspensky,
Spinoza, and (as I hope to show) the pre-critical Kant. “Plants and animals, soils and waters,
according to this paradigm, are integrated into one super-organism. Species are, as it were, its
organs, specimens its cells” (Callicott 2010, 87). This Gaian concept can be detected in Kant’s
regulative understanding of nature’s teleological systematicity in Critique of Judgment, but it is
even more pronounced in the pre-critical works such as Universal Natural History and “Whether
the Earth is Ageing.”
In the foreword to the land ethic, Leopold asserts that “the basic concept of ecology” is
the understanding of land as a community (Leopold 1966, xix). By community, Leopold has in
mind his “community concept” wherein humanity is conceived as embedded in a “community of
interdependent parts” (Leopold 1966, 239). The community concept, as a conceptual
determination of humanity, is subject to evolution in the same sense in which all species in
nature evolve according to the overarching ends of Gaia. For Leopold the land ethic is the
paradigm shift that “enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants,
and animals, or collectively: the land” (Leopold 1966, 239). An ecological understanding of
nature is one in which the interdependence and co-evolution of each part is recognized for what
it is in the larger organic context. Kant’s view of nature in the early works anticipates Leopold’s
later insights, although he only asymptotically approaches them. Despite Kant’s rejection of
ontological holism in the critical period (forever precluding him from Leopoldian moral
revelations), he retains a system-oriented theoretical understanding of nature. For Leopold, the
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land ethic’s ecological holism “changes the role of Homo from conqueror of the land-community
to plain member and citizen of it” (Leopold 1966, 240). Kant would never claim that the land
deserves respect as an end in itself (for obvious reasons), but his pre-critical ontology suggests a
similar Leopoldian relationship to nature itself, as humble member rather than despot.
Stewardship is a clear moral implication of ecological holism, and I develop this idea with
greater detail in Chapter 5 on Kant’s holistic view of humanity and cosmopolitan sustainability.
Leopold defends a hierarchical ordering of nature emerging through process rather than
an aggregation of static objects. This is presented through the symbol of the “land pyramid,”
which Callicott takes to be the key section of Leopold’s essay; for the understanding of nature as
a processual system rather than aggregate of discrete things marks the conceptual paradigm shift
from anthropocentric individualism to ecological holism. A grasp of this leads one, on Leopold’s
view, to effect “a complete transition from concern for ‘fellow-members’ to the ‘community as
such’” (Callicott 2010, 89). Here, Leopold states in layperson terms the ways in which solar
energy travels through the various strata of the earth-system; how energy is transferred and
transformed from the stratosphere to the biosphere in a dynamic fashion. In short, nature is not
an aggregation of things but is instead a holistic web of energy. Nature is a confluence and
convergence of different processes that dialectically unfold, retaining the structural integrity and
beauty of the whole:
The pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as to seem disorderly, yet the stability of
the system proves it to be a highly organized structure. Its functioning depends on the cooperation and competition of its diverse parts.
In the beginning, the pyramid of life was low and squat; the food chains short and simple.
Evolution has added layer after layer, link after link. Man is one of thousands of
accretions to the height and complexity of the pyramid…the trend of evolution is to
elaborate and diversify the biota.

98

Land, then is not merely soil, it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils,
plants and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct energy upward;
death and decay return it to the soil. The circuit is not closed; some energy is dissipated in
decay, some is added by absorption…but it is a sustained circuit, like a slowly augmented
revolving fund of life…This interdependence between the complex structure of the land
and its smooth functioning as an energy unit is one of its basic attributes (Leopold 1966,
252-254; Callicott 2010, 89).
Leopold and Callicott provide a solid philosophical image of an ecological view of nature: it is
systematic, holistic, dynamic, and evolutionary. Humanity is not at the privileged center, but is
understood contextually as a living part of the whole.
This image can be sharpened to even greater relief if the very meaning of the concept of
ecology is further analyzed. Etymologically, “ecology” means the “study of the house.” The
house is the dwelling that sustains us; it is the structure under which we live. Here, the house is
nature. A house can of course be divided into subsections—the kitchen is an οἶκος oriented
toward cooking, the living room is an οἶκος for postprandial repose, and so on, just how each
ecosystem on earth has its own micro and macro function connected to the broader earth-system.
As flora and fauna relate to an ecosystem, so too does each ecosystem relate to the larger system
of nature. This is precisely the way how Kant views nature in the pre-critical works—a relational
system of interdependencies.
Finally, there is a clear economic sense of ecology; a house requires proper maintenance
in order to function sustainably. Without a well-regulated economy (lawful house, or οἰκονόμος),
the flourishing of the whole (and of its members) diminishes. The economic aspects of the
concept of ecology can be helpful for making sense of ecological thinking and its connection to
Kant’s early ontology. Just as Kant views nature as a balanced system of primitive forces or
entelechies, Leopold and Callicott view nature as a regulated exchange of energy. In the land
ethic’s ecological economy,
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[t]he living channels—food chains—through which energy courses are composed of
individual plants and animals… at the heart of ecological processes: Energy, the currency
of the economy [of] nature, passes from one organism to another, not from hand to hand,
like coined money, but, so to speak, from stomach to stomach (Callicott 2010, 91
emphasis added).
The early Kant, like Leopold, would agree that the currency of nature is energy or force put into
action. Kant’s pre-critical conception of nature, then, is readily compatible with the ecological
view of nature presented by these thinkers. Kant views nature as interconnected, emergent,
naturalistic, and holistic; it is a living, systematic, self-organizing, organic web of relations. This
is precisely the way ecocentric thinkers like Leopold and Callicott conceive of nature as
presented in the land ethic’s community concept and land pyramid. Kant’s early view of nature
indeed fits with this model, though it certainly predates it.110 Because of Kant’s critical turn, he
never reaches the moral conclusions of Leopold and Callicott. However, I suggest that there are
clear practical implications of Kant’s early theoretical view for climate ethics, as well as what I
take to be its complementarity with ecocentrism. These are suggested below before I consider an
objection and then transition to the question of conservation from a Kantian standpoint.
Kant and Leopold: Domestic Partners, Mutual Support
Kant’s ecological view fits with ecocentric views in two ways—first, it is compatible with it and
second, it complementary to it. By the former, I mean that the ecological holism of the precritical ontology coincides with many central theoretical tenets of the land ethic; they diverge in
their explicit ethical injunctions, but from the theoretical standpoint they share much in common:
a view of nature as like an organized being, harmoniously connected and intertwined; humanity

Scott M. Routlier claims of Kant’s view of nature that “to the extent that Kant treats nature
holistically—as an interlocking system of ends—he anticipates Leopold’s land pyramid or ecosystem
view” (Roulier 2004, 141). Roulier hints at the affinities between Kant’s system-oriented thinking and
ecosystems, but does not discern the way in which the pre-critical view of nature is even more ecological.
In Part 3 I argue that Kant’s early view of nature can be also understood as a foundation and precursor to
deep ecological thinking.
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is a mere member that is embedded in the living whole;111 the basis of nature is energy, force,
dynamic activity; living and non-living entities and conscious and inert matter naturally relate
along a continuum of evolutionary development. In these ways, Kant is not opposed to
ecocentrism as many environmental ethicists are wont to say. He simply must be read outside the
narrow confines of the critical period. Second, Kant’s view fits with ecocentric views insofar as
it is, in addition, complementary to it. More specifically, it is complementary when considered in
light of the exigencies of climate change: even if animals or land have no value in themselves on
the traditional Kantian view, Kant’s holism can justify a stewardship view of nature. Leopold
(and his land ethic) has been important historically in environmentalism and environmental
ethics, but he still remains a marginal thinker and his philosophy is virtually unknown outside
environmental philosophy. Kant, on the other hand, has remained one of the titans in the Western
canon. It would undoubtedly be easier to integrate Kant’s pre-critical insights into the
philosophical canon and use them as a springboard for environmental praxis rather than try to
popularize an inherently unpopular view like Leopoldian ecocentrism.112 In any case, the Kantian
view can complement the Leopoldian one since the former shares much with the latter
theoretically, albeit the former has more philosophical credibility, as it were. Moreover, Kant’s is
another philosophical perspective from which humanity can view the climate crisis. Kant’s
ecological view of nature is yet another asset for combating climate change: the more
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If this sounds suspiciously close to the Spinozist view, it should come as no surprise to learn that the
romantic post-Kantian German philosophers married Kant’s philosophy with Spinoza’s in an organic
synthesis. Though it may seem bizarre to think of the critical Kant and Spinoza happily wed, when the
pre-critical Kant is considered this marriage makes more sense.
Perhaps the land ethic’s time will come as humanity transitions away from a commodity-centered view
of nature, but strictly holistic views in ethics have never been very popular. This can even be seen with
other radical and unpopular thinkers, such as the strong animal-rights proponent Tom Regan, who mocks
ecocentrism by calling it “ecofascism.” Kant, on the other hand, is a respected figure for his defense of
universal human rights, and an integration of the pre-critical holism would likely be easier to effect.
112
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environmental allies, the better; on this basis, Kantians can say that Kant isn’t a foe but a
possible ally in this battle, especially with regard to viewing nature holistically as an object of
cognition from the standpoint of the pre-critical works.
Kant’s ecological view of nature as I have construed it makes Kant out to be an important
cognitive tool for the ethics of climate change. Climate change is a very difficult challenge.113 It
presents a number of problems for humanity’s usual individual-centered thinking. Scientific
thought since the early modern period has been preoccupied with cognition of individual,
discrete objects of experience. It would be much later when Alexander von Humboldt and Ernst
Haeckel114 would effect a paradigm shift of nature as a complex system that shows how discretethinking is inadequate. These philosophers set foundations for fields such as ecology as a
scientific discipline. Though Kant is not usually associated with these figures,115 his philosophy
retains a focus on systems-thinking: In the early works, Kant seeks an understanding of nature’s
systematicity; in the critical period, Kant secures the epistemological foundations for a
systematic organon of knowledge; in his practical writings, Kant views ethics through the lens of
a unified system of nature and freedom. Kant’s fixation with systems and networks can remind
us that climate change involves the entire earth-system and thus requires a systematic response
involving all of us collectively. If Kant’s nexus-orientation is adopted, it can facilitate reflective,
scientific, and practical cognition of the earth as a world-system, which is necessary for the
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The details of this challenge, especially with regard to the collective ethical and scientific problems
that face us, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 on Kant and sustainability.
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Ernst Haeckel, a 19th century zoologist, was best known for coining the term ecology in its scientific
context in his Generelle Morphologie der Organismen (1866); he was greatly inspired by Alexander von
Humboldt’s holistic view of nature and was a popularizer of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural
selection (Wulf 2015, 362-363).
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Unsurprisingly, Alexander von Humboldt—the grandfather of ecology—was significantly inspired by
Kant (and especially the pre-critical works such as Universal Natural History), even having a bust of
Kant in his library (Wulf 2015, 40).
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collective challenges of climate change. The usefulness of the pre-critical view for the climate
crisis makes Kant out to be much greener than environmental ethicists usually concede. These
ethicists hardly consider the pre-critical works, and this partly the fault of Kant scholars
themselves failing to recognize the practical value of these works. Thus, both sides are
misguided in neglecting these works, and both have much to gain from reconsidering them.
An Obvious Complaint: What of Kant’s Critical Turn?
Before I discuss the practical import of Kant’s pre-critical philosophy of nature, I would like to
address an objection about the seeming disconnect between the pre-critical ontology and the
critical epistemological turn. Now, even if it is granted that the pre-critical ontology—when
interpreted ecologically—has value for environmental ethics and climate change, this still
doesn’t address the schism between Kant’s pre-critical works and the so-called mature works in
the 1780s. Why should these early works be taken seriously if Kant so famously abandoned
them, subjecting them even to radical criticism in Critique of Pure Reason?116 And even worse
for the greening of Kant, aren’t his later views in the critical period more problematic for nature
since he shifts from a holistic ontological realism to an individualistic epistemological
idealism?117 To this, I reply: Kant didn’t fully change his mind; though Kant makes the

Norman Kemp Smith (A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ 1918) suggests that many
of the Leibnizian-Wolffian views that transcendental idealism opposes represent Kant’s attempt to
overcome his own philosophical problems such as the compatibility of mechanism with freedom and the
soul. Michael Friedman (Kant’s Construction of Nature 2013) articulates a similar point, suggesting that
Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations is in part an extended critique of his own naturalistic works, such as
Physical Monadology.
116
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Interpretations of the extent of the epistemological reading of the critical period are still part of an
ongoing, contentious debate. Some parties espouse an ontological “two-world” view (Schulting 2011, 2),
while others defend Kant more in the holistic sense wherein Kant’s “two-aspect” view (intelligible vs
empirical, noumenal vs phenomenal) is interpreted in an epistemological or methodological way; others
view Kant here to be developing a perspectival differentiation. In any case, it can at least be agreed: 1)
that dualisms pervade the critical period, which and these offer difficulties for an environmental ethic,
since nature is usually placed on the opposite side of reason, and 2) that individualistic interpretations are
predominant (I criticize this latter assumption in Chapter 5 on Kant and socialism). For a succinct
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epistemological turn with his Copernican anthropocentric individualism, he still thinks in holistic
terms even in the three Critiques: nature—conceived through and structured by our own
cognitive faculties—is still comprehended in terms of systems, even if only regulatively. Kant
never abandons his initial judgment that nature is always to be grasped as a holistic system of
interconnected parts. He simply adjusts and amends how he thinks humans are capable of
representing it. Thus, despite Kant’s rejection of ontological language and metaphysical realism,
the critical works are continuous with the early ones with respect to how an ecological view of
nature can be developed from his system of nature. And, even if Kant did radically change his
mind, there are at least two reasons why this shift is not a significant worry for making use of the
ontological insights of the pre-critical works.
First, that a philosopher rejects his or her earlier views does not mean those views are
meaningless, wrong, or insignificant. Counterexamples abound in both fiction and philosophy;
Franz Kafka thought his writings were an absolute failure—he left numerous novels incomplete
and had thousands of pages of manuscripts: “According to the directives addressed to his friend
Max Brod in Kafka’s will, these manuscripts were all to be burned” (Reiner 2005, 2). And yet
hardly anyone would agree that works such as The Trial have no important insights into the
human condition just because Kafka changed his mind or thought it insignificant. Similarly,
Ludwig Wittgenstein drastically changed his philosophical views from the Tractatus to the
unpublished Philosophical Investigations; he constantly doubted the merit of his work and
wanted it to remain hidden from the public eye, and yet this work changed the trajectory of

discussion of the current debate with regard to Kant’s transcendental idealism, see Dennis Schulting,
“Kant’s Idealism: The Current Debate” in Kant’s Idealism (2011).
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Western philosophy in the 20th century.118 Thus, a philosopher’s renunciation of his or her early
views does not mean that they are of zero value. With Kafka and Wittgenstein—like Kant, as I
maintain—such works have immense philosophical value. Unlike Kafka and Wittgenstein,
however, Kant’s relevance is particularly pressing. For climate change (and its impacts such as
water and food depletion, extreme heat and drought, and hurricanes) is not just an aesthetic or
theoretical challenge but is also, potentially, an existential threat to people in impoverished
nations and future generations.119
Second, even if Kant did significantly change his mind in the critical period with a shift
away from ontological holism toward epistemological individualism, he faces the same
challenges as other individualist environmental ethicists like Paul Taylor.120 In his influential
Respect for Nature (1986), Taylor develops a Kantian-inspired deontological environmental
ethic. His view is biocentric because it maintains that all living beings have equal inherent worth.
Since living beings pursue their own goods, aim to flourish, and avoid what is against their
interests, they are “teleological centers of life.” Echoing Kant’s formulation of respect for
persons, Taylor claims that all such centers of life are ends in themselves and deserving of
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For an excellent biographical study of Wittgenstein and his constant self-struggle, see Ray Monk, The
Duty of Genius (1990). Though Kant didn’t live as tortured a life as Wittgenstein, both philosophers
struggled throughout their lives and constantly engaged in self-criticism to develop their ideas. It is
important to remember that even Kant’s own critical works are not static but constantly evolving. Critique
of Judgment is one particularly salient example of how Kant, like Wittgenstein, is always chipping away
at his own philosophical edifice, as a sculptor works on a stone.
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For a discussion of catastrophic climate change and the potential of an intergenerational arms race
which could spell doom for future generations, see Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy
of Climate Change (2011).
I draw this criticism of Taylor (from the standpoint of his individualist ethics) from Callicott’s holistic
approach to the question of the value of nature. It should be noted, however, that not all environmental
ethicists consider Taylor’s individualism to be an impediment to moral praxis. I highlight Callicott’s
complaint in this section because I think it is an important one, and also because I aim to underscore the
significance of Kant’s holistic tendencies in this dissertation.
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dignity and respect. This leads Taylor to reject anthropocentrism and the presumption of human
superiority over nature with a duty for respecting nature as such.
Though initially more plausible for an environmental ethic than Kantianism, Taylor’s
biocentrism runs into a number of intractable difficulties that follow from his radical egalitarian
individualist view of value; because all living beings have intrinsic value, any human agent will
find herself in an almost impossible situation in moral dilemmas and simply living, in general.121
Taylor’s radical egalitarianism and his failure to consider collectives, as Callicott suggests, puts
his ethic in a precarious position liable to reductio. As Callicott put it, living the life of a Jain
would be easier than adhering to the demands that Taylor’s theory requires, as there is no
meaningful way to resolve moral conflict (Callicott 2013).122 Thus, Taylor’s moral individualism
and radical egalitarianism (that is, that individual goal-directed organisms are the recipients of
inherent worth and that all such entities have it equally)—even if more “eco-friendly” than
Kant’s Groundwork—is a deadlock when holism is eschewed. A Kantian environmental ethic
that likewise neglects a holistic view of nature will run into similar objections, but the important
point is that this is no real complaint against Kant’s critical philosophy since the same objection
sticks against Taylor’s admittedly more “environmental” approach in Respect for Nature. Both
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For a helpful discussion of deontological approaches to environmental ethics and the associated
problems of radical egalitarianism and practical vacuity (which includes Taylor’s biocentric approach),
see Robert Elliot, “Normative Ethics” (2007).
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Taylor attempts to avoid this problem by arguing that moral subjects have basic existential needs. For
example, though all organisms are ends in themselves, some need to consume others in order to survive.
Similarly, Taylor thinks that humanity can appeal to priority principles such as self-defense or distributive
justice in order to live (Taylor 1986, 263). However, this is still unhelpful, since a clear distinction
between “luxury” and “subsistence” needs is no easy task. Even if it were granted that only subsistence
needs are permissible, one would wonder what kind of austere life is possible at the lowest level. Hence,
Callicott’s claim that Taylor’s view makes the life of Jains—devout ascetics who are said to sweep before
their every step in order to ensure they do not trample insects—easy by comparison to what his ethical
theory obligates. For a fuller discussion and critique of Taylor’s biocentrism (and its relationship to
Kantianism) from the standpoint of Leopoldian ecocentrism, see Chapter 8 of Callicott’s Earth Ethic,
“The Earth Ethic: A Critical Account of Its Biocentric Deontological Foundations” (2013).
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the Taylorian biocentrism and Kantian ethics of Groundwork view morality from the standpoint
of ends in themselves vs things, and only individual entities matter in this framework; both
succumb to Callicott’s complaint regarding holism, though Kant avoids radical egalitarianism,
which gives additional support to my claim that the holistic, pre-critical ontology of nature is a
resource worth revisiting: the ecological import of the pre-critical works indeed deserves
consideration for the greening of Kant, since here Kant views value in terms of evolving degrees
in the ladder of being, and he keeps an eye toward the importance of holistic systems-thinking in
his Gaian view of nature.
According to Martin Schönfeld in “Who or What has Moral Standing?” (1992) not only
does Taylor’s radical egalitarianism run into the previously discussed practical problems for a
realistic environmental ethic, but it also runs into logical problems, namely, that biocentrism
does not necessarily entail egalitarianism:
A more serious problem arises, if moral standing is not only assigned to humans and
nonhumans alike, but to humans and nonhumans equally. Both human beings and
animals are moral patients, hence both have moral standing. But the fact that both have
moral standing in principle cannot entail that they have moral standing equally. There are
several reasons which make an egalitarian allotment of moral standing problematic. First,
such an egalitarian allotment implies consequences that come close to absurdity…
Secondly, such an egalitarian allotment would lead to the overpopulation of moral
dilemmas in the normative system… [to avoid such dilemmas, one could justify]
allowing hierarchical gradations in the moral standing of different entities as long as the
hierarchy is tied to relevant [moral] facts (Schönfeld 1992, 257).
As Schönfeld notes, Taylor sneaks in a premise—un-argued for—that all goal-directed beings
are also equally valuable; yet, he is wary of the possibility that value might come in degrees.123
Taylor can avoid radical egalitarianism’s problem of moral absurdity by appealing to a hierarchy

In Chapter 1, I considered Christina Hoff’s complaint that the critical Kant does not allow for value to
come in degrees with regard to ends in themselves and non-rational nature. The pantheistic-leaning precritical view of nature can help to avoid these challenges, though any serious Kantian reading must also
account for the critical works, as I do in that chapter.
123
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of value. An ecological view of nature wherein entities evolve, progressing up the ladder of
being—such as Kant’s view as I’ve presented it—can obviate the worries of radical
egalitarianism. One way of thinking about resolving this ethical worry is to consider that moral
value tracks rational complexity. For example, though all living beings have moral value,
rational humans are more valuable than pigs, and pigs are more valuable than chickens, though
all beings should be afforded care and concern in moral deliberation.124 Moreover, if Taylor
should adopt a degree- or hierarchy-view of natural value (as I suggest is implied by Kant’s
evolutionary ontology) then his biocentric environmental ethic will be more secured against the
claims lodged by Schönfeld, Callicott, and others.
In summary, the objection that Kant’s critical views gainsay the significance of the early
works is only partially right (since there are continuities in Kant, though he does indeed make the
shift from the ontological to the epistemological), and even if a radical shift were granted, the
problems it entails are not particular to Kant but apply even to other environmental individualists
who stand to learn from the pre-critical teachings. As a sort of sustained response to this
objection, my later discussion of Critique of Judgment will show how the critical view of nature
can have important implications for protecting and conserving nature. Before moving onto an
application of moral framing for environmental praxis, I digress with a short discussion on how
the critical views retain many ecologically relevant features found in the pre-critical philosophy
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The specifics for determining what counts as more or less complex, or the criterion for specifying
degrees of moral value, falls outside the scope of this chapter, which was simply concerned with
considering how the pre-critical philosophy of nature offers more with regard to ecocentrism and
biocentrism than is usually thought. All that needs to be noted is that there is a way for adjudicating
between courses of action in ethical dilemmas on this view. Perhaps one way of doing so would be to
ascribe more value to creatures with more intellect or wisdom, which is certainly Kant’s way of thinking
about it when he discusses the varying alien intelligences across the solar system. We have to be cautious
here since, lamentably, a similar approach has been used by racists and sexists to attempt to justify
slavery or the domination of women in the past.
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of nature. In certain respects, there is more continuity between the pre-critical project and the
critical project that is usually supposed.
The Critical Philosophy and the System of Nature
It may seem that I am suggesting that a return to the pre-critical ontology is necessary for the
greening of Kant because the critical philosophy is somehow deficient for a Kantian
environmental ethic. Though others such as Wood and Svoboda have argued that this is
mistaken, it is not an implausible assumption. This is because Kant makes use of dualisms in the
critical works, and his Copernican turn takes an apparent nature-centric shift toward
anthropocentric individualism. The dualisms of the anthropocentric shift, it may be thought,
muck up any possibility for a Kantian environmental ethic, possibly even making the critical
Kant an opponent of environmental thinking. This view is misguided. Kant’s theoretical
emphasis on dynamic systems-thinking is one commitment which remains continuous across
Kant’s works.
With the critical turn, Kant argues that any attempt to understand reality in itself (beyond
any possible experience) is forever doomed with insoluble paradoxes; constitutive knowledge of
nature independent of human experience is forever off limits—an elusive and enticing
philosophical deadlock, for which critique offers the ultimate therapeutic convalescence. Even
though ontological discussions of nature are rejected in the critical works, one ecologically
relevant continuity between the early and critical works is that Kant still thinks about the humannature interface in terms of dynamic systems. In both Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of
Judgment, nature is thought systematically as a postulate or presupposition of judgment itself for
the possibility of experience; humans, on Kant’s view, simply cannot but help to think about
nature as a systematic and well-ordered totality, and this is a regulative feature of our cognitive
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machinery.125 The dynamic interplay between our cognitive faculties and the world are a
continuous feature of Kant’s philosophy. Human reason aims to reconstruct reality in accordance
with its requirements for systematicity. Though we cannot make valid ontological claims about
the edifice of nature, our philosophical thinking functions as an epistemological mirror the
system of nature.
A second ecologically relevant continuity between the pre-critical ontology of nature and
the critical philosophy relevant for the greening of Kant is his dynamic conception of the
systematic causal structure of nature. As Watkins convincingly argues, Kant’s critical view of
causality shares ontological features from the pre-works:
Despite…differences between Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical views, it is quite striking
that he still maintained several fundamental features of the model of causality he had
developed early on…Whether one talks of substances or agents, causal powers or
faculties, essential natures or characters, determining or acting, the same kind of basic
ontological structure is instantiated in both cases, and that structure is represented by the
same set of concepts, namely the categories of substance and causality and the
predicables of activity (Handlung) and power or force (Kraft) (Watkin 2005, 425).
Kant’s view of causality, as discussed with his primacy of forces, suggests a systematic and
dynamic conception of nature.
Finally, with the completion of Critique of Judgment, Kant aims to show how the
unification of the realms of nature and freedom as a single, holistic system, is possible. This ties
in the ideas of the highest good in Critique of Practical Reason and his theoretical investigations
of empirical experience in Critique of Pure Reason with Critique of Judgment’s teleological

In “Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity” from Kant’s System
of Nature and Freedom (2005), Paul Guyer presents an extensive analysis of the role of systematicity for
experience and knowledge in the critical philosophy. He notes a tension between Kant’s epistemological
claims in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment (e.g., is the presupposition of systematicity
constitutive of experience or is it a reflective device for acquiring empirical knowledge?), which suggests
that Kant was continuously developing his ideas about nature’s systematicity from the pre-critical works
all the way toward the end.
125
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judgment as one natural whole. Though the traditional view of Kantian ethics, drawn from the
critical philosophy, appears to leave little room for moral consideration to non-rational nature,
Kant’s unending commitment to systems-thinking—both in regard to our judgments of nature
and our understanding of ourselves—is another ecologically relevant continuity between the precritical view of nature and the critical turn. What all this amounts to is that the critical regulative
holism can be helpful for viewing the earth as a single object of cognition. This can then be an
asset for thinking through the complex challenges of climate change. For climate is a global
phenomenon that affects the entire earth-system; nearly everyone contributes to it and most will
feel its sublime effects. It needs to be thought through in holistic terms, and the regulative view
from the critical period can assist with this endeavor. The theoretical view of the critical
philosophy, in sum, is not necessarily anathema to environmental ethics.
Part 3: Moral Framing and Environmental Praxis: Pre-critical to Critical
The purpose of Part 3 is to highlight the ethical implications of the Kantian view of nature, both
in its pre-critical ontological interpretation and its critical epistemological one. To be clear, I am
not concerned with concrete Kantian duties here; they will be developed later in this dissertation.
Rather, my concern is with the ethical implications and possibilities for developing a Kantian
environmental ethic as a result of this exploration; one such implication is the capacity for an
ecological view of nature—such as Kant’s has—for aiding in the preservation and conservation
of nature via what is often referred to as a moral framing device.
What is a moral framing device? It is a conceptual schema or heuristic device used for
thinking through a difficult or complex problem in order to garner practical support for an issue.
A moral framing device will often have epistemic dimensions to be effective, putting the issue at
hand into a broader perspective. By means of such a device, the problem can be framed or
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packaged in such a way for non-experts to adequately process, deliberate on, and act. In short, a
moral framing device is a cognitive tool used to structure and disclose a plan of action, much in
the same way that medical professionals rely on metaphors and analogies in order to explain
difficult and necessary procedures that have clear therapeutic benefits for patients. In a similar
way, moral framing devices have been used to communicate environmental issues to great effect,
making them intelligible and relevant to the masses.126 One such example is James Lovelock’s
Gaia Hypothesis, which was a part of the 1970s era of conservation. Although not a scientific
theory (since it isn’t testable), the Gaia Hypothesis was used primarily as an epistemic tool for
getting scientists and citizens to think holistically about the earth-system and as a moral tool for
convincing humanity to preserve nature.127 This device frames our planet as itself like a macroorganism; it is a complex, self-regulating creature. Manipulation of any of its essential processes
(e.g. via emissions or pollution) will disturb the equilibrium and flourishing of the entire
organism. From the standpoint of moral framing, the Gaia Hypothesis was helpful for convincing
the masses to conserve nature since it got many to think about nature in non-commodity terms.
By considering the earth as a single organism of which we are simply a part (like an organ in the
body), it is easier to think about the importance of acting harmoniously in accordance with the
whole of it rather than being as it were a cancerous growth. By contributing to pollution, waste,
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For a discussion of the importance of framing devices for communication with the masses apropos of
climate change, see Matthew Nisbet, “Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public
Engagement” (2009). For a discussion of framing strategies (and how they have shifted) in conservation
biology, see Georgina Mace, “Whose Conservation? Changes in the Perception and Goals of Nature
Conservation Require a Solid Scientific Basis” (2014).
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Though historically used as a framing device for conservation in the 1970s, the Gaia Hypothesis is still
being considered for its relevance today in the Anthropocene. For instance, see the recent Gifford
Lectures by Bruno Latour, “Facing Gaia: A New Enquiry into Natural Religion” (2013):
http://rs.resalliance.org/2013/03/22/bruno-latour-thinks-about-the-anthropocene/comment-page-1/. Date
accessed: 22 October 2018.
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and deforestation, humanity projects itself as a parasite or tumor instead of an important organ in
the body of Gaia. Reframing nature holistically had (and has still) two clear moral implications
for nature: first, Gaian framing allows for a re-identification of humanity with nature, and
second, it allows us to rethink our role in nature. If we identify with nature rather than see
ourselves as adversaries, any attack on the body of it is an attack on the parts—conservation
operates as a form of self-defense. Thus the preservation and conservation of nature becomes
more morally salient with Gaian framing. And, if we shift our vocation from a parasitic foreign
body to a properly functioning organ, we will not only live in accordance with the will of nature,
but will also live sustainably. The moral call for stewardship becomes a live option when the
earth is framed in holistic, Gaian terms. The framing strategy involving identification and selfdefense is one adopted and utilized by deep ecologists.
Deep Ecological Framing: Spinoza or Kant?
Now, I maintain that the ecological insights of the pre-critical ontology of nature can have moral
implications through framing mediated by deep ecology. Deep ecology128 has made use of
framing devices in order to promote environmental praxis (in particular, with the idea of self-

Deep ecology, like Leopold’s land ethic, is an unorthodox approach to ethics that underscores the need
to reconsider the place of humanity in nature; though it has gained more momentum on the side of actual
praxis as a grass-roots movement rather than a philosophical theory, it does have defenders who—like
Callicott for the land ethic—attempt to explicate its normative dimensions theoretically. The founder of
deep ecology—Arne Naess—emphasized the importance of a pluralistic approach to theoretical
foundations in order to establish as many grounds for an environmental ethic (making use of the so-called
convergence thesis for environmental ethics). He himself found Spinoza’s monistic philosophy to be one
ideal platform for deep ecological praxis, as he sees Spinoza’s philosophy as systematic and logical it its
defense of a single-world, unified view of nature wherein ethics is conceived in naturalistic terms. For
Naess’s unique interpretation of Spinoza in relation to deep ecology, see “Spinoza and Ecology” (1977).
Contemporary philosophers such as Pauline Phemister argue that alternative figures in the canon can be
useful for deep ecology and environmental ethics in general; she argues in particular for the
reconsideration of Leibniz’s organic monadological philosophy for these ends in Leibniz and the
Environment (2016). In concert with Phemister’s call for a reexamination of the canon, I wish to show
how Kant’s pre-critical philosophy is not only conducive to deep ecological praxis, but also argue that his
philosophy is a conceptual foundation for deep ecology’s Gaian total-field perspective.
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identification), and I will show how Kant’s view of nature can be seen as an adequate foundation
for a deep ecological view, being ecologically superior even to Arne Naess’s philosophical hero,
Spinoza. But first, I must lay out a little background on deep ecology as a philosophical and
normative theory before I discuss its unexplored affinities to Kant’s dynamic ontology of nature.
Deep ecology has its roots in a 1973 paper by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. 129 In
this paper, Naess coins the term “deep ecology” and formulates a new approach to environmental
philosophy. Naess bases deep ecology on an eclectic combination, including the theory of
Spinoza, practice of Gandhi, and mysticism of eastern thought (Drengson 1995, xvii-xviiii).
Deep ecology endeavors to reevalute current so-called “shallow” ecological movements and their
values. By shallow, he understands environmentalism concerned superficially with the present,
pollution, and developed countries; the environment only has instrumental value on this view.
Naess, channeling Kuhn,130 pursues a new paradigm in environmental thinking. Most
importantly, this entails a shift to a non-anthropocentric ontology. Whereas shallow ecology
“avoids serious fundamental questions about our values and worldviews,” deep ecology “aims to
achieve a fundamental ecological transformation of our sociocultural systems, collective actions,
and lifestyles” (Drengson 1995, xix). Naess believes that this kind of radical, deep questioning
will allow us to re-think humanity’s relationship to nature and return to our environmental roots.
According to Naess, there are two primary components of deep ecology: first, the deep
ecology movement and second, ecosophy. The former is concerned with activism, policychange, and grassroots-change (Drengson 1995, xxi). Naess argues that a plurality of positions

The classic paper is Naess’s “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A
Summary” (1973). I mostly cite from the 1995 version in The Deep Ecology Movement, ed. Drengson.
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For the classic text on paradigms in the philosophy of science, see Thomas S. Kuhn, Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1962). Cf. to Drengson (1995): “Shifting Paradigms: From Technocrat to
Planetary Person” for an environmental take on paradigms.
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must converge toward the goal of sustainability. It doesn’t matter whether Christian, Buddhist,
atheist, or Spinozist, so long as deep ecology’s fundamental tenets are preserved. The second
component of deep ecology is what Naess calls ecosophy, or a philosophy of ecological wisdom
(Naess 1995, 8). If the movement is focused on concrete change (e.g., policy), then ecosophy is
concerned with the more philosophical, systematic, or spiritual elements of deep ecology. The
most important part of any ecosophy is the capacity it has for disclosing that, through “selfrealization,” “wide identification” is possible; wide identification is “a broadening and deepening
of the self” beyond the limited confines of liberal individualism (Naess 1995, 14). The basic idea
is that any ecosophy should allow you to see yourself as more than yourself. If you are a
Christian mystic, you can identify with all of creation. If you are a Spinozist, you can see
yourself in God/Nature as an essential mode in the totality. If you are a pre-critical Kantian, you
can see yourself as an entelechy or force embedded in the web of the cosmic edifice. When you
are able to identify with the totality, you are then able reconceive your relationship to nature. For
example, if both you and a forest are modes of God and the forest is being threatened by
corporations, you will feel compelled to protect the forest in an act of self-defense (Mathews
1995, 130). Naess claims, moveover, that wide identification can “elicit intense empathy” with
others, including nature itself (Naess 1995, 15). The holism of wide identification makes
humanity more sensitive to injustice and suffering in general.
Wide identification allows you to see yourself in the universe and the universe in you
from your own perspective (since otherwise, the self would be annihilated in the totality).
Indeed, this already starts to sound very much like some of the themes found in Leibniz and the
pre-critical Kant. Kant’s affinity to deep ecology can be understood once the seven central deep
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ecological tenets have been laid bare. According to Naess, any ecosophy in deep ecology
involves
(1) Rejection of the human-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total-field
image. Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations… (2)
Biospherical egalitarianism—The ‘in principle’ clause is inserted because any realistic
praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression… (3) Principles of
diversity and of symbiosis… (4) Anti-class posture… (5) Fight against pollution and
resource depletion… (6) Complexity, not complication…(7) Local autonomy (Naess
1995, 3-6).
Upon a cursory glance, it is clear that many of these principles are implications of Spinoza’s
Ethics. Naess argues that Spinoza’s philosophy is a solid foundation for deep ecology for a
variety of reasons. First, Naess claims that an ecosophy needs to have a systematic foundation
from which practical maxims for environmental praxis can be developed (Naess 1995, 11).
Spinoza’s Ethics, with its geometric method and rigorous systematic framework accords with
this picture nicely. Second, Spinoza’s holism is decidedly non-anthropocentric. For deep
ecology, holism is perhaps one of the most important elements for transitioning out of a humancentered ethic and into a new `axiological paradigm. Spinoza pulls no punches in regard to his
critique of humanity’s tendency toward religious and anthropocentric projection on nature
(Spinoza 2002, 239-240). Though the lack of a teleology in Spinoza might be problematic from a
deep ecological view,131 it is clear that his holistic non-anthopocentrism is one vital reason Naess
likes Spinoza. Third, Naess favors Spinozism because—in identifying God with nature and
denying a personal God—it entails a immanent, anti-teleological worldview. As such, it is quite
conformable with modern evolutionary theory and ecology. By avoiding the theological and
hermeneutical tangles of orthodox views of God, Naess’s Spinozistic foundation for deep
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For many deep ecologists, like Kant, wish to preserve final causes and think of the earth-system itself
as like a functioning, flourishing being (cf. Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis).
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ecology is able to settle agreeably next to scientific ecology as its normative obverse. Finally,
and perhaps most obviously, Naess likes Spinoza because of his monistic holism. For Spinoza,
there is only one substance and all are merely attributes and affections or modes of this
substance. Moreover, the variety of this substance is infinite in quality and magnitude. On such a
view, the deep ecological injunction to see the world and ecosystems as essentially
interconnected opens a new way of considering other non-human beings and systems morally.
Biodiversity and the infinite complexity of nature are part of God/Nature’s perfection, and there
are only a few more steps to seeing this diversity as being worthy of respect. These are a few
plausible reasons—some stated explicitly and others not so—why Naess prefers Spinoza.
However, it is not the case that this preference excludes a pre-critical Kantian take on deep
ecology. Indeed, the central dynamic and holistic aspects of Kant’s early philosophy discussed in
this chapter are quite compatible with deep ecology. Viewing the latter through the lens of the
early works allow us to understand how Kant can be seen as a philosophical precursor to deep
ecology and how his dynamic approach is superior to the static view of Spinoza’s monism.
With his appropriation of Spinoza (via his systematic, holistic, and naturalistic ontology),
Naess is able to frame a biocentric model of nature; identification and self-realization are useful
for conservation, the total-field, relational view of nature is useful for admiring and respecting
nature; the holistic understanding of nature shifts humanity’s place in it as humble steward rather
than hegemonic narcissist. And yet, for very similar reasons, Kant’s early ontology of nature can
be seen as a better intellectual foundation or precursor to deep ecology. This has, moreover,
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important implications for deep ecology in the philosophical canon—both for academic
philosophy and pedagogy.132
As I have shown, Kant presents a view of nature that is holistic and multipolar—a web of
relational knots in a total-field unfolding through time; dialectical polar principles of attraction
and repulsion, identity and negation, and force dynamically structure the cosmos; organisms for
Kant are like the cells in the Gaian world-spirit; diversity, complexity, and the beautiful harmony
and order of nature resonate importantly for Kant. I maintain that Kant’s early ontology is
ecologically superior to Spinoza’s because it is not only more dynamic, but it is naturalistic and
multipolar. To understand the latter, Spinoza’s monism can function as a useful contrast:
Spinoza’s monistic view of nature is undoubtedly dynamic, as all beings unfold in the ripples of
nature’s naturing; these ripples are modes, or the heartbeats of God/Nature’s unending divine
pulse. However, on Kant’s multipolar view of nature, the source isn’t simply the One, but the
Dialectic. Spinoza’s monistic view presents a uniform field-view of interconnectivity that is
indeed helpful for deep ecological thinking, but Kant’s is one-step above and beyond Spinoza’s
with regard to an ecological view insofar as Kant’s pre-critical presentation of nature is one of
interactivity; instead of uniform, it is an organic and relational network of emergent structures,
undergirded by dynamic and dialectical entelechies. In this respect, Kant’s view is more
compatible with evolutionary theory and naturalistic views in cosmology. By virtue of its
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For example, if deep ecology has philosophical foundations in both Spinoza and the early Kant, then it
should be taught to students of philosophy outside of environmental ethics classrooms. Though radical in
its ethical mandates, deep ecology should be seen as at-home in the philosophical palace rather than like
an uncanny Ronin; deep ecology indeed has a feudal lord, and this is Kant.
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multipolar, relational, and dialectical foundations, it is also, therefore, more ecological and more
deep ecological than Spinoza.133
In the end, Kant’s early view of nature can be helpful as a deep ecological moral framing
device for protecting and conserving nature since it can teach humanity to see itself as a
relational constituent of Gaia. When nature is framed in the early Kantian dynamic way, we can
realize our humble place on the organic ladder of being and begin to consider the importance for
conserving and protecting the rung upon which we so tenuously stand.
From the Pre-critical Ecology to Environmental Reflective Judgment
In the course of this chapter, I have suggested that we reexamine the pre-critical works in Kant’s
works in order to discern their environmental significance for today. These works have largely
been ignored for contemporary ethical application, and have instead only been analyzed for their
historical value. I highlighted aspects of Living Forces, Universal Natural History, New
Elucidation, and Physical Monadology that draw out the ecological resources of Kant’s early
ontology of nature. On my reading, Kant presents a holistic view of nature in which all things are
interconnected and systematically intertwined. Nature is for Kant a unified, world-edifice; his
ontology is grounded upon dialectical and multipolar principles of identify and negation,
attraction and repulsion, force and resistance; and, Kant’s metaphysical view of nature in these
works is inherently dynamic, as he sees the cosmos emerge and evolve from chaos into a
beautiful and harmonious system according to natural principles. Finally, on Kant’s anti-dualistic
physical influx theory of causality, consciousness and minds are themselves—despite their
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Some of the more ethical tenets of deep ecology, such as biospherical egalitarianism and anti-class
posture, are not really implied by Kant’s pre-critical view of nature. However, it was never my intention
to show how Kant is compatible with the practical view of deep ecology, but was rather to show how it
can be seen both as a theoretical precursor and as superior to Spinoza’s.
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complexity—just as natural as matter. Material and mental phenomena are both founded upon
primitive dynamic forces, entelechies, or physical monads. Though humanity regards itself as a
nobler creature by virtue of its rationality, it is simply another natural species that resides on a
rung of the ladder of being. In short, Kant’s early view of nature is ecological as understood in
the philosophical sense presented by Callicott, and humanity is an essential link in the systematic
chain of Gaia.
This chapter has also shown how Kant’s holistic view of nature—by virtue of this
ecological interpretation—is theoretically compatible with ecocentric views in environmental
ethics and can present itself as a theoretical resource for environmental ethicists. Furthermore,
Kant’s early ontology—as I argued by contrast with Naess’s Spinoza appropriation—can be
understood as a conceptual precursor and foundation to deep ecology, superior even to Spinoza
by virtue of Kant’s multipolar and organic conception of nature. Finally, I argued that adopting
the pre-critical view of nature can have ethical implications for how we should treat nature,
similar to how Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis has been used in the past by environmentalists,
ecologists, and conservationists; framing humanity as humbly embedded in nature assists with
preservation and conservation efforts. For, like the injunction of the deep ecologists for selfidentification, the early Kantian view of nature can be utilized for getting citizens to think about
their place in nature: its harmonious beauty and order is indelibly disrupted by anthropogenic
climate change, and the harmful effects of climate change’s magnitude and might impress in us
to think about its sublimity (which reminds us of our moral determination). We appreciate nature
for all that it provides—both aesthetically and existentially, and we humbly admire nature in its
immensity. Indirectly, as moral framing devices, these views of nature clearly have
environmental significance, though they of course require further development in order to
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specify what concrete duties they entail. In the next chapter, we will consider Kant’s critical
view of nature’s systematicity and the moral resources that natural aesthetics—via beauty of
flora and fauna and sublimity of climate change—can be for humanity in light of climate change.
This will allow us to flesh out more concretely what sort of duties humanity has with regard to
nature and in the face of climate change. It will also help unearth the extent to which Kant can be
seen as a green figure for our current predicament with the environmental crisis.
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CHAPTER 4:
KANTIAN HOLISM AND AESTHETICS
In Chapter 1, we critically examined some of the most influential interpretations of Kantian
ethics vis-à-vis non-human animals and the environment. It was argued that, despite the
perspicacity of many of the views from the traditional interpretation, they only provide us one
picture with regard to the value of Kant’s thought for environmental concerns.134 This obliged us,
in Chapter 2, to investigate alternative interpretations of Kant regarding non-rational nature from
figures such as Wilson, Guyer, and Wood on the one hand, and new readings from up-andcoming scholars like Kain and Svoboda, on the other. These are indeed welcome additions to the
literature since they not only make unique contributions to Kant scholarship, but they also offer
compelling reasons for environmental ethicists to reconsider the moral worth of Kantian thought
for environmental ethics. The way in which this new school of Kant interpretation revisits older
views suggests to us that there may indeed lie further insights of Kantian thought for our
environmental concerns, and in particular, the ethics of climate change. Unlike Chapter 3’s
emphasis on the pre-critical works, the new school has tended to focus on the major works from
the Kantian canon, which are those many environmental ethicists find most problematic.135 This
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Admittedly, my strategy is to make use of the usual Kantian move—of reconciliation and synthesis,
inherited from Leibniz (Jolley 1996, 2)—of showing how both sides are right given one perspective, but
wrong from another; the truth lies somewhere in between.
A likely reason for the environmental disdain of Kant’s critical philosophy lies with a conflation of the
logocentrism inherent in Kant’s “Copernican Turn” with a vicious anthropocentrism (which, as I have
shown, is a strawman of Kant) used in part to motivate radical anti-anthropocentric positions such as
those found in deep ecology.
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chapter will take a similar approach and appeal to Critique of Judgment in order to make the case
that even aspects of the critical philosophy—though beset by certain limitations—can be an asset
for environmental ethics. We shall reconsider the ethical significance of Critique of Judgment
with regard to environmental aesthetics and Kant’s teleological insights for the world-system.136
Critique of Judgment and Views of Nature
Since some of the more influential proponents of the new environmental reading of Kant make
use of Critique of Judgment (rather than Groundwork) as their point of departure for thinking
about the value of non-rational nature, the task in this chapter will be to identity other holistic
aspects of this text for the greening of Kant. With the help of contemporary commentators137
such as Guyer and Wood, I show how Kant’s account of natural beauty can be of interest for
viewing nature with disinterested appreciation. Then, I investigate the Critique of Teleological
Judgment to establish a bridge between the moral appreciation of beautiful natural objects and
nature as a whole. Commentators on Kantian environmental aesthetics have much to gain by
incorporating elements from the Critique of Teleological Judgment into their views on Kant’s
aesthetics, since Kant’s view of nature’s systematicity is one way for considering the
environment and biodiversity from an aesthetic-moral standpoint; and environmental ethicists

Kant’s contributions to an understanding of nature as a holistic world-system can be seen in Alexander
von Humboldt. Humboldt is one of the first to help popularize the idea of nature as a unified, worldsystem beyond the poesy of the romantics or the speculations of German idealists like Schelling. In short,
Humboldt helped make the idea of a science (understood in the contemporary sense of the term) of a
world-system plausible, influencing later figures in the environmentalist movement such as George
Perkins Marsh, John Muir, Rachel Carson, and James Lovelock (Wulf 2015, 9-10). Since Humboldt took
many of his insights from the pre-critical cosmological works and the third Critique, the transition from
the pre-critical works of Chapter 3 to Kant’s aesthetics and regulative teleology in Chapter 4 is apropos.
136
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For work in Kant scholarship discussing the connection of beauty to the value of non-rational nature,
see Wood, “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature” (1998), Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste
(2001, 234-35), Guyer, “Natural Ends and the Ends of Nature” (2007) and Kant and the Experience of
Freedom 1996, Chapters 1 and 7), Biasetti, “From Beauty to Love: A Kantian Way to Environmental
Moral Theory?” (2015), and Svoboda, Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic (2015).
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stand to benefit from a consideration of Kant’s regulative teleology, since it provides a heuristic
for viewing nature holistically while avoiding the metaphysical spookiness and apparent
problems of constitutive teleology for natural selection (Svoboda, 2015). Next, I argue that the
Kantian sublime as it is typically understood from the Analytic of the Sublime is of limited use
for fostering a moral view of nature. Nonetheless, I show how Kant’s sublimity can still be
helpful indirectly—from an anthropocentric perspective—for the ethics of climate change. The
environmental value of Kantian sublimity beyond the scope of climate ethics is limited because it
is seen as primarily promoting respect for humanity’s rational nature (freedom), possibly at the
expense of non-rational nature.138
My exploration of the environmental significance of Critique of Judgment is divided into
three parts. In Part 1, I examine Kantian beauty, highlighting its ethical connections for the
environment, as discussed in the secondary literature. By drawing from elements of the Analytic
of the Beautiful, Kant’s discussion of “On Beauty as a Symbol of Morality” in section 59, and
sections of Metaphysics of Morals, I show that we have a duty to not wantonly harm beautiful
flora or treat animals inhumanely. In Part 2, I suggest a return to the Critique of Teleological
Judgment to open up new ways for thinking about Kant in relation to nature and overcoming
some environmental setbacks in his account of beauty. In Part 3, I intend to contribute to this
discussion of Kantian environmental aesthetics by arguing that dynamical sublimity—
understood specifically in relation to climate change—can facilitate climate change mitigation
and adaptation; this discussion will be carried over to Chapter 5, where the sublime experience of
humanity’s courage incites resistance to climate change as a heroic project of the human species.
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For an orthodox Kantian, to respect nature is to regard it as a law for us, which would indeed be
heteronomous. Schiller’s account of sublimity is subject to a similar objection.
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I conclude by pointing to potential environmental shortcomings of the standard Kantian view of
sublimity, motivating my final investigation into Kantian anthropology for sustainability.
Part 1: Kantian Beauty and the Environment
Kant’s aesthetic analysis in Critique of Judgment opens several routes for valuing nature. One
relies on Kant’s account of natural beauty. This view hinges on beauty as a symbol of morality
(CJ 5:351-354), which is often supplemented by commentators with similar passages from
Metaphysics of Morals (e.g. MM 6:442-43). The general view is that, from a Kantian
perspective, a disinterested appreciation of natural beauty functions as a sort of moral preparation
for acting humanely to others and discharging our duties regarding non-rational nature.
According to Kant in the Analytic of the Beautiful, we disinterestedly value beautiful nature
when we reflect upon it.139 And, the cultivation of a reflective appreciation for beautiful nature
has affinities to moral feeling. According to Kant, “to take a direct interest in the beauty of
nature…is always a mark of a good soul; and…if this interest is habitual, if it readily associates
itself with the contemplation of nature, this indicates at least a mental attunement favorable to
moral feeling” (CJ 5:298-9). When we cultivate these aesthetic and morally analogous feelings in
our disinterested appreciation of beautiful nature, we develop an attitude favorable to morality.
Kant thinks there are important links between love and concern for nature and moral virtue: “if
someone is directly interested in the beauty of nature, we have cause to suppose that he has at
least a predisposition to a good moral attitude” (CJ 5:300). How does this work? The reflection
of nature’s beauty is alluring—this aesthetic disposition is the result of an ability to appreciate
the seeming purposiveness and harmony of nature (i.e., that nature seems as if it were organized

In the third Critique, Kant says that “The beautiful prepares us for loving something, even nature,
without interest” (CJ 5:267).
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as a single interconnected unity suited for humanity’s mental faculties)140 along with the
appreciation for beautiful nature’s form, rather than empirical content. As a result, the
disinterested appreciation for natural beauty can be instrumental for loving nature and, hence,
having an attitude favorable to performing our duties regarding nature, such as the negative
injunction not to wantonly damage and exploit nature.141 Destruction of beautiful nature
degrades humanity’s own moral perfection, which for Kant is an imperfect, though direct duty to
oneself with regard to non-rational nature. In Metaphysics of Morals, Kant puts this quite
succinctly:
A propensity to wanton destruction of what is beautiful in inanimate nature (spiritus
destructionis) is opposed to a human being’s duty to himself; for it weakens or uproots
the feeling in him which, though not of itself moral, is still a disposition of sensibility that
greatly promotes morality or at least prepares the way for it: the disposition, namely, to
like something (e.g beautiful crystal formations, the indescribable beauty of plants) even
apart from any intention to use it (MM 6:443).
This connection between an aesthetic attitude favorable to morality in Critique of Judgment and
our duties to beautiful nature in Metaphysics of Morals can be bridged by considering Kant’s
discussion of beauty as a symbol of morality in Critique of Judgment. Paul Guyer in Kant and
the Experience of Freedom establishes the connection between Kant’s claims about our duties
regarding nature and beauty (or taste) rather nicely:
Response to beauty is like the judgment of morality in being immediate, disinterested,
free, and universal. It is unlike the latter in being represented to sense rather than through
concepts. But since the pure idea of morality is not itself directly representable to sense,

The “as if” qualification is important in the context of the critical philosophy. To avoid any
unwarranted dogmatic or constitutive claims (such as were was ruled out in Critique of Pure Reason),
Kant’s critical teleology of nature is considered a regulative epistemological device. That is, the
purposiveness of natural beings should be understood more as a heuristic principle (CJ 20:205) or
methodological tool, rather than the way things really are in themselves. For the originator of this classic
interpretation of Kant, see Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des als-ob (1911).
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For important work discussing and problematizing Kantian natural aesthetics and the moral
implications for the appreciation of nature, see Malcolm Budd’s The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature
(2002), especially Part 2 of Chapter 2 (“Kant on Natural Beauty and Morality”).
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this disanalogy does not undermine the analogy between beauty and morality but is rather
what requires the former to become the symbol of the latter (Guyer 1993, 316).
Taste prepares us for disinterested attachments; that is, even if the [empirical] content of
objects of taste is independent of morality, the experience of taste [through the interplay
of our cognitive faculties in appreciating its form] is a cause of a disposition favorable to
the performance of duty…Kant clearly believes that experience of the beautiful can be an
instrument or means for the development of a subjective disposition—he here calls it
“love”—which is intimately connected to moral duty (Guyer 1993, 317-318).142
Thus, though duties cannot be generated directly from the aesthetic experience itself, the
experience allows us to cultivate a virtuous attitude favorable for assisting us in discharging our
duties, which include indirect duties to non-rational nature such as flora and fauna.
One immediate concern about the validity of a Kantian environmental ethic from the
standpoint of Kant’s account of beauty regards its limited application. Beautiful nature, by virtue
of its analogy with morality and its ability to prepare humanity for morality by teaching us how
to disinterestedly value other entities (even if only from an aesthetic standpoint) allows us to
value the beautiful in nature, and this indeed includes a vast amount of flora, fauna, and
landscapes such as beaches (e.g. sunset) or caverns (e.g. crystal formations). Beautiful nature,
however, is not the sole constituent of an ecosystem; in fact, many keystone species (i.e., species
whose functions are essential for the healthy flourishing of an environment) are often
aesthetically underwhelming, being ugly, small, or uninteresting. As I will later show, Kant’s
account of sublimity can supplement the limited usefulness of his account of beauty for climate
change. And still, not all nature is beautiful or sublime for the viewer. How can a Kantian deal
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As far as I am aware, Guyer is one of the first Kant scholars to challenge the traditional reading of
Kant vis-à-vis nature in Chapter 9 (“Duties Regarding Nature”) of Kant and the Experience of Freedom
(1993). I do not fully lay out the argument connecting natural aesthetics and duties regarding beautiful
nature in Kant in this chapter, since Guyer articulates it gracefully in his. I merely summarize this avenue
a Kantian can take for environmental aesthetics.
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with ugly or small nature from the standpoint of Critique of Judgment?143 In the Analytic of the
Sublime, Kant asserts how sublime nature, by virtue of its immense size or power, is humbling.
Small nature, by contrast, is associated with contempt, namely disrespect (Verachtung), for Kant
(CJ 5:249).144 If the small is contemptible on Kant’s account and the small nonetheless often
plays the most important foundational role in a functioning ecosystem (as in krill or zooplankton
in an aquatic environment, for example), how can Kant’s Critique of Judgment be of any use for
supporting a plausible environmental ethic?
Part 2: Reconsidering the Critique of Teleological Judgment
As a way of simultaneously linking the environmental resources of Kantian beauty to the
regulative account of teleology and holism and responding to the question of ugly nature, I
suggest that we consider how the experience of natural beauty presses humanity to investigate
nature’s systematicity.145 Though the Critique of Teleological Judgment doesn’t explicitly
concern itself with beauty,146 utilizing aspects of this part of Critique of Judgment that discuss
organisms and nature as a system allows for a way for a Kantian to take the moral insights of the
Analytic of the Beautiful and apply them to the beauty of nature as a whole; valuing the beautiful
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This problem is not new, and accordingly there is a great deal of literature on the status of the ugly in
Kantian aesthetics. For more on this, see Paul Guyer, “Kant on the Purity of the Ugly” (2004), Christian
Wenzel, “Kant Finds Nothing Ugly?” (1999), and Hud Hudson, “On the Significance of an Analytic of
the Ugly in Kant's Deduction of Pure Judgments of Taste” (1991).
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Interestingly, Leibniz allows for the infinitely small to be sublime (and this probably has to do, if
speculation is in order, with his training as a mathematician).
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In the first introduction to the third Critique, Kant discusses how reflective judgment yields a
regulative, or heuristic, understanding of nature’s systematicity. Judgment, for Kant, presupposes
systematicity “in nature, as a presumption. This lawfulness is a formal purposiveness of nature that we
simply assume in it…but it does give us a principle for judging and investigating nature: a principle by
which to seek, for particular experiences, the universal [empirical] laws we must follow in engaging in
such experiences in order to bring out that systematic connection [of them] which [we] need for coherent
experience” (CJ 20:204).
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The Critique of Teleological Judgment rarely mentions pleasure or beautiful nature (cf. CJ 5:380).
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in nature as a whole will, of course, also include the ugly and small nature not accounted for in
the Analytic of the Beautiful or the Sublime. Even non-beautiful flora and fauna (and especially
keystone species, which aren’t always the paragon of beauty and cuteness) have important
ecological roles to play in the flourishing and harmony of the whole. Through teleological
reflective judgment, I claim we are able to judge the whole itself as systematically unified and,
hence, as beautiful insofar as it promotes a kind of harmony in diversity as a system of nature.
Moreover, this exploration will disclose other Kantian avenues of environmental resourcefulness
in not only the Critique of Teleological Judgment but elsewhere, such as in, for example, Chapter
5 on Kant’s teleological philosophical anthropology. For Kant’s teleology and anthropology tend
not to be the main object of investigation for proponents of the new environmental interpretation
of Kant, despite their potential, as I will show, in supporting a green Kant.147
Now, the main problem here is that, though Kant discusses beautiful objects (e.g. flora,
fauna), he doesn’t explicitly discuss the beauty of ecosystems or nature as a whole in the
Analytic of the Beautiful; the question is thus how to bridge the two. The problem is to discern
how a Kantian can transition from reflection of the beauty of a single object of nature (which is
the main business of the Analytic of the Beautiful, CJ 5:243) to the beauty of nature as a whole
(which ends up being the task of the Critique of Teleological Judgment, though not with regard
to beauty but with regard to natural science, CJ 5:378-384). In Universal Natural History, Kant
has no problem with judging the cosmos as beautiful. My goal is to try to connect these two in a
plausible way. The way to bridge them is, I submit, through a detour into the Critique of
Teleological Judgment. According to Kant, the appreciation of natural beautiful prompts

For one exception to this trend with regard to teleology, see Svoboda’s use of Critique of Judgment in
Chapter 4 of Duties Regarding Nature (2015), “Teleology and Non-Human Flourishing.”
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scientific investigation into nature (CJ 5:185; 5:379-381). This may go in two ways, on my view:
by reflecting on beautiful organisms we amplify our reflection to nature as a whole, or by
reflecting on beautiful environments we amplify our reflection to nature as a system.
Reflecting on the beauty of organized beings (e.g., plants and animals) can lead one to
investigate their organization and suitability for their environment (e.g., the way in which a fish’s
eyes are adapted to a murky or dark depth). Some might object that the association of an object’s
beauty with inquiry into its ecological context spoils the true appreciation of the former. Kant
sometimes even talks this way.148 Nonetheless, because of the crucial role of purposiveness and
imagination in both natural inquiry and judgments of taste, this connection need not diminish the
role for beauty. For in either teleological judgment (which stimulates investigation into nature as
a system) or judgements of beauty (which disinterestedly appreciates the form of an object), the
purposive role of the imagination and the free play of the cognitive faculties are key. In the case
of the teleological judgments, this is focused more on external, determinate objects while with
beautiful judgments, internal indeterminate concepts. In either case, formal relations and their
connection to the power of imagination obtain.
Now, the appreciation of a beautiful natural object and the way it sparks an interest into
how such an object is possible then obliges one to understand how these organized beings
operate and have adapted to their locale; teleological reflection leads down a path to cognition of
how various ecosystems overlap and are embedded in larger climes. Research beginning with the
appreciation of beautiful organisms can thus, on Kant’s view, facilitate a view of nature as a
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Of course, it is possible for the appreciation of beautiful flora—say, for instance, a flower—to fail to
lead the judger to further investigate nature’s organizational structure. Indeed, Kant often suggests that
knowledge of an object sometimes makes it harder to judge the beauty of said object (e.g. CJ 5:231). For
determinate knowledge of that object’s natural end (e.g., the purpose of its colorful buds) makes it harder
for the judger (e.g., the botanist) to abstract from this end in appreciating its beautiful form in the free
play of our cognitive faculties.

130

whole (CJ 5:398). Of course, the role of beauty is not essential in stimulating an intellectual
interest in ecosystems and nature as a whole, and this explains why beauty is not discussed in
any great detail in the Critique of Teleological Judgment. And yet, one would be hard-pressed to
find even a handful of natural scientists who deny that their impulse to enter their fields began
with an aesthetic or romantic interest in nature’s beauty.149
The other way of connecting Kantian aesthetics to teleology is as follows: reflecting on
the beauty of ecosystems or environments (e.g. ponds, coral reefs)150 can motivate—by means of
the stimulus of the free play of the imagination linking internal and external purposiveness—
investigations into how these land- and seascapes function as macro-organic systems for
organized flora and fauna. In this case as well, the aesthetic contemplation of nature can play a
role in facilitating scientific inquiry into organisms. If reflective judgment continues to trace the
teleological, self-organized links of nature, it eventually terminates in reflection on nature as a
whole.151 In short, a holistic view of nature becomes manifest. Then, with this holistic and
teleological scaffolding, it becomes possible to judge nature itself as beautiful, by way of its

149

This is, of course, an empirical question and I merely speculate here. It does have philosophical
precedent, however: Alexander von Humboldt, often thought of as the father of ecology, thought Kant’s
insight on the connection between beauty and scientific inquiry was monumental; in Cosmos, Humboldt
continuously remarks on the role of beauty in the scientific investigation of nature.
150

A qualification needs to be made here: though regions can be thought as beautiful, Kant is clear that
so-called beautiful views where nothing remains still and graspable for the contemplative imagination—
as in a “rippling brook”—are not beauties properly speaking (CJ 5:243).
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Those familiar with the final sections of Critique of Judgment might object that the truly final end in
the teleological chain is, for Kant, humanity as the final end of nature (CJ 5:429-436). This seems
problematic for environmental ethics because it is decidedly anthropocentric. However, it must be borne
in mind that for Kant when we think about nature in these sections it is not from the standpoint of
determinative judgment yielding theoretical cognition of nature; rather, teleological judgment is reflective
judgment, taking its standpoint from what must be posited by the human judger in order to make sense of
how nature could actually be capable of being purposive for our faculties of judgment. Moreover, in these
sections Kant adopts a practical perspective, which means that even if humanity is the final end of nature,
we still have duties regarding nature to not wantonly exploit or damage it. See Guyer for more extensive
attention to this objection (Guyer 1993, 330-334).
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systematic harmonization of manifold and diverse flora, fauna, ecosystems, and environments in
the free play of our imagination: organized nature as a teleological system is, in regulative terms,
Gaia. With this synthesis of teleological and aesthetic judgment, even ugly nature gets accounted
for,152 since objective, teleological judgment leads the observer to see how each organism, no
matter how small or ugly, contributes to its diversity—to the harmonizing and flourishing of the
whole of nature (CJ 5:379). Through the subjective lens of a judgment of taste, the whole of
nature can be appreciated as the free play of the imagination harmonizes in reflection upon it.
When nature is viewed only through the narrow lenses of the Analytic of the Beautiful, ugly
nature is on the face an intractable problem from an environmental perspective, since we are only
obliged to protect and conserve beautiful nature for Kant. Fortunately, with my integration of
beauty in the context of teleological judgment regarding nature as a beautiful and harmonious
Gaian system, the moral-aesthetic problem of ugly nature is resolved.
The scientific exploration and aesthetic appreciation of nature’s systematicity thus
facilitates the cognition and admiration of nature’s unity in diversity; for example, we are
inspired by the harmonious ways in which organisms are essential for their environments, by
analogy to how our own organs function for us; or we appreciate the unity of nature in its
heterogeneous diversity of empirical laws (CJ 5:185-87). The connection of natural beauty with
Kant’s regulative teleology can thus provide humanity with an incentive for valuing natural
entities and nature as a whole:

This initially appears similar to Leibniz’s early theodicy—specifically, in “On the Ultimate
Origination of Things” (Leibniz 1989, 153), where he discusses his painting analogy for evil; even the
ugly and splotchy part of a painting contributes, when one has a view toward the big picture, to the beauty
of the whole. With Kant, however, caution should be exercised in taking the analogy of art and nature
(apropos organisms) too far, as he warns of the limits of this comparison in the Critique of Teleological
Judgment (CJ 5:374; 5:384-385).
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Once nature has been judged teleologically, and the natural purposes that we find in
organized beings have entitled us to the idea of a vast system of purposes of nature, then
even beauty in nature, i.e., nature’s harmony with the free play of our cognitive
powers as we apprehend and judge its appearance, can similarly be considered as
objective purposiveness, namely, of the whole of nature [regarded] as a system that
includes man as a member. We may regard nature as having held us in favor when it
distributed not only useful things but a wealth of beauty and charms as well; and we may
love it for this, just as its immensity may lead us to contemplate it with respect
[Achtung] and to feel that we ourselves are ennobled in this contemplation—just as it
nature had erected and decorated its splendid stage quite expressly with that aim (CJ
5:380, boldface emphasis mine).
Judgments of the beautiful in nature attune us for reflecting holistically on nature’s systematicity
and appreciating it for its value. This bridge between Kantian aesthetics and teleology prepares
the way humanity to love nature and regard153 it with respect; all the while humanity is reminded
of its embeddedness in nature, not as masters over it, but as members who should love and care
for it. This appreciation compels humanity to avoid being complicit in unnecessary harm toward
nature. If nature as a whole is considered beautiful, then we have a duty to ourselves to not
wantonly destroy it (just as we have a duty not to wantonly destroy beautiful flowers or crystal
formations).
Because judgments of beauty are singular judgments concerning singular objects, it might
be objected that an attempt to view ecosystems (or nature as a whole) as beautiful is misguided
because these are dynamic systems or aggregates, not singular objects. To the contrary, I claim
that if 1) the insights of Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgment regarding how inquiry of
organized beings lead to a larger view of nature as a whole as a singular, organized system, and

It is interesting to note that in the Metaphysics of Morals, in particular, the “amphiboly in moral
concepts of reflection, taking what is a human being’s duty to himself for a duty to other beings” where
one is “led to this misunderstanding by mistaking his duty with regard to [Ansehung] other beings for a
duty to those beings” (MM 6:442), our rational faculties easily lead us to uncritically regard non-rational
nature with respect that is, on Kant’s account, only owed to rational beings (Svoboda 2012, 145). In this
passage from the Critique of Teleological Judgment, however, “Ansehung” is not the term used. It is a
curious question of how to interpret what Kant means by saying nature may be contemplated with respect.
153
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2) if the Analytic of the Beautiful's injunction is to only consider those objects in nature beautiful
that are singular, then objection may be discharged. For, take an organism such as a beautiful
bird; Kant's view warrants judgment of such a bird beautiful, provided the proper occasioning
conditions (e.g. disinterested harmony of the free play of the imagination in the face of an
entity’s apparent formal purposiveness) for a judgment of taste obtain. However, from the
standpoint of the Critique of Teleological Judgment, the bird—as an organized system—is itself
composed of an interrelated aggregate of purposive objects; internally, the cells function to make
the organs function, and externally, the bird is a self-regulating, self-sustaining system. Is this not
the same with regard to ecosystems and nature itself?154 From the vantage of teleological
judgment, flora and fauna are as it were reflectively viewed as the cells that compose the
ecosystems, which are as it were the organs that compose the organism of Gaia itself, which is
nature as a whole. If the Analytic of the Beautiful allows for judging fauna such as birds as
beautiful, why not allow this judgment to expand to larger perspectives that include nature itself?
And if the judgment of a bird as being beautiful entails a duty to avoid wantonly exploiting it,
does not a judgment of the beauty of nature as a whole also entail a similar prima facie duty for
avoiding wanton harm?
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood take similar courses for considering how a Kantian may
value non-rational nature by means of connecting Kant’s aesthetic and teleological judgment to
morality. According to Wood, “Kant thinks we also have moral duties regarding nature in
general as regards what is beautiful or purposive in it. We must not wantonly destroy what is
beautiful in non-rational nature” (Wood 1998, 4). The Kantian emphasis on the importance of

An self-regulating, teleological view of nature similar to Kant’s was made famous in
environmentalism with James Lovelock’s famous Gaia Hypothesis. Gaia was discussed in Chapter 3
where I intimated that Kant’s view of nature can be used as a moral framing device for conservation.
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natural beauty has moral implications. Guyer supports this claim. On his reading, nature’s beauty
and purposiveness could not allow humanity to “interpret morality to require the denial or
destruction of nature within or without our own skins” (Guyer 2007, 93). Reflective aesthetic and
teleological judgments, as analyzed by Kant in Critique of Judgment, have environmental
implications that many traditional readers of Kant fail to account for. The ethical connection of
beauty to nature in Kantian aesthetics thus provides a motivation for valuing the beautiful in
nature. Additionally, the teleological connection of beauty to nature as a whole proscribes the
wanton destruction of even the non-beautiful parts of nature insofar as they are viewed as
purposive from the standpoint of reflective judgment. But what about the contrapurposivness of
sublimity? Surprisingly, little has been said of this in relation to environmental ethics.155 So, this
is where I shall turn to next in order to see what kind of ecological importance it holds.
Part 3: Sublimity from an Environmental Perspective
Another route for connecting Kantian aesthetics to environmental considerations is through
sublimity. Kant gives his official treatment of sublimity in a relatively short section156—the
Analytic on the Sublime—in Critique of Judgment. Kantian sublimity rests on a seeming
formlessness or heteromorphism between the mental faculties of the viewer and the presentation
judged sublime (CJ 5:244). The sublime experience is represented as limitless “and yet it is also
thought as a totality,” and the faculty of reason subjectively relates to the sublime presentation by
means of the ideas of reason (CJ 5:244; 256), whether this totality be immensity, as in the
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For one of the best recent defenses of Kantian sublimity from an environmental perspective, see Emily
Brady’s The Sublime in Modern Philosophy (2013). Brady argues that the admirable feeling associated
with natural sublimity can be a ground for a respect for nature, but the extent to which a Kantian could
commit to such a claim hinges on the crucial distinction between admiration and respect—the former of
which only pertains to nature properly speaking.
156

The sections 23-29 and the general comment on sublimity are shorter, relative to the other two on
beauty and teleology.
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mathematical sublime (CJ 5:248-260), or great power, as in the dynamical sublime (CJ 5:260264).
Because of the seeming boundlessness of the sublime presentation, the aesthetic feeling
of sublimity differs markedly from beauty. The experience of sublimity, which we cannot sense
or imagine but only think it, does violence to the imagination (CJ 5:245). The liking sublimity
produces is a repelling contrapurposive,157 simultaneously evoking feelings of respect.158
For Kant, the feeling of sublimity
is a pleasure that arises only indirectly…produced by the feeling of a momentary
inhibition of the vital forces followed immediately by an outpouring of them that is all
the stronger. Hence, it is an emotion, and so it seems to be seriousness, rather than play,
in the imagination’s activity…since the mind is not just attracted by the object but is
alternatively always repelled as well, the liking for the sublime contains not so much a
positive pleasure as rather admiration or respect (CJ 5:244-45).
The sublime experience arouses in humanity a feeling of independence from nature (CJ 5:246).
This feeling awakens an intimation of our free rational nature—we are able, at least in principle,
to resist any natural inclination or force of nature by means of our power of freedom and respect
for the moral law. Sublimity does not refer to an actual object in nature.159 This is vital for how

157

Paradoxically, the contrapurposive feeling produced by a judgment of sublimity feels purposive in the
sense that we like the tension or constraint that such a judgment places on the senses and the imagination
in attempting to grasp the totality.
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In the following, I shall argue that sublimity has an indirect moral function relevant for the ethics of
climate change. It is important to note that the feelings engendered by sublimity can be utilized to drive
numerous purposes—ethical or unethical—and thus it is important to consider how Kant limits the moral
functions of sublimity. For the time being, I suggest that the moral function of the sublime for humanity
can be constrained by Kant’s moral account of beauty with regard to nature: if we ought not to destroy the
beautiful in nature as a system (and we appreciate this nature disinterestedly and insofar as it sustains us)
or be cruel to animals, then the sublime feeling would also not condone rationally the wanton destruction
and exploitation of nature and animals. For a more in depth discussion on the moral functions and
limitations of the Kantian sublime, see Joshua Rayman, Kant on Sublimity and Morality (2012).
159

Properly speaking, beauty is also only in the subject for Kant. However, Kant often seems inconsistent
here, as he discusses “beautiful objects” in the Analytic of the Beautiful (cf. CJ 5:243), whereas in the
Analytic of the Sublime, Kant is quite careful to restrict his language such that the reader is aware that
sublimity is a subjective affectation rather than an external predicate.
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Kant connects this aesthetic judgment to morality, since sublimity shows how humanity’s free
moral capacities are themselves sublime, capable of instilling respect.
The experience of sublime nature does violence to humanity’s sensuous inclinations,
exhibits the power of its freedom, generates a sense of self-respect, and makes possible the
transition from nature to freedom by means of aesthetic reflective judgement (Rayman 2012, 54).
By referring the feeling of sublimity back to the cognitive powers and moral determination of
humanity, Kant attempts to bridge sublimity and morality. In other words, the contrapurposive
feeling of sublimity reminds us of our own purposive nature with regard to the ends of morality.
The connection between sublimity and morality is highlighted succinctly by Henry E. Allison in
Kant’s Theory of Taste and Joshua Rayman in Kant on Sublimity and Morality.160 On Allison’s
reading,
[A]ccording to the terms of Kant’s own analysis, the sublime stands in an even more
intimate relation to morality than does the beautiful (Allison 2001, 303).
[Sublimity] is at least analogous to moral feeling, and this suffices to make it purposive
for the mind as a whole, or, as Kant sometimes puts it, “the whole vocation of the mind”
([CJ] 5:259; 116), since it helps attune the mind to the uncompromising demands of
morality (Allison 2001, 324).
In addition, Rayman makes the case that there is an even tighter relationship between sublimity
and morality than mere analogy and attunement for morality:
The reflective judgment of sublimity generates the necessary conditions for determining
the moral law, for it proves the existence of a moral sense, produces in the subject the
necessary attunement of respect for the moral law and demonstrates to the subject that it
possesses a determination (Bestimmung) surpassing nature—a moral power. Sublimity
constitutes a necessary condition of moral choice; it does not show what morality or duty
requires, either in general or in specific cases, for these are functions of reason and
determinative judgment. While the experience of moral obligation is supposed to prove
the existence of freedom for practical purposes, since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, this
experience cannot elevate the subject from the phenomenal to the supersensible sphere or
The specifics of their arguments cannot be dealt with here. For a critical reading of Allison’s account
and a broader defense of the moral functions of sublimity in Kant, see Rayman, Kant on Sublimity and
Morality (2012, especially Chapter 5, “Replies to Objections to Sublimity’s Moral Functions” 93-140).
160
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generate the morally necessary attunement of respect for the moral law, for the
experience of obligation does not entail the exhibition of our supersensible moral power
or the determination of respect for the moral law. Whereas the experience of moral
obligation provides an indirect, practical link to our freedom, the experience of sublimity
provides a direct, practical proof of freedom, in that it makes us aware of our
supersensible power to act independently of nature… The experience of
sublimity…establishes the conditions for the determinability of the moral subject in
revealing the subject’s powers and situating the subject in the paradigm case for morality
(Rayman 2012, 138-139).
The contrapurposive feeling of nature’s sublimity with regard to our reflective facilities and the
realization of the purposiveness of our mind with regard to the demands of morality marks the
key epiphanic moment, shifting our reflection inward toward our own power of freedom and the
determinability of our will by the moral law. With sublimity, “we can feel a purposiveness
within ourselves entirely independent of nature” (CJ 5:246). The feeling of powerlessness or awe
in nature’s vastness functions as a stark reminder of the mighty power of humanity’s own
rational faculties. Kant thus asserts that “if in judging nature aesthetically we call it sublime, we
do so not because nature arouses fear, but because it calls forth our strength” (CJ 5:262).
Kantian sublimity presses us to overcome our own unethical practices by reminding us of
our moral nature—that is, regardless of nature’s immensity or might, we still can act morally and
stand our ground. In the case of dynamical sublimity in particular, this allows us to understand
how we can have the moral fortitude (CJ 5:261) to resist the mighty forces of nature—even if it
should destroy us. The hurricane’s sublimity, for instance, reminds us of our moral nature by
letting us feel respect for the moral law; we know that we can remain steadfast in the face of
nature’s immense power, despite our imminent doom. Compared to its might, “our ability to
resist becomes an insignificant trifle”—Sublimity elevates “the soul’s fortitude above its usual
middle range and allow us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which is of a quite different
kind, and which gives us the courage [to believe] that we could be a match for nature’s seeming
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omnipotence” (CJ 5:261). The reflective visualization of our demise attunes us to morality by
reminding us of our freedom and the capacity we have to determine our will in accordance with
the moral law rather than sensuous inclinations; we realize that we can remain moral even in
spite of concerns for our own safety. For instance, a physician in the midst of the sublime storm
is reminded of her duty to help the sick, even if this puts her life at risk by remaining in flood
zones. The experience of the storm’s sublimity helps her double-down in performing her duty
with moral courage.
Notwithstanding the strong connection Kant makes between sublimity and morality,
Kant’s approach tends to follow in the anthropocentric161 tradition that many environmental
ethicists deplore162 since he elevates human rationality above non-rational nature (CJ 5:264).
Because of this prejudice, it is difficult for a Kantian account to allow for duties to what we
would call sublime nature.163 Despite this, the experience of natural sublimity on Kant’s view
arouses in humanity self-respect. By bypassing the disinterested valuation of nature itself (as in
this chapter’s discussion of the Analytic of the Beautiful), and doing violence to our selfish

Because Kant’s primary focus in the Analytic of the Sublime is how reason functions as an interplay
with the aesthetic response, it might be argued that Kant’s account is not anthropocentric but, to use
Wood’s phrase, “logocentric” (Wood 1998). Nonetheless, because humanity’s sensible faculties—
idiosyncratic to the human species, play a key part in Kant’s aesthetic accounts, Kant’s anthropocentrism
may still be considered as a potential obstacle.
161
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Since environmentalist approaches to philosophy have tended to draw from empirical theories in
ecology and the life sciences, they have also tended to favor naturalized visions of humanity, deploring
anthropocentric or logocentric philosophical thinkers who separate the natural from the rational or moral.
Kant—at least in his standard view from Groundwork and the first Critique’s transcendental idealism—
appears to be opposed to any naturalized conception of humanity. For examples of non-anthropocentric
environmental approaches, see figures in the deep ecological tradition, such as Naess, “Self-Realization:
An Ecological Approach to being in the World” (1995) or eco-centrist proponents, such as Callicott, “In
Defense of the Land Ethic” (1989). In Chapter 3, it was argued that the views of environmental ethicists
of this sort are compatible with Kant’s early ontology of nature.
163

Whenever I talk of sublime nature, I mean nature as experienced as sublime by the agent, since on
Kant’s account, sublimity properly speaking precludes discussion of sublimity as a predicate of nature—
rather, it is properly found “in the mind” (CJ 5:245; 5:250).
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inclinations, sublimity attunes us to reconsider our unethical lifestyles. From this, then, the
connection of irrational and undignified behaviors to unsustainable ones can be made. Herein lies
one key for applying Kant’s aesthetic-moral teachings to environmental concerns like
sustainability and environmental degradation.
Sublimity allows us to have the moral courage to overcome the feeling of powerlessness
against nature and to act properly in the face of something as massive or powerful as climate
change. To wit, the experience of the sublimity of climate change’s can establish the precondition for the determinability of our will by the moral law, adapting Rayman’s account of the
moral function of sublimity for present environmental concerns. The sublime experience can
engender in us an impetus toward environmental protection, which could be a useful tool for
grappling with the ethics of climate change; if we imagine164 climate change and its effects as
sublime—for example, sea-level rise and its devastation on maritime peoples; hurricanes and
their monstrous power; or extreme heat the ensuing desolation—that is, if we consider the
evocation of sublimity from climate change with its effects and feedback loops, this judgment
can arouse in us the mettle to overcome it. The sublime aesthetic experience can indirectly
motivate us in pursuing climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies, which in turn can
facilitate concrete environmental praxis such as, for instance, conservation or sustainable and
equitable development. The sublime phenomena constitute an emotion; this emotion moves us to
moral action but does so without specifying our precise duties. Nonetheless, when we reflect on
climate change and the impacts that it will have on present generations, future generations, and
non-rational nature, the sublime experience of climate change lets us realize that we have the

Michael Thompson, “Climate, Imagination, Kant, and Situational Awareness” (2011) provides a recent
example of how one can connect Kant’s account of imagination to the ethics of climate change. However,
he doesn’t grapple with Kant’s account of sublimity for these ends as I do here.
164

140

power to act morally in the face of its immense power. Failure to engage in sustainable action is
incompatible with our duty to act as if we were legislators in a kingdom of ends; precludes
human progress; unjustly treats other ends in themselves—especially persons in developing
countries who face the blunt of climate change—as a mere means for the sake of business-asusual luxury emissions; and finally amounts to a vast diminution of the moral purity of
individual moral agents—since countless species stand to be harmed or become extinct if we fail
to contend with climate change.165 Though Kantian sublimity supports the bifurcation of
humanity from nature that many environmental ethicists deplore—in arousing in us the sense of
our capacity to stand outside nature, to think it as a totality, and to resist its force—it still
presents us with an emotion that morally attunes us to the environmental task at hand. Kantian
sublimity thus has a moral function that aids us to combat our own moral evils and deficiencies
that have engendered anthropogenic climate change in the first place.
Environmental Limitations of Kantianism
Despite the usefulness of Kant’s account of natural beauty, it might be objected that Kantian
sublimity is only indirectly helpful for human-related concerns like climate change, and this
somehow makes it deficient for an environmental theory. In addition, the feeling of sublimity
does not attune us for any specific duties. Aesthetic judgment provides a reason for valuing
beautiful nature (including the beautiful harmony of biodiversity) from which inferences can be
made about moral duties in relation to climate change. However, with Kantian sublimity, nature
is not itself loved or valued, since sublimity ultimately refers to humanity’s rational faculties.
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These three avenues—namely a duty to perfect the species, a duty to not treat those in developing
nations as mere means for the sake of luxury, and duty to oneself to care and be concerned for the welfare
of animal species affected by climate change—are pursued in more depth in Chapter 5. Presently, my
point is merely to show how the experience of climate change as a sublime dynamic object helps prepare
the way for thinking about such duties for sustainability in an indirect fashion.
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Sublime nature possibly entails an instrumental view of nature where nature is valued as a
means, and that means is for perfecting humanity. This has already been noted in much of the
environmental aesthetics literature, where Kant is often seen as the eco-bogeyman because of
this elevation of human reason over nature (e.g. Bilbro 2015, 137). Indeed, Kant says that
sublimity makes us “conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and thereby also to nature
outside us” (CJ 5:264). Notwithstanding my intended focus on the limitations of Kant’s sublime
for environmental ethics, the bifurcation of human-rational nature from non-human irrational
nature strikes to the core of the problematic relationship between his philosophy and the
environment.166 J. L. Bilbro is a contemporary commentator who has identified certain
anthropocentric problems of Kantianism for environmental philosophy, but he is by no means the
first person to make this observation. To be sure, critics of Kant have been making this and
similar claims about the supposedly inhumane aspects of Kant’s philosophy for non-human
animals since at least the 1980s.
Now, the two mains thrusts of this objection, then, seem to concern the limited moral
value of Kantian aesthetic judgment (and Kantianism in general) insofar as environmental issues
only matter as they relate to humanity, and the contention that Kant separates humanity from
nature in some deep normative or metaphysical sense. In the ‘70s and ‘80s, the first would
indeed be a legitimate concern. However, as was argued previously, Kant’s apparent
anthropocentrism is no longer a liability. Rather, in fact, it is now a resource; for in the age of the
Anthropocene, failure to tackle the challenge of climate change also entails an imminent sixth

As Holly L. Wilson addresses and attempts to refute in “Rethinking Kant from the Perspective of
Ecofeminism,” many environmental ethicists (and especially ecofeminists) object to the normative
dualisms they see as built into Kant’s critical philosophy, whereby “the mind appears to be superior to the
body, and human beings appear to be superior to animals” (Wilson 1997, 385).
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mass extinction. Hence, the old concerns of whether we have direct duties to animals and
whether anthropocentrism is compatible with environmental ethics have become outdated.
Addressing climate change—even if only from the vantage of preserving human ends in
themselves—indirectly assists in protecting vast swathes of animal life, biodiversity, and
ecosystems. With regard to the second concern, it is misguided. Kant’s aesthetic account indeed
emphasizes how humanity is embedded in nature. According to Brady,
It is important to remember…that the disruption of the self that occurs here [in sublime
judgment] is not a self standing outside nature. After all, in the Critique of the Power of
Judgment, Kant does not argue from the position of human separation from nature, but
from our inclusion in nature and nature’s inclusion in us, namely the sensible self with its
inclinations.
He is not arguing for a dominion of humans over nature, and his view of nature is not one
of a hostile environment to be conquered, even if it does threaten our well-being. Instead,
he values nature for the challenges it presents to us, as something that is difficult for us to
face, and against which morality provides the resources needed to cope (Brady 2013, 8283).
With the sublime challenge of climate change, the recognition of humanity’s embeddedness in
nature is even more urgent. So, although Bilbro’s Hoffian objection regarding the
anthropocentrism of Kantian sublimity is well-taken, reframing Kant’s moral philosophy and
aesthetics in light of the more pressing concern of climate change makes it largely
inconsequential.
From Moral Views of Nature to Sustainable Cosmopolitanism
So far, I have defended a theoretical-aesthetic means by which a broadly Kantian approach can
prepare us morally for thinking through potential duties regarding environmental issues like
environmental degradation and climate change. Additionally, Chapter 3 and 4 focused on nature
and the environment considered as a holistic totality and on ways of valuing and morally
preparing for nature presently. To get a better picture of Kant’s holism and applicability to

143

environmental ethics for the greening of Kant, we need a vision that includes both spatial and
temporal dimensions: a future-oriented view of Kant’s thought is required to show his relevance
to the pressing challenge of climate change and the fate of future generations. Our next task will
thus take its point of departure from the evolutionary and cosmopolitan standpoint of Kant’s
philosophy of history, invoking Kantian anthropology and Kant’s understanding of humanity as
a moral species to develop the possibility for concrete duties in preparation for an ethics of
sustainability (such as contributing to the project of perfecting the human species, which now
should involve ecological stewardship and a concern for future generations). As Yirmiyahu
Yovel notes (Yovel 1980, 72) the idea of the highest good developed out of Kant’s moralanthropological reflections—as an aspiration toward the harmonization of morality, happiness,
and nature into a unified system—becomes not merely a lofty goal worth hoping for, but rather a
social duty167 and a historical task that Kant’s vision of cosmopolitan progress requires.
Like Bilbro, Hoff’s worry with regard to Kant’s humanistic philosophy lies in his
ostensibly impoverished environmental pretensions. Grappling with these worries requires, first,
an investigation into Kant’s view of humanity outside the abstract lens of Groundwork or Kant’s
aesthetics and second, a perspective with climate change in view. The worry with regard to an
anthropocentric take on climate ethics is not yet overcome; humanity could, for instance, be
motivated to save itself from climate change by experiencing its sublimity, yet remain indifferent
for fostering nature’s diversity. The sublime experience of climate change’s dynamical might
could perhaps impress humanity to save the planet, but to do so by means of geoengineering the

Harry van der Linden in Kantian Ethics and Socialism (1988) interprets Kant’s anthropological and
moral works in order to show how Kantians have not only individual duties, but also social duties. The
next chapter will consider how such social obligations arise and can be justified by Kant’s philosophy.
167
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planet into one of minimal biodiversity (the bare minimum for sustaining ecosystems).168 Such is
the invidious nature of the Anthropocene. It is obvious that many environmentalists will not
accept this, as diversity in nature seems to be a key value in environmental ethics. Will sublimity
as found in the Analytic of the Sublime remain limited here? It would appear that Kant’s
injunction in the Analytic of the Beautiful and Critique of Teleological Judgment to appreciate
and preserve nature’s unity-within-diversity could assuage such worries. Still, in order to gain
more traction for the greening of Kant and persuade those unconvinced by Kant’s pre-critical
ontology or critical aesthetics, I suggest we now turn to Kant’s anthropology and philosophy of
history in order to show they can be a resource for the ends of sustainability. For the specter of
Hoff returns: her problematization of Kantian humanism requires us to pursue the question of the
value and limitations of Kantian anthropology for environmental ethics. I intend to show how
many of the supposed problems with regard to Kant’s view on animals can be resolved by
thinking about how Kant’s philosophy can be applied for the ends of climate ethics. Thus, we
will make sense of Kant’s holism and its environmental import by moving from the theoreticalaesthetic view of nature in the pre-critical ontology and Critique of Judgement to the politicalcosmopolitan view of humanity in Idea, Conjectural Beginning, and Anthropology.
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Some conservation literature suggests that ecosystems can be sustained with very minimal variety in
fauna. Many proponents of the so-called “bright-“ or “neon-green” ecology embrace this implication,
celebrating the Anthropocene as humanity’s triumph over or escape from nature. For example, consider
Erle C. Ellis, “Sustaining biodiversity and people in the world’s anthropogenic biomes” (2013) for
argument that anthromes are superceding biomes.
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CHAPTER 5:
KANTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY: BLUEPRINTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY
The previous chapter was concerned with a holistic view of nature through the lens of Kantian
reflective judgment. This chapter will shift gears to discuss human history in a similarly holistic
way. Contributing to the moral development and progress of the species is, for Kant, analogous
to the making of humanity and nature into a work of art. Indeed, what better analogy for
perfecting the species than how a work of art is refined? In this chapter, we find ourselves in an
ideal position to transition our discussion from nature and natural aesthetics to humanity and
sustainability. For, morally perfecting humanity as art also means— in light of climate change—
redesigning the human interface with nature toward sustainability and reshaping ourselves as
environmental stewards: the fundamental task of the Anthropocene. This involves, even more
fundamentally, a deep questioning of our values; just as the artist becomes one with the artwork,
so also must humanity rethink the meaning of its relationship to nature. To be an artist
contributing to the perfection of the species today requires, at a minimum, becoming a steward of
nature. Regarding the Kantian holism issued in support of the greening of Kant, Chapters 3 and 4
were concerned with holism vis-à-vis the environment (interconnection in space) and natural
aesthetics (moral views of nature). This final chapter will be concerned with holism vis-à-vis
human history (evolving through time) and art (sustainability).
Revisiting Kant’s Anthropology and Philosophy of History
An overarching motif of Kant’s anthropology is the view of humanity as an essentially
developmental species: humanity progresses on a pathway of perfection as it strives for an
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enlightened, cosmopolitan future.169 This chapter concentrates on the ethical insights of
underappreciated anthropological texts from Kant’s critical period170 with an eye for their
contemporary application. Specifically, I argue that holistic aspects of Kant’s understanding of
humanity have interdisciplinary and ethical relevance for the global challenge of climate change.
Interestingly, these seemingly anomalous essays have received scant attention in contemporary
Kant literature.171 The collective and evolutionary172 elements of Kant’s thought—such as the
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Kant is clear that the progress of the species is in no way guaranteed (e.g. CB 8:17), and it is quite
possible that humanity will destroy itself by war (or, now, by the monster of its own creation:
anthropogenic climate change). The stakes are real. Rather, progress is a regulative idea that has a useful
moral function in helping us realize it. The commonly lodged claim that Kant is a naive optimist, like
Leibniz, is thus misguided. This isn’t the best of all possible worlds, but it is possible to make it better.
170

These essays sit at an interesting middle-point in the critical period. Idea was published shortly before
“Enlightenment” in 1784, one year before Groundwork. Conjectural Beginning was published a year after
Groundwork, in 1786—the same year that Kant attempted to incorporate the critical teachings into his
reading of Newtonian mechanics in Metaphysical Foundations and prior to the B edition of Critique of
Pure Reason (1787). Both of these essays precede the developments in the second and third Critiques,
though in many respects they are inchoate anticipations of those later works. Connections can also be
drawn to the later Religion or Perpetual Peace (Allison 2009). Scholars such as Ameriks (2009) note the
tension found in Idea and Conjectural Beginning by their seemingly uncritical use of teleology and
conflation of theoretical and practical cognition, the former of which would not be qualified by its
regulative epistemological status until Critique of Judgment (1790), the latter, resolved in the second
Critique’s (1788) elucidation of cognition from the practical point of view. For more reflections on Idea
and its place in the Kantian canon, see the collection Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History with
Cosmopolitan Aim’: A Critical Guide, edited by Rorty and Schmidt (2009).
171

There are numerous reasons for why these texts have been undervalued by Kantians. Idea, even with
the first sentence of thesis I apparently asserts a dogmatic claim about teleology contrary to Kant’s
teachings on the appropriate use of reason for possible experience. Yovel claims that Conjectural
Beginning is an odd dogmatic text of only political value; he suggests that it is best complimented with
Critique of Judgment as a way for resolving its dogmatism (Yovel 1980, 127; 186); if Yovel’s suggestion
is heeded, this makes my discussion of humanity in this chapter flow seamlessly from the previous
chapter’s discussion of the third Critique. Conjectural Beginning, as Lewis White Beck (1963) notes, was
a polemical response to Kant’s student, Herder, whose romantic Spinozist pretensions contradict the first
Critique’s transcendental idealism. Both texts also seem much more religiously oriented—with Idea’s
“guiding hand of nature” as providence, and Conjectural Beginning’s use of the Bible. Part of my aim,
then, is to show how there is more to be found in these texts than is usually thought. They indeed deserve
our philosophical attention in the age of anthropogenic climate change.
By “evolutionary” I do not mean to imply that Kant’s thought relates to evolutionary theory as
promulgated by Darwin and his followers (though there is an interesting passage in Anthropology where
Kant supposes that it wouldn’t be contrary to a system of nature for humanity to have evolved from apes,
7:328); rather, by evolutionary I mean that natural entities—humanity included—have the capacity to
develop from rudimentary forms into more complex and intellectually sophisticated ones. This includes
172
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notion of a cosmic, cosmopolitan citizen—are brought into greater relief in these historical
essays than others from the critical period, and humanity is viewed in holistic terms. Since his
teleological views are progressive and future-oriented (interpreted within the secular problematic
of the Enlightenment rather than theology), Kant’s philosophical views on the human species173
can thus be a resource for the ethics of climate change and the notion of moral progress. As
Yirmiyahu Yovel says, the telos of history for humanity is at its core that “which has to spread
and embrace the whole human race” (Yovel 1980, 126-27). And yet, despite the affinity of the
progressive ideas highlighted in Kant’s anthropological essays with past and later developments
in Western philosophy—such as Rousseau on the one hand and Schiller, Hegel, and Marx, on the
other—they remain fruitlessly interred.174 I aim to show how these themes are of particular

evolution in a moral sense (as we sharpen our moral predispositions for the sake of aspiring to perfection
in Kant’s philosophy of history), a cognitive sense (in the history of philosophy our ideas culminate to
enlightened self-reflection), a socio-political sense (as humanity, by way of its unsocial sociability and
propensity to culture, approximates perpetual peace), and a physical sense (via the emergence of the
cosmos; e.g. UNH 1:312-14).
173

See footnote 7 in the Introduction for my rationale for not addressing the lamentable racist and sexist
tendencies in Kantian anthropology. In brief, I am concerned with the holistic elements of Kantian
anthropology and the notion of the species as an intergenerational totality, not with the idiosyncrasies of
Kant’s theory of race and etc. These certainly deserve consideration but fall outside the scope of this
dissertation.
A few relatively recent works suggest that these undervalued works are essential to the study of Kant’s
ethical thought. Robert Louden’s Kant’s Impure Ethics (2000) and Yovel’s Kant’s Philosophy of History
(1980) are two studies that place importance on Kant’s anthropological and historical texts for
understanding Kant’s development and his thought as a whole, especially with regard to his moral
philosophy. Despite these exceptions, in general Kant’s anthropological texts such as Idea and
Conjectural Beginning have fallen by the way-side.There is other recent work on applying Kantian
accounts of history vis-à-vis ethical and political theory to contemporary issues, such as the refugee crisis
in Syria (Altman, “Limits of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism” 2017). However, little work has been done with
regard to these specific essays and their relationship to the challenges of climate change. One exception is
Casey Rentmeester, “A Kantian Look at Climate Change” (2010), who briefly mentions the connection of
Kant’s collective view of humanity here with a league of nations and the potential of the UNFCCC.
Rentmeester, however, devotes most of his attention to the standard ethical texts of Kant such as
Groundwork, rather than these essays in particular.
174
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importance today, especially with regard to addressing climate change: in short, they can be read
as blueprints of sustainability.175
Problems of considerable difficulty for climate change concern the representation of the
world-system as a single object of cognition and, second, the utilization of such a representation
for confronting the collective, international challenges of climate change. I argued for potential
benefits of Kant’s pre-critical ontology of nature for these issues in Chapter 3. In the present
chapter, I claim Kant’s anthropology can be an asset here as well, especially with regard to
sustainability. For on Kant’s anthropological views, nature is understood as the unity in which
humanity unfolds in accordance with the idea of a teleological narrative. The human species and
its potential for progress are viewed holistically by Kant in these works, internationally and
intergenerationally: “Moral progress on the historical scale is,” on Yovel’s reading of Kant’s
anthropological view, “a totalizing concept, stretching beyond the boundaries of the single
person to incorporate all rational beings in all their acts and decisions” (Yovel 1980, 197).
Thomas E. Hill in “Humanity as an End in Itself” (1980) also highlights the holistic, social
emphasis of Kantian ethics via Kant’s view of humanity (Linden 1988, 31). Reconsidering
Kant’s holistic view of humanity and history with an eye to our global predicament makes his
seemingly dated teleological views relevant to the contemporary world of ethics and politics,
especially since “Kant’s philosophy of history is,” indeed, “praxis- and future-oriented” (Linden
1988, 114). This chapter’s exploration into the environmental resources of Kantian anthropology
indeed has important implications for the intergenerational, international ethics of climate change

Schönfeld, “The Kantian Blueprint of Climate Control” (2008) also discusses how Kant’s thought can
be interpreted in light of current issues as blueprints. However, he differs from my approach here because
I am concerned with political and evolutionary thought in Kant’s anthropology and philosophy of history
and its heuristic potential, whereas in that paper Schönfeld is concerned with interpreting Groundwork’s
formulation of universalizability with regard to sustainable actions and the formulation of respect for
persons with regard to humane benevolence for present and future generations.
175
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and gives us a heroic vision for a cosmopolitan world, as I shall explain below. In the last
analysis, insights from Kant’s underappreciated anthropological texts are thus not only
philosophically relevant with regard to Kant scholarship, since they underscore the collective,
non-individualist elements of his thought, but they also have practical significance for the
pressing global concerns humanity faces today. I argue that four specific aspects can be drawn
from Kant’s vision of humanity that are helpful for application to climate ethics. These are
sketched below and further developed in the body of this chapter.
First, when interpreted in light of the climate crisis, Kant’s heroic vision enjoins us to
develop an attitude of solidarity needed for overcoming climate change and transitioning to
sustainability. In other words, viewing the climate crisis through Kant’s anthropological texts can
help us reinterpret humanity as a collective agent: a hero struggling with an obstacle impeding
cosmopolitan progress. My use of the term “heroic” here is intentional, not hyperbolic. Not only
is the fight against human-made climate change, so to speak, a battle176 of epic proportions the
likes of which humanity has never faced before—but it also is a collective endeavor in which we
are forced to think of the species as a singular agent (or “hero”).177 On the Kantian picture,
humanity (mediated through the present generation) can be seen as a hero in the traditional sense,
for two reasons: first, humanity is framed as a singular by Kant: “the actual subject of the history
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Naomi Klein in the popular This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (2014) frames
climate change as a battle between capitalism and the planet (Klein 2014, 22); I think, rather, that the
heroic task from the Kantian perspective should be seen as the battle of humanity against its own selfincurred immaturity in creating the conditions for climate change: The heroic battle is humanity fighting
for sustainability.
Cf. to Kant’s analogical discussion of nations as a single rational agents (PP 8:344; MM 6:343), and
his holistic view of humanity in Part 3 of TP (8:307-313). I am not the only one to discuss Kant’s view of
human progress as a heroic view; Kleingeld discusses the heroic position in Chapter 6 of her Kant and
Cosmopolitanism (2012). I am not as pessimistic as Kleingeld (e.g. “we must battle, with no hope of
victory, to do as we ought”)—since I find in Kant reasons for thinking that, despite no guarantee of
“victory” for human progress, humanity still has good reason to hope for a future of cosmopolitanism.
177
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of reason is not the individual but the human race collectively” (Yovel 1980, 144). Second, a
hero acts for the sake of something greater than itself—for the sake of future generations and a
sustainable future; for Kant, this is precisely the way in which present humanity, as a collective
entity, should act in pursuit of an enlightened kingdom of ends.
The mythology of the hero can be helpful for thinking about Kant’s heroic vision for
humanity along the treacherous pathway of progress. As literature and comparative mythology
scholar Joseph Campbell expressed in 1949 in The Hero with a Thousand Faces, though the hero
has been portrayed in manifold ways across cultural time and space, there are a few unifying
features of the mythological hero that converge in the idea of a “monomyth.” The monomyth can
underscore how Kant’s view of humanity reflects the hero taking up the heroic task. For
according to Campbell, “The standard path of the mythological adventure of the hero is the
magnification of the formula represented in the rites of passage: separation—initiation—return:
which might be named the nuclear unit of the monomyth” (Campbell 2008, 23). The hero must
begin by alienating the world of comfort in order to set out on the heroic path. The hero acts
beyond the present, oriented toward the future. With regard to Kant, this means that humanity
must take up the difficult task of developing culture, science, and philosophy in order to
supersede the limitations and obstacles for progress such as idleness, self-conceit, and war; today
we must include unsustainability and a business-as-usual attitude as impediments to progress in
an environmental sense. Now once the heroic task has been completed, the hero returns,
grounded in a new significance and at home, in both literal and ecological senses, for the root of
ecology means “home.” The hero doesn’t simply return to the way things were before. Rather,
the hero’s return involves a qualitative, authentic shift—in both the self and the society as a
whole. Indeed, for the mythological hero the return of the hero is “a world-historical,
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macrocosmic triumph” (Campbell 2008, 30). Humanity understood by Kant must follow this
trajectory of progress in order to secure a kingdom of ends on earth, which is such a qualitative
shift. Not only ought all our external actions harmonize, as a “society of devils” could do alone
(PP 8:366), but humanity’s inner state must change. In taking up the heroic task, we reorient
ourselves with regard to our values and sustainability in how we treat nature and how we treat
others. The structure of the heroic task—both in the mythological hero and in how it is mirrored
in Kant’s vision of humanity—can be expressed today as the quest for overcoming climate
change and returning home to a sustainable future.
On Kant’s view, like the mythological hero’s struggle, humanity must continually strive
for the sake of the larger whole, despite being unable to reap the benefits of happiness or security
in enduring the hardships that necessarily burden this difficult path. This includes working
towards progressing the species, pursuing enlightenment, and fostering the education of youth.
Striving heroically for humanity’s progress thus leads to an attitudinal shift toward universal
solidarity, facilitating collective action. The heroic struggle is the beginning of the cognitive shift
we find as the mythological hero returns home. With the onset of climate change—like war for
Kant—this pathway of progress becomes all the more perilous: it is a heroic task. Humanity
assumes the role of the hero and must live up to its task. Only time will tell if our hero must
perish in the epic quest or if our hero’s sublime battle against climate change will be victorious.
Regarding the second aspect of Kant’s anthropological thought helpful for sustainability:
as a result of this attitudinal shift toward solidarity, the heroic incentive inspires us to act as
citizens of the world, which includes the cultivation of virtues such as mindfulness, courage, and
responsibility. Extensive recent work has been done in environmental virtue ethics, and Kant’s
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historical texts can be of some help for thinking how the ideal of moral progress is tied to virtues
conducive for transitioning to a sustainable future.
Third, when we adopt Kant’s heroic vision, engage with our world in a cosmopolitan
manner, and cultivate environmental virtues, humanity can be seen in a different light, viz.
defined by our relationship to the environment. Understanding what it means to be human
changes, since climate change challenges the human-environment interface and the meaning of
existence. Humanity’s moral vocation, on Kant’s view, is an essential aspect of the species.
Accordingly, climate change requires a reconsideration of how this vocation can be adapted for
the sake of transitioning to sustainability. Thus, an environmental re-examination of Kantian
anthropology reminds us that our moral vocation, today, requires stewardship. In order to fulfill
this vocation, humanity must strive for a kingdom of ends and treat moral agents with dignity.
Since climate change creates inequitable and inhospitable environments, stewardship becomes a
fundamental condition for realizing our moral vocation. Thus, from the perspective of the
environment, this points us toward sustainable stewardship.
Last, on Kant’s account, humanity has an obligation to contribute to the perfection of the
species; failure to take part in this project is thus a moral failing. And with climate change, our
moral failing also becomes an existential failing, as human lives stand to be lost. Because of our
duties for moral purity and for realizing a kingdom of ends, a reawakening of the cause for
cosmopolitan enlightenment is required. This reawakening shows how Kant’s moral philosophy,
when viewed through the lens of the anthropological works, is much more non-individualist than
is usually thought. Rather, as some thinkers (hearkening to the neo-Kantian interpretations of
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Hermann Cohen)178 point out, Kant’s philosophy can be an adequate foundation for a moral
socialism. Because of the well-known deadlock between capitalism and sustainability, a
disclosure of the socialist tendencies in Kant’s thought can aid in thinking past the liberalcapitalist obstacles of sustainable progress.
This chapter consists of three parts. In Part 1, I outline Kant’s teleological vision of
humanity as collective, historical, and progressive, focusing on Idea and Conjectural Beginning
(but also drawing from “Enlightenment,” Pedagogy, and Anthropology). I address the tricky
issue of interpreting Kant’s views on religion in a lengthy discussion that concludes Part 1; I
make the radical suggestion that Kant’s religiosity is best explained in Gaian terms. In Part 2, I
then utilize Kant’s heroic view of humanity to show that conceiving of climate change as a
heroic task challenging humanity’s historical progression can instill a sense of courageous
urgency for sustainability. Finally, with Part 3 I briefly discuss Kantian thought in relation to
capitalism and the limits of liberalism; Kant’s understanding of humanity as collective and
historical—spanning space (nations) and time (generations)—overcomes the unsustainable
limitations of liberal thought.179
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For some of the most historically influential socialist readings of Kant, see Hermann Cohen, Kants
Begruendung der Ethik (1877), Karl Vorlaender, Kant und Marx (1926) and “Kant und der Sozialismus”
(1900), Thomas E. Willey, Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical
Thought (1978), Timothy R. Keck, Kant and Socialism: The Marburg School in Wilhelmian Germany
(1975), as well as Linden’s “Appendix: A Historical Note on Kantian Ethical Socialism” (1988).
When I refer to “liberalism” in this chapter I am specifically referring to the classic economicoideological conception of liberalism—where the notion of individuality is regarded to be of utmost
importance and the belief in the virtue of unimpeded individual freedoms is apotheosized; this is to be
distinguished from the contemporary social use of the term, where one distinguishes liberals from
conservatives on a political spectrum, usually with regard to identity political issues. With regard to
classic liberalism, one could be both a liberal in the classical sense and a conservative in the social sense.
In Part 3 I will consider the extent to which Kant is a proponent of classic liberal thought, and how this
may impede his usefulness as a philosopher of sustainability. The reader may wish to refer to John Stuart
Mill’s On Liberty (1859), which is generally thought to be the best philosophical depiction of classical
liberalism.
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Part 1: Overview and Context of Kant’s Idea and Conjectural Beginning
I focus my discussion of the philosophical and ethical relevance of Kantian anthropology by
examining Idea and Conjectural Beginning.180 These two peculiar and seemingly misplaced
essays were written during the critical period. Both were published in the Berlinische
Monatsschrift—a casual journal aimed more for learned citizenry than for theologians or
philosophers (Rorty and Schmidt 2009, 4-5). In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant intends for his
readership philosophers and academics, not laypersons (CPR Axviii-xix). Idea and Conjectural
Beginning, by contrast, are clearly aimed to a more popular audience. In spite of this, the
seriousness of Kant’s claims should not be downplayed. For several central ideas in these essays
indeed pervade the critical teachings, though some, perhaps, in inchoate form. For example, Kant
subscribes to a “teleological doctrine of nature” in Idea as one of its guiding motifs (Idea 8:18),
yet doesn’t distinguish between the regulative and constitutive teleology of the other
Critiques.181 In Idea and Conjectural Beginning, it may appear that Kant slips into dogmatism.
This assumption is mistaken. Though Kant has yet to make the strong distinction between
practical and theoretical cognition that he makes in the second Critique (CPrR 5:19-20), this is
surely his intent when discussing the weak epistemic status of his heuristic claims in his
philosophy of history (Idea 8:29; CB 8:109, 123). I will discuss both essays briefly in turn, to get
to the core of Kant’s philosophical understanding of humanity. This, as I will show, is how
Kant’s insights can be connected to contemporary climate issues.
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I focus on these texts because first, they have generally been scrutinized more in the literature than
Kant’s other anthropological texts, and second, because they best highlight the connections between
Kant’s view of humanity with his ethical theory. This is unsurprising, as they were written around the
same time as Kant’s Groundwork and shortly before Critique of Practical Reason.
See, for example, the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of Critique of Pure Reason: “On the
Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason” (CPR A642/B670-A668/B696) and Critique of Judgment
(CJ 5:379).
181
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Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Aim
Kant publishes Idea after the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason and shortly before
“Enlightenment” (Beck 1963, viii). Not unsurprisingly, it addresses several aspects dealt with in
those works, but deviates insofar as it does not focus on transcendental idealism or individual
enlightenment. Instead, Idea takes a collective or social frame of reference when considering
humanity’s orientation toward the future. Kant’s main concern in this essay is to reflect on
whether it is possible—from a philosophical, not empirical, standpoint—to consider human
history as going somewhere. Is it rational to think of humanity’s trajectory as a narrative on a
developmental pathway, progressing toward excellence?182 What kind of pragmatic utility or
experiential guidance can such an evolutionary narrative bestow us?
Kant begins Idea by suggesting that it is promising to depict “a pattern, indeed a
progress, in human affairs through the development of humankind’s ‘original predispositions’”
(Allison 2009, 26). Like his early ontological works in Physical Monadology and Universal
Natural History,183 Kant takes a grander point of view in Idea. Here, he attempts to reflect on the
dynamic structures of human existence—not in relation to individual rational agents as in
Groundwork, but from the perspective of humanity as a species. In the first proposition, Kant
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Evidence that Kant took the progress of the species as a serious philosophic concern can be found from
comments of Kant’s colleague and follower, Johann Schultz: “A favorite idea of Professor Kant is that the
final end of humankind is the attainment of the most perfect political constitution, and he wishes that a
philosophical historiographer would undertake to provide us in this respect with a history of humanity,
and to show how far humanity has approached this final end in different ages, or how far removed it has
been from it, and what is still to be done for its attainment” (from Anthropology, History, and Education
2012, 8:468).
183

In Physical Monadology, Kant considers from a broader, natural-metaphysical perspective, how
dynamic attractive and repulsive forces engender space, matter, and bodies. Similarly, in Universal
Natural History, Kant takes A “big picture” view of the cosmos. The anthropological texts such as Idea
are reminiscent of these pre-critical, cosmological and naturalistic texts insofar as they all utilize a
dynamic, evolutionary view of the world and our place in it. The ecologically useful elements of Kant’s
pre-critical ontology are still apparent in a more implicit form, even in the critical period.
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endorses a form of natural teleology: all organic entities are destined to develop their natural
predispositions. Then, he homes in on humanity and our unique predisposition toward reason.
Why would nature furnish us with rational faculties and the ability to set our own ends, questions
Kant, unless it would be possible for us to someday fully develop and utilize them? As Kant
would later formulate in Critique of Judgment, it is a demand of reason (for judgment) and
condition for the possibility of the rational investigation of nature184 to assume that nature does
nothing in vain (Förster 2009, 198). The problem for humanity, however, is that this process can
never be completed in a single individual, as our lifetimes are short and often filled with strife.
Moreover, “no single human being, not even any group of people, nor even all human beings
living at any given time or up to any given time, will ever fully exhibit all the rational capacities
of the human species” (Wood 1999, 211). To resolve this difficulty, Kant assumes a teleological
progression in humanity as a species. That is, we develop our full capacities as a collective
endeavor over an extended period, through the accomplishments, conflicts, and challenges of
history.

As was argued previously, this reflective capacity of judgment on nature’s holism and systematicity
from the third Critique—in conjunction with Kant’s insights on natural beauty—can function as
preparation for considering nature in a moral sense. The theoretical and aesthetic preparation in Chapters
3 and 4 becomes instantiated in a more determinate sense toward the end of the present chapter.
184

157

In Idea Kant also presents his account of “unsocial sociability,”185 which is his response
to Rousseau and Hobbes.186 Human nature, on Kant’s view, is unique in that it is inherently
dialectical. Humans are self-interested and seek solitude, yet possess an inherent collectivenature that attracts cooperative and communicative interaction (Wood 1999, 212). This dialectic
is the driving-force behind cultural achievements and the perfection of our rational
predispositions, on the one hand, and our seemingly unending lapse into barbarism and war, on
the other (Idea 8:24). Only when enlightened humanity has grasped the narrative guiding-thread
of nature and human history through philosophy can it make sense of our destiny on the
treacherous pathway of progress. After humanity has matured and become capable of thinking
for itself, philosophy reveals itself as one of the keys for perfecting the species. This is because
philosophical reflection, by way of the ideas of reason, allows humanity to project itself into the
future: the regulative idea of history’s teleological narrative, under the auspices of philosophy, is
seen as a mere idea with crucial moral import. This is why philosophy is so important for
cultural progress and, in the Anthropocene, philosophy (in a sense), makes or breaks humanity:

Unsociable sociability is just one instantiation of a recurring evolutionary motif in Kant’s philosophy.
We see it elsewhere in various forms, as one of Kant’s favorite means for thinking through concepts: that
is, in terms of a linear revolution in thought, history, and science (Michael Morris, “The French
Revolution and the New School of Europe: Towards a Political Interpretation of German Idealism” 2011,
540). For example, in the works on natural science we witness dynamic attractive and repulsive forces; in
cosmology, the evolutionary unfolding of the cosmos in the Kant-Laplace nebular hypothesis; in ethics,
we can interpret the categorical imperative and its various formulations as unfolding into more complex
variations, with the formulation of a kingdom of ends being the most substantive since it connects the
form of law and the intrinsic value of ends in the themselves (Wood 1999, 167). Moreover, with the
categorical imperative, all the formulations holistically interrelate into a system (Wood 1999, 187); and in
Critique of Pure Reason, the dialectical tensions and resolution between the historical development of
science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. Thus, when interpreted against the larger backdrop
of Kant’s evolutionary thought, unsocial sociability in Idea and Conjectural Beginning takes on a new,
holistic meaning pregnant with potential for environmental issues today.
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For an interesting study on Kant’s philosophical tensions with Rousseau and Hobbes vis-à-vis
humanity, cosmopolitanism, and political philosophy see Howard Williams, Kant’s Critique of Hobbes:
sovereignty and cosmopolitanism (2003).
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“seeing the social world as tending toward a final end is essential to making it true that it reaches
it” (Herman 2009, 164). Therefore, we can conclude that when enlightened humanity orients its
actions for the sake of perfecting the species and striving for cosmopolitan sustainability along
the teleological narrative of progress, it can begin to actualize it. Today, climate change is the
crucial hindrance blocking this pathway. If Kant’s historical narrative is adopted—despite its
weak epistemic justification—the aspiration to a world of peace and flourishing (i.e., the highest
good) is seen as not only possible, but morally demanded. Obviously, this essay has clear
connections to Groundwork’s formulation of a kingdom of ends, the later political works on
cosmopolitanism, and Kant’s follow-up anthropological essay which he wrote as a response to
his student, Herder (Beck 1963, ix)—namely, Conjectural Beginning. Before discussing my
interpretation of this essay and how it may be applied for the ends of environmental ethics, the
following section outlines the main ways it has been interpreted, especially in light of Kant’s
contentious views on religion and morality.
Kant on Religion and the Historical Education of Humanity
Like Idea, Conjectural Beginning is very unusual by comparison with the Critiques. Kant
attempts to provide a plausible (though by no means certain)187 account of the origins of human
history though a conjectural “philosophy of nature” (CB 8:109). This philosophy of nature aims
to characterize the beginnings of a possible philosophy of history (such as is found in Idea) and
the trajectory of the moral development of humanity. For his point of departure, Kant takes the
biblical story of Genesis as a “map” for his trip, “which I make on the wings of the power of

The weak epistemic status of this essay’s conjectures is quite apparent. It is even weaker than the
regulative guiding thread of nature that we may assume in Idea; On Kant’s view, these conjectures are
merely therapeutic. For “they cannot announce themselves as serious business, but at best only as a
permissible exercise of the imagination guided by reason, undertaken for the sake of relaxation and
mental health” (CB trans. Beck, 8:109).
187
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imagination, though not without a guiding thread attached by reason onto experience” (CB
8:110). On an initial reading, it might seem like Kant’s main aim is to reconcile his critical
project with Holy Scripture since he utilizes this text as an experiment for framing humanity’s
origins. On a more detailed reading with consideration for his other anthropological texts, I
submit that Kant’s main purpose is not religious apologism. Rather, he is attempting to reflect on
the ways in which humanity could have intelligibly developed its predispositions to reason and
morality under the presumption of Ideas’s teleological conception of nature. The main concern,
then, is a philosophical consideration of how a supposedly atemporal or noumenal understanding
of reason can be reconciled with the idea of humanity progressing and evolving as a rational and
natural species. On this reading, Kant can square his account of reason in Groundwork (namely,
with regard to our individual duty for pursuing a kingdom of ends) with the historical idea of
perfecting the species as a whole (which is his main concern in the cosmopolitan texts). On my
view, then, Kant doesn’t offer a biblical interpretation or justification of his views from Christian
doctrine, but instead uses these stories as a pedagogical vehicle for his own philosophy of
history.
There are some commentators, however, who do read Kant as a deeply Christian thinker.
For instance, Michel Despland in Kant on History and Religion (1973) takes Kant’s historical
texts seriously as I do, although he interprets them to suggest that Kant was at heart a religious
thinker. Despland submits that the neutral or secular reading of Religion according to which Kant
sets boundaries to religious activity by means of morality is “unnecessarily extreme and
suspiciously lacking in nuances” (Despland 1973). Pace Despland, proponents of the secular
view of Kant on religion read Kant “in true Enlightenment fashion,” claiming that “all that is
essential in religion can be reduced to morality” (Kuehn 2001, 250). The main tenets of
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organized religion, on this reading, are only valuable as “articles of belief.” Despland argues that
the secular reading of religion in Kantian scholarship is mistaken. Through a reinterpretation of
Religion from the standpoint of Kant’s philosophy of history (rather than his critical teachings),
Despland makes the case that the problem of theodicy indeed weighed heavily on Kant’s mind
and that his Religion offers a positive, rather than destructive, contribution to the philosophy of
religion. On the secular interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of religion, Religion is primarily seen
as a negative project, setting in greater relief the rational constraints on religious practices that
follow from the dismantling of dogmatic metaphysics in Critique of Pure Reason and the rational
dependency of all religious beliefs—such as the existence of God and the immortality of the
soul—on morality in Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment. Despland, by
contrast, since he takes his point of departure from the historical writings (which often appear to
shirk the warnings of the critical teachings), finds room for a reinterpretation of Kant’s
philosophy of religion that makes him out to be more religious than commenters from the secular
reading concede.
In support of his argument that the secular reading is mistaken and that a new one is
required, Despland traces the use of Kant’s teleological language throughout his works,
especially Conjectural Beginning. He relies on Kant’s ambiguous use of the term “Nature” (or
“Providence”), especially when it is used in a pseudo-intentional sense. When Kant makes use of
agential language regarding Nature, Despland suggests that Kant is here alluding to the
monotheistic God of traditional Christianity. He points to Kant’s reliance on theological musings
in pre-critical works like Universal Natural History and argues that Kant’s reservations about the
“dead” Newtonian view of nature led him to seek a philosophical reconciliation between the
theological, Leibnizian picture of nature, the moral heart of Rousseau’s humanism, and the
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mechanistic pretensions of the moderns (Despland 1973, 25-27). He then traces the teleologicalmoral use of language throughout Kant’s works spanning from the pre-critical to the historical
and religious writings to set the foundations of his interpretation of Kant’s positive philosophy of
religion. As was argued previously, Kant’s early ontology presents a dynamic and interconnected
view of nature. On this view, nature’s parts interact in a reciprocal, harmonious network. As
Despland rightly observes, Kant’s reliance on teleological premises in these works easily lends
itself to a theological, religious interpretation.
However, Despland seems to conflate the teleological with the theological; Kant’s
holistic vision of nature hearkens back to the pre-critical period in that it has an ontological flair,
making it easily viewed in religious terms, but it is then emended in Critique of Judgment, where
Kant clearly states how appealing to a self-organizing, purposive Nature remains a regulative
epistemic device for the pursuit of theoretical knowledge of nature (CJ 5:383). Moreover, though
Kant does appeal to theological premises in the pre-critical works (especially in New
Elucidation), the historical context and status of censorship must be borne in mind here: Kant
was not yet tenured, and as such had to speak carefully; contradicting orthodox Pietist or
Protestant views would certainly mean career suicide, and so Despland’s evidence from the early
works must be taken with a grain of salt.
Fortunately, there has been much recent research into Kant’s Religion and its connection
to morality, history, and Kant’s religiosity since Despland’s study was published in 1973.
Manfred Kuehn’s Kant: A Biography (2001) has delved deeper into the nuances of Kant’s life,
the contradictions of his three contemporaneous biographers, and his writings across his works in
order to show how Kant is perhaps better seen as a non-religious philosopher. This chapter is not
specifically concerned with the extent of Kant’s religiosity or his contribution to the philosophy
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of religion and, accordingly, I will not pursue a thorough examination of Kuehn’s work, the
Religion, or Despland’s reinterpretation of the secular view. I will, however, briefly mention
some provisional reasons why I think Despland’s reading, though astute and original, is
potentially in tension with central features of Religion, which evidences that Kant was not a
deeply religious thinker (at least, not in the orthodox sense of the term). Manfred Kuehn
observes of Kant that “religious observances played no part in his life” (Kuehn 2001, 318), that
he was called an “indifferentist” with regard to religion, and that he disliked religious people
(Kuehn 2001, 5).188 The caricature of Kant as a highly devout, punctual, and uninteresting
individual was, as Kuehn convincingly argues, a political imposition contrived by three
theologian biographers to hide Kant’s rather unorthodox (and even hostile) personal views of
organized religion (Kuehn 2001, 7-16). At the most, a culling of Kant’s philosophical writings
and personal letters suggests Kant was probably closer to a deist of the pre-Christian, stoic sort
(Kuehn 2001, 151), where God is viewed as the immanent ordering and unifying principle of the
cosmos. Kant indeed had philosophical concerns about religion, but was likely not very religious
himself as Despland seems to suggest.
In Religion there is plenty of textual evidence to counter the religious interpretation and
suggest that Kant thinks that organized religion, like war in Idea, is only a temporary historical

Further evidence for Kant’s disdain for orthodox Christianity can be found in Anthropology. For
example, in Ak 7:188 Kant alludes to the biblical story of the fall and calls it an “absurdity.” And at
7:189, Kant asserts—in his popular lectures (!)—that the “extreme limit of absurdity, or of deception”
relates to the seer or prophet. Interpreting this section in light of Christianity is difficult, since the prior
paragraph discusses the soothsayers of antiquity; and yet, the paragraph directly before Kant’s
condemnation of prophecy seems to reference the fall: “All prophesies that foretell an inevitable fate of a
people, for which they are themselves still responsible and which therefore is to be brought about by their
own free choice, contains an absurdity—in addition to the fact that the foreknowledge is useless to them,
since they cannot escape from it” (Anthropology 7:188). In either case, Kant’s antipathy toward revelation
and prophecy is clear, rendering a stronger orthodox Christian or literalist interpretation of Kant’s views
of religion implausible.
188
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phenomenon—an early vehicle of progress. Instrumentally, organized religion is important; but
philosophically, it doesn’t require a thorough treatment for its own sake. Instead, all religion
requires of philosophy is to provide an historical account of its role in humanity’s maturation
toward moral cosmopolitanism:
[S]ince this last—namely the moral improvement of human beings—constitutes the true end of
all religion of reason, it will also contain the supreme principle of all scriptural exegesis
(Religion 6:112).
[O]nly the pure faith of religion, based entirely on reason, can be recognized as necessary and
hence as the one which exclusively marks out the true church. Thus…a historical faith [e.g.
Christianity] attaches itself to pure religion as its vehicle, yet, if there is consciousness that this
faith is merely such and if, as the faith of a church, it carries a principle for continually coming
closer to pure religious faith until finally we can dispense of that vehicle, the church in question
can always be taken as the true one (Religion 6:115).
[I]n the end religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and from all
statutes which rest on history and which though the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally
unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule
over all… The leading-string of holy tradition with its appendages of statutes and
observances…becomes bit by bit dispensable, yea, finally, when man enters upon his
adolescence, it becomes a fetter (Religion, cited from Linden 1988, 156).
In these sections (which support the secular reading, pace Despland), Kant’s religion of reason is
earthly: it is the realization that the moral law unites all of humanity, obliges us to pursue a
kingdom of ends on earth, and gives us the heroic incentive to strive for an enlightened,
cosmopolitan future. All religious interpretation, therefore, only serves a pedagogical purpose for
cultivating the moral ideas that lie within the breast of humanity. God isn’t needed.189 In
Religion, as in Conjectural Beginning, connections can be made from Kant’s discussion of an
ethical commonwealth as a moral ideal and the notion of a moral society or kingdom of ends in
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In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant asserts that morality requires the practical postulate of the
existence of God (which is similar to Critique of Judgment’s use of a “moral argument” for the existence
of God). However, as Beck notes in his famous commentary on the second Critique (1960), Kant is clear
that though this postulate is a necessary belief for rational faith, it is only subjectively necessary.
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Groundwork. The ideal moral society becomes an historical possibility only after humanity has
grown up. For humanity to grow up means that it must make use of the vehicles of enlightenment
and disciplined culture, sloughing off any final semblance of dogmatic theism or religious
orthodoxy (Religion 6:115-118). Moreover, metaphysical “Scriptural exegesis,” Kant himself
asserts, “lies outside the boundaries of the competence of mere reason” (Religion 6:44n). In the
same passage, Kant claims that, despite our metaphysical incompetence in religious exegesis,
there is still a “moral use” for philosophically interpreting the text. This use is as a pedagogical
device, which is supported by Kant’s belief that education is the most important secret of moral
progress (Pedagogy 9:444). My criticism of the strong religious reading of Kant lends support to
Wood’s claim that Kant makes use of scripture in his conjectures in a twofold manner: first, as a
way to satirize “the vehicle Herder used to present his views in Book 10 of the Ideas” (Wood
1999, 233), since Herder’s text made dogmatic religious-exegetical claims. And second, my
reading of Conjectural Beginning as a pedagogical-moral device supports Wood’s view that
“Kant’s conjectural history is a kind of thought experiment” (Wood 1999, 234).
Now, in order to resolve the tensions between Despland’s astute reading of Kant as a
religious philosopher and Kuehn’s new findings that Kant was likely very much against
organized religion, the debate must simply be framed in the proper context. First, it is
undoubtedly true that Kant writes extensively on religion throughout his life; he refers to God in
the early works and toward the end in Opus Postumum; he reinterprets God as a moral-epistemic
device in the critical works; and he constantly makes use of religious or spiritual language when
discussing teleology (e.g. Providence, “Nature’s wise arrangement,” the creation). How are we to
make sense of all this? First, it must be understood that Despland is indeed right on two counts:
First, Kant was very much concerned with theological questions throughout his life; a
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commitment to the importance of rational faith, the limits of reason, and hope pervades his
thinking, and this can readily be seen in what he takes to be one of the key questions of
philosophy: for what may humanity hope? (CPR A805/B833). And second, Despland is wise in
appealing to Kant’s historical texts in order to flesh out Kant’s views on religion. In these texts,
Kant generously discusses his admiration for Providence and Nature’s wisdom. Kant is indeed a
spiritual thinker, since he tries to understand the sacred within the secular, the providential
wisdom guiding humanity along in nature. And yet, evidence from Religion, Anthropology, and
his letters also suggests that he had little respect for organized Christianity, had little patience for
superstition, revelation, or prophecy, and argued that divine command theory was a deadlock for
morality. In this sense, then, Kuehn is also correct: “All-crushing Kant” was in many respects
anti-religious. The tension between these two scholars’ interpretations can be resolved if Kant’s
suggestion about a world-soul in “Whether the Earth is ageing, from a physical point of view” is
taken seriously (FE 1:211-212). Perhaps Kant’s religiosity or spiritual faith is better understood
to be a faith placed in the “secret driving force” or world-spirit of Nature (FE 1:203). Though
this perhaps conflicts with some of Kant’s epistemological complaints against pantheism in
Critique of Judgment190 and transcendental realism in Critique of Pure Reason, it certainly fits
more securely with the biographical observations articulated by Kuehn. Kant’s seemingly
uncontroversial religious language then starts to make more sense; it is an evasive, esoteric

In Critique of Judgment Kant claims that Spinozism is “only a more determinate version of pantheism”
(CJ 5:421). Here, Kant argues that Spinozism is untenable (e.g. CJ 5:391-394). A recent study of Kant’s
more intricate relationship with Spinoza and pantheism can be found in Omri Boehm’s Kant’s Critique of
Spinoza (2014), where it is argued that Kant is committed (though esoterically) to a Spinozist
metaphysics in the pre-critical philosophy.
190
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maneuver.191 Kant utilizes the standard theological language of his time in accordance with the
requirements of Prussian censorship, but his meaning is of a different sort. For Kant, God is
Gaia.192 As discussed in Chapter 3, Nature is the energetic manifestation of the totality of the
cosmos in all its manifoldness, diversity, harmony, and beauty. Kant’s unwavering humanistic
hope with regard to humanity’s plight in the face of evil then makes sense, for humanity is a
divine expression of Gaia’s infinite complexity. The highest good is a goal to be sought on earth
(Religion 6:134-136), not the life beyond, for Gaia is immanent. On the Gaian reading, Kant’s
interminable discussions of God in Opus Postumum—whose goal is to bridge the metaphysics of
nature with natural science—become more intelligible; they are not the senile expressions of a
genius mind faltering, but are instead the laborious attempts to synthesize the theological with
the physical, the sacred with the natural, for God is Gaia. Though I am aware that my suggestion
is a provocative one, it at the very least helps make sense of the seeming contradictions in Kant’s
thinking on religion and morality, and helps resolve the tensions between the readings of
Despland and Kuehn; on my interpretation, both scholars have hit on an important aspect of
Kant’s thought: his spirituality and his humanism are indeed two sides of the same coin because
they are grounded in a conception of nature as a Gaian system.

To be sure, I am aware of the justificatory difficulties for the “esoteric method” made famous by Leo
Strauss. The issue on Kant is by no means settled, though the esoteric reading certainly has a certain
provocative allure for mediating the contradictions in Kant’s views on religion.
191
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If the Gaian invocation initially sounds too much like enthusiasm (Schwärmerei) for an enlightenment
philosopher like Kant to accept, perhaps it is best to think about what, exactly, is meant by Lovelock’s
Gaia Hypothesis. Though it indeed has many affinities to animistic views of nature, we need not take such
a dogmatic view and instead just consider that by Gaia, we understand nature as a complex, selfregulating, system on analogy with a living organism. Even without a strictly religious or animistic view
of Gaia, it still makes sense to look toward it with admiration and appreciation, and such a view does not
preclude a spiritual relation to nature provided it does not make claims to justified theoretical cognition.
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A further discussion of Kant vis-à-vis religion would deserve its own individual study,
and so now I suggest that the best course of action is to return to Kant’s Conjectural Beginning.
Let it be stipulated for the sake of argument, then, that Kant makes use of Scripture as a sort of
pedagogical or analogical device through which he can better articulate his views on history. I
am not alone in my interpretation of Conjectural Beginning as a pedagogical device. Yovel, for
example, views Kant’s stance on religion as primarily oppositional,193 and argues that Kant’s use
of the Bible is an offensive weapon and a defensive strategy: it is offensive because it can be
used as a useful rhetorical strategy for helping his religious reader convert to Kant’s rational
religion, and it is defensive because it can provide political immunity from charges of heresy.
Yovel sees Kant’s use of “Providence” in the historical essays as secular or methodological;
“God” (like the use of noumenon in Critique of Pure Reason as an epistemological “limiting
concept”) is a “systematical device” whose use is “merely an analogy” (Yovel 1980, 97, 100,
126). Indeed, on Yovel’s reading, “the philosopher has to employ religious metaphors while
transforming and reinterpreting their meaning” in order to “take an active part in promoting the
historical process which he recommends” (Yovel 1980, 172) ; similarly, Linden reads Kant’s
pseudo-religious use of terms like “Providence” in Idea and Conjectural Beginning as “just a
manner of speech, reflecting the common discourse of his time” (Linden 1988, 117). Linden
views Kant’s historical works not as theodicies, but as secular blueprints for moral-historical
progress: they are philosophical foundations that rationally justify hope for the flourishing of

In a rather strong reading, Yovel contends that “Almost every positive idea that Kant has to express
under the title of rational religion has already been expressed in his ethics, while what is new in Religion
within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793) is mainly an uncompromising attack upon existing religions and
an attempt to eliminate them from the historical scene… the role of the philosophy of religion is to
abolish religion as an independent sphere and reduce it to rational morality alone” (Yovel 1980, 202).
Though I am more partial to this reading than Despland’s, it seems to me to betray Yovel’s HegelianMarxist leanings more than anything else.
193
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humanity. I think this is a helpful reading, and I intend on pushing these secular blueprints into
the realm of sustainability. If Kant’s use of the biblical story is understood as a useful
pedagogical device or thought experiment rather than serious biblical exegesis or apologetics, the
way in which Conjectural Beginning sits in relation to Idea and the later developments in the
third Critique make better sense. This reading also illuminates how Kant’s collective view of
humanity can be better applied appropriately for the heroic project of climate change.
Conjectural Beginning of Human History
In this essay, Kant conjectures how humanity (understood as a collective species) transitions
through three main epochs in its evolution toward cultural enlightenment: the stage of nature, of
freedom, and finally of culture.194 As the stages unfold, humanity gains a more nuanced
perspective on how it is collective and future-oriented. In the first stage, inexperienced humanity
obeys the call of nature (CB 8:111). It is self-interested, instinctual, and amoral; this stage is
associated with biblical Eden. However, once reason begins to stir within it, humanity steps into
the world anew with prudential freedom—becoming capable of resisting short-term desires for
the sake of attaining second-order ones; this stage is associated with the forbidden fruit (CB
8:111-2). Once roused from its rational slumber, humanity experiences the first glimmers of the
power of imagination and self-consciousness. These simultaneously engender the protofigurations of love and beauty, as well as shame and modesty (Sittsamkeit). On Kant’s view,
feelings of love and beauty for humanity and in nature are the earliest signs of morality (CB
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Wood identifies only two main epochs of human history for Kant (Wood 1999, 244). The third and last
epoch that I identify is qualitatively different from the epoch of freedom (from the standpoint of
enlightenment and moral discipline) and thus, I think, deserves its own status in the division of Kant’s
philosophy of history.
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8:113).195 The last stage in humanity’s moral development is the stage of culture. With culture
and education,196 humanity becomes aware of itself as a temporally oriented being.197 Humanity
as a moral species understands prospects of the future, reflected through the present and past.
Moral self-consciousness brings with it the anxiety of death, as well as a care and concern for
posterity; this expectation of the future is crucial for humanity’s understanding of its moral
vocation (CB 8:113). Later I connect Kant’s historically conditioned realization of our vocation
with sustainability and stewardship. Finally, humanity becomes aware of itself qua reason,
deserving of dignity and respect as an end in itself (CB 8:114). Humanity is now in this stage,
Kant very stoically asserts, yet we have not quite refined and disciplined culture to its ultimate
enlightened form (CB 8:121 Wood 1999, 298). This stage reflects the biblical story of the fall
and humanity’s moral endeavor toward salvation. I now draw from these essays to sketch an
image of Kant’s view of humanity, capable of bridging Kant’s anthropological claims with the
Groundwork and their applicability to the difficulties present in the ethics of climate change.

An interesting connection can be drawn here from Kant’s statements of morality and love for nature
with those found throughout Critique of Judgment. See, for example, CJ 5:380; 5:267; and 5:299). Love
for nature may also be connected to appreciation for beautiful nature as discussed in Chapter 4. Biasetti
draws from these passages in his defense of Kantian environmental aesthetics (Biasetti 2015).
195

This is also supported in Kant’s lectures on pedagogy, where he asserts: “‘A human being can become
human only through education. He is nothing but what education makes of him’ (Pedagogy 9:443). Kant
also holds that the development of our human predispositions is a social process, a result of the collective
actions of society” (Wood 1999, 203).
196
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This passage of Conjectural Beginning reads very proto-Heideggerian to me. As is well known,
Heidegger was heavily influenced by the first Critique and especially the A-deduction and schematism. It
would be interesting to find out if he was also familiar with Kant’s anthropological texts (especially,
given that Being and Time is often accused of being a sort of anthropological philosophy). I was pleased
to learn that Yovel has similar suspicions in this regard: “It is noteworthy that most of the basic
‘existentials’ that Heidegger ascribes to the being of man—anxiety, care, future-directedness
(temporality), and the consciousness of death—can be found in Kant’s account of ‘the state of humanity’”
(Yovel 1980, 191f42).
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The Progressive and Evolutionary side of Kantian Anthropology
There are a number of progressive and evolutionary198 aspects in Kant’s teleological account of
humanity that are relevant for its application as blueprints for sustainability. Though Kant
adheres to the orthodox language of teleology, he employs it in a radical Enlightenment fashion
to defend a secular, humanistic cosmopolitanism. This progressive use of teleology can be, I
claim, of value for us today with regard to climate change. Most importantly (and from which
others follow), Kant views humanity holistically, as an essentially collective species on a
pathway of progression toward moral perfection (Idea 8:21; CB 8:123). We are different from
animals because human progress requires intergenerational evolution, as Kant notes in
Anthropology:
It must be noted that with all other animals left to themselves, each individual reaches its
complete destiny; however with the human being only the species, at best, reaches it; so
that the human race can work its way up to its destiny only through progress in a series of
innumerably many generations (Anthropology 7:323-325).
“Infinite perfectibility,” on Kant’s view, “is not a characteristic of the human individual, but
applies only to the human species” (Kuehn 2009, 83). From the historical perspective, humanity
must be seen as a common, collectively united subject projecting along an overarching
evolutionary pathway (Förster 2009, 193). As a collective species, humanity has one single,
overarching telos that transcends individuals (Ameriks 2009, 46) and unites all humankind. This
“collective purposiveness” (Wood 2009 112) enjoins our species to progressively perfect and
cultivate its dispositions toward goodness (CB 8:115; 8:120). In pursuit of the realization of this
end, humanity must orient itself toward a future goal of cosmopolitanism (Idea 8:26) and bring
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Yovel (1980, 80) agrees that humanity is dynamic and evolutionary (it is historical and projects itself
into the future); cf p. 129; Linden takes a similar stance, characterizing Kant’s views on humanity with
regard to its “social evolution” (1988, 188).
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about the end of domination (Herman 2009, 157). This requires humanity to work together
internationally and intergenerationally to realize this task. Idea “implies an ideal end that is pregiven for all of us, one that, in several senses, we ‘must’ all work to bring about” (Ameriks 2009,
49). In the end of Conjectural Beginning, Kant teaches how every human being has a duty (as
part of her moral determination) to contribute to this project of progress:
This, then, is the lesson taught by a philosophical attempt to write the most ancient part of
human history: contentment with Providence, and with the course of human affairs,
considered as a whole. For this course is not a decline from good to evil, but rather a
gradual development from the worse to the better; and nature itself has given the
vocation to everyone to contribute as much to this progress as may be within his
power (CB trans. Beck, 8:123, boldface emphasis mine).
Such a task—because it challenges humanity’s moral resolve and will require generations to
fulfill—can be seen as a heroic project for the betterment of the species as a whole. This project
commands our respect and fills us with hope for future generations (CB 8:113), despite the
seeming ubiquity of human narcissism. Enlightenment is also requisite for the facilitation of
moral progress; this involves an openness to information, the capacity to think for oneself, and
the ability to self-legislate the moral law. Enlightenment, as the cultural vehicle of progress for
escaping the cunning of nature (Yovel 1980, 153), is relevant to the climate crisis today. In order
to face up to the heroic task of overcoming climate change, humanity must become receptive to
information from climate scientists, learn to think beyond the claims of “fake news” and climate
skeptics, and act responsibly and sustainably.
Kant’s view of humanity—because of its collective, progressive, and goal-oriented
status—makes it surprisingly different from most liberal approaches. This may be surprising for
those who read Kant only through the lenses of the abstract, individualist-perspectives of

172

Groundwork.199 From the vantage of these historical essays, however, Kant’s non-individualist
historical thought (Ameriks 2009, 50) looks much closer to Hegel and Marx rather than the
liberal box into which he is usually forced (Wood 1999, 319); the way Kant’s views navigate the
channels of the Enlightenment thought and German romanticism anticipates the historical turn in
Hegel’s philosophy of history and Marx’s historical materialism, yet is not tied to the potential
problems of conservative Hegelian or radical Marxist ideology. Because of these interesting
aspects (and their tension with individualist and capitalist appropriations), I now consider how
they can be applied to the contemporary issue of most pressing concern: namely, the ethics of
climate change. First, however, I must briefly describe some of the ethical, cognitive, and
cultural challenges of climate change. Then, in Part 3, it will be suitable to discuss the supposed
liberalism of Kantian thought and its ability to aid humanity in transitioning to sustainability.
Part 2: Climate Ethics, Kantian Anthropology, and the Heroic Incentive
From the standpoint of ethics, climate change is a particularly difficult collective problem
because it has intergenerational and international causal significance. No single individual can be
meaningfully held culpable. Unlike standard ethical issues where it is possible to impute an
individual with praise, blame, or responsibility, the very nature of climate change eludes such an
approach.200 This is because fossil fuel emissions—the primary drivers of human-made climate

On Wood’s view, “Kant’s anthropology involves a complex individual psychology, but it is one
arrived at only through a teleological theory about the collective tendencies of the human species in
history” (Wood 1999, 200). Accordingly, “the common characteristic of Kant as a moral ‘individualist’
could not be more mistaken” (Wood 1999, 204, see also 319). Moreover, the connection between Kantian
ethics and Kantian non-individualist anthropology is not a coincidence: “Kant’s ethical thought is
fundamentally about the human race’s collective, historical struggle to develop its rational faculties”
(Wood 1999, 296).
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To be sure, one could convincingly argue that CEO’s of fossil fuel giants bear a larger degree of moral
blame than average automobile operators; however, given the further complications in climate change
regarding the time-lag of carbon and other emissions, this approach would perhaps lead us to hold longdead fossil fuel tycoons from centuries ago accountable—this, though plausible, doesn’t seem to help our
200
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change201 which stay in the atmosphere202 (or other regions, such as in the ocean or permafrost)
for an unbelievably long time—are produced by all of us. For example, 10-15% of carbon
dioxide lasts in the atmosphere for 10,000 years (Gardiner 2010, 6). This means that we are still
feeling the effects from the industrial revolution. The effects of our unabated emissions, in turn,
will be experienced by future generations for decades, if not centuries. Additionally, the very
nature of feedback loops exacerbate global heating and food depletions, creating vicious,
unpredictable cycles.203 This makes strictly individualist approaches to climate ethics
insufficient, since the causes and effects of climate change “are smeared out in time as well as
space” (Garvey 2008, 60). Even if responsibility can be assigned—say, to an affluent fossil-fuel
dependent nation—the nation itself must still be considered as a single entity. Each individual
contributes little and yet, added up, the results are devastating. In addition, there is the epistemic
challenge of informing individuals about the moral implications of their emissions and the
action-oriented challenge of making this information a real motivator for adequate lifestyle
changes, all before we end up with runway, abrupt climate change. Clearly, then, individualist
normative theories are ill equipped to deal with climate change because of its complex spatial

current predicament; sure, we have inherited an “original sin” (Garvey 2008, 79) of unsustainable
technologies, but we now have an obligation to restructure our maladaptive inheritance.
201

For climate ethics, carbon dioxide is often the primary item of focus since it is the major driver (70%
by comparison with other greenhouse gases) of human-caused heating; methane released from melting ice
clathrates and peat bogs as well as factory farming also contribute significantly to global warming
(Garvey 2008, 20; Gardiner 2010, 6).
202

Carbon dioxide can last in the atmosphere for anywhere from 5-200 years; methane—whose effects
are more deleterious but less long-lived—12 years (Gardiner 2010, 6).
203

This is not to say that climate science (which is, ultimately, a project of consilience between myriad
disciplines such as climatology, geology, biology, economics, and so on) is inaccurate. Rather, by
unpredictable I mean difficult to comprehend from the standpoint of the non-specialist layperson and
involves huge uncertainties for the scientist and economist (Broome, Climate Matters 2012).
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and temporal structure.204 Garvey discusses the difficulties of climate ethics as centering around
three problems:
There are global features of climate change: the relevant causes and effects and the agents
behind them are spatially dispersed throughout the globe. There are intergenerational
aspects too: the relevant causes and effects and the agents involved are temporally
dispersed. Finally, reflection on the problems attending climate change is hampered by
our theoretical ineptitude which, when combined with the spatial and temporal features of
climate change, can lead to a kind of moral corruption…we’re not much good at thinking
about our long-term future (Garvey 2008, 59-61).
Since individualistic approaches appear deficient, we must rethink how we interface with the
environment. Because our moral vocation influences how we understand our humanity, climate
change requires us to reconsider how this vocation can be integrated into a new framework for
transitioning to sustainability. In what follows, I will argue that Kantian anthropology can be an
asset for thinking about how we can address or resolve these difficulties in climate ethics.
Kant’s Anthropology, Solidarity, and the Heroic Project
Climate change is a collective problem, requiring international effort and intergenerational
solidarity. Fortunately, one strength of Kant’s views as found in Idea and Conjectural Beginning
is its emphasis on a teleological perspective of the human species, one which is hopeful for
instilling a sense of solidarity and hope for our predicament. In Idea, Kant claims that we have a
rough moral and existential project impeding the path toward cosmopolitanism (Idea 8:28).
Indeed, climate change, like war in Kant’s account, is a unique challenge and opportunity for
testing humanity’s moral mettle. Just as war exaggerates humanity’s unsociable tendencies but
creates conditions for peace through its revelations, so also the realization that human-made
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Standard approaches in Kantian ethics are no exception to this challenge. In fact, the traditional
interpretation of Kantian ethics makes it particularly ill-equipped for dealing with the complexities of
climate change (for challenges to this view, see Schönfeld’s “The green Kant: environmental dynamics
and sustainable policies” (2008). This explains the dearth of Kantian approaches to this problem and,
moreover, my reason for thinking about how the insights of Kant’s less individualist-oriented works may
be integrated with the strengths of his deontology.

175

climate change is an obstacle for human history can help in the reconsideration of our place
among other members of humankind and the world-system as a whole: in short, viewing climate
change as a heroic task has direct implications for the human-environment interface (which is,
currently, malfunctioning into obsolescence).
Climate change challenges our very ways of life. We can either remain in a mode of
selfish, conceited disregard for the plight of humanity and the harms that will ensue, or we can
gather, like the mythological hero, the strength to face the sublime might of climate change205
and foster an attitude of solidarity for resisting it. Such a realization can be a theoretical tool for
achieving solidarity not only with our fellow citizens facing the plight of climate change, but
with all humanity as it has culminated up to this point. In brief, the heroic project of climate
change helps us to realize that we are, ultimately, despite spatial and generational gaps, on the
same heroic battlefield. In Conjectural Beginning Kant tells us that laboring for the sake of social
evolution will involve great toil and hardship, yet we must remain courageous in the face of our
moral responsibility to perfect the species (CB 8:121). Kant’s injunction to cultivate virtues206
such as courage for the sake of humanity’s plight are, furthermore, a way of connecting his
cosmopolitanism to environmental virtue.

In Chapter 4, I argued that the experience of climate change’s sublimity is a key starting point in our
moral preparation for seeing the environment in an ethical light. The reader may gather that this sublime
experience is but the first glimmer of our moral project that is illumined in this chapter, and indeed both
the aesthetic experience of climate change and our recognition of humankind as collective and holistic
function in tandem as ways for thinking about alternative approaches for viewing Kant’s philosophy as an
asset for climate change and environmental ethics.
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Since Kant isn’t concerned, strictly speaking, with morality in these historical essays (except, perhaps,
for the possible moral benefits of considering a progressive vision of history), he discloses several virtues
but fails to give a systematic account of how they fit into his moral teachings. These would, later, be
incorporated into Metaphysics of Morals, but they can be seen throughout his Lectures on Ethics and
anthropology. Accordingly, in the following section I will cite from those texts when necessary in order to
elucidate the implicit kernels of virtue found in the historical essays.
206
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The Cosmopolitan Orientation and Environmental Virtue
In the anthropological texts, Kant underscores several virtues conducive for progress. Virtues
such as courage (which is connected with the moral sense of honor), perseverance, and a stoic
mindfulness of humanity’s embeddedness in nature help us transform ourselves into cosmic
citizens.207 These virtues, on my view, can be appropriated in an environmental way once we see
ourselves as citizens of an earth-system that is in trouble. For climate change shows us how we
should orient these virtues for the sake of sustainable stewardship so that we can perfect the
species and fulfill our duties to ends in themselves. Now, traditional agent-centered perfectionist
theories have aroused suspicion for climate and environmental ethicists.208 Nonetheless,
environmental virtue theories have been on the rise: taking a point of departure from Kantian
philosophy of history, I submit that we may also be able to consider virtues that are relevant from
an environmental standpoint. Engaging with Kant’s heuristic of humanity’s evolutionary
progression emboldens us with a heroic attitude, which in turn inspires us to pursue and cultivate
traditional virtues that have a new significance when interpreted in light of the challenge of
climate change.
The Kantian virtue of courage (CB 8:121) is one such virtue that can aid the heroic task
for mitigating climate change and facing the challenges of human corruption and disregard for

207

Kant never explicitly discusses virtues in these historical texts, but they are implied. For passages in
Idea and Conjectural Beginning where Kant discusses the virtues that I suggest are necessary for
becoming cosmic citizens, see the following: courage (CB 8:121; Anthropology 7:257), honor (CB Ak.
8:113, Idea 8:30-31; Anthropology 7:257), perseverance and stoic mindfulness of our place in nature
(Idea 8:27; CB 8:123).
208

For a brief account of why virtue ethics and perfectionistic theories are potentially limited for climate
change and environmental issues, see Robert Elliot, “Normative Ethics” (2003). For proponents of the
recent resurgence of virtue theoretic approaches vis-à-vis environmental philosophy, see Ronald L.
Sandler, “Environmental Virtue Ethics” (2013) and Dale Jamieson, “When Utilitarians Should be Virtue
Theorists” (2007).
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nature. Courage is necessary not only for stepping up to the challenge in the battle against
climate change, but also to overcome inclinations to laziness, cowardice, and contentedness with
the business-as-usual paradigm of infinite economic growth. On Kant’s view, when courage is
rectified by reason, it “gives the resolute man strength that nature sometimes denies him”
(Anthropology 7:256, cf. MM 6:406). For with courage, “he who in reflecting on danger does not
yield; brave is he whose courage is constant in danger” (Anthropology 7:256). The virtue of
courage, discussed explicitly and connected with honor in the Anthropology and Metaphysics of
Morals, pervades Idea and Conjectural Beginning. With regard to climate change, courage and a
proper love of honor—which is a negative disposition to act morally, because we wish not to be
deserving of contempt (Collins LE 27:408-412.)209—allows us to engage in battle, heroically, for
the progress of the species and the stewardship of nature.
When moral courage is properly connected with honor, humanity stands to be motivated
to shift to sustainability; by considering how future generations might regard us if we leave them
with a bleak outlook, we use the feeling of honor to guide us (Idea 8:30-1).210 The dignity we
have for ourselves repels the possibility of being despised by our youth: “If, in doing something
worthy of honor,” such as, for example, cultivating courage in the heroic battle of climate
change,

209

Kant also connects love of honor with the virtue of proper pride, which is an unyielding concern for
rectifying one’s own dignity as a moral being (MM 6:465). In the Herder Lectures on Ethics, Kant warns
that a pursuit of honor for its own sake “is more harmful to morality than any other passion” since it
makes us slaves to our own selfish delusions (LE 27:45). The proper sense of honor that I am claiming is
helpful for climate change concerns the love of honor connected to moral courage in achieving
sustainable progress for future generations.
Cf. to Kant’s Idea (8:30-31)—how will future generations regard us? If we see ourselves as part of the
collaborative goal of the species, we become capable of acting honorably for the sake of subsequent
generations. Cf. Korsgaard (2004, 185f14) who cites the TP as a place where Kant conceives of morality
as a “collaborative” endeavor.
210
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we do not allow ourselves to be intimidated by taunts and derisive ridicule of it…but
instead pursue our own course steadfastly, we display a moral courage which many who
show themselves as brave figures on the battlefield or in a duel do not possess. That is to
say, to venture something that duty commands…requires resoluteness, and even a high
degree of courage; because love of honor is the constant companion of virtue
(Anthropology 7:257).
When we think of how future generations will perceive our actions, we should “so act as to be
worthy of honour, to deserve respect and esteem from all, if it were generally known… That man
is worthy of positive honour, whose actions are meritorious, and contain more than they are due
to contain” (Collins LE 27: 281). If we continue with a business-as-usual mindset, rather than
strive to cultivate virtue and perfect the species, we will not be worthy of honor from the
perspective of future generations. We would be wise to apply Kant’s “honor-imperative” to the
future-oriented challenge of climate change.
The Kantian virtue of perseverance211 has environmental significance as well. Through
the hardships and toil, despite not reaping personal benefits for happiness in our current situation
(Idea 8:20), we gain a sobering212 appreciation for the task at hand (CB 8:123) and understand
our rootedness in nature as cosmic citizens of the world (Anthropology 7:120). As Genevieve
Lloyd puts it, “reading the Idea can make us aware of unfamiliar connections between modern
ideals and old ideas of human beings as part of an interconnected cosmos” (Lloyd 2009, 211).
This traditionally stoic virtue provides a cosmic context that is indeed helpful for sustainable
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Perseverance, on a Kantian view, should not be confused with patience. The latter, according to Kant,
is passive and has quietist implications (Anthropology 7:258), whereas perseverance (as is implicitly
expressed in the historical essays) is active. An active, engaged perseverance is the ideal stance for the
battle of climate change, because quietist patience is decidedly complicit with business-as-usual. The hero
actively engages the world with perseverance.
212

The virtue of perseverance, implicitly discussed in the historical texts, can easily be connected to the
Metaphysics of Morals. Kant discusses how the pursuit of virtue is a kind sobering “apathy” that can be
regarded as moral strength of will, much like a stoic outlook: “The true strength of virtue is a tranquil
mind with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue in practice” (MM 6:409). With climate
change, we need to cultivate this sobering strength in order to persevere and transition to sustainability.
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cosmopolitanism. Cosmic-citizenship means, first and foremost, that humans see themselves as
citizens of the world-system. Viewing Kant’s virtues with this ecological perspective allows for a
translation of traditional virtues into environmental ones, because they help humanity
understand—as natural beings pushed along by the guiding hand of nature—their embeddedness
in the world-system itself. And “As human culture grows,” on Wood’s reading,
the degree of peace and order required for further progress also tends to
increase…increasing interdependence and cooperation…This means that as culture
progresses, human reason is challenged to devise ways of creating a well-ordered society
in which people’s antagonistic tendencies can be kept in check (Wood 1999, 213).
The virtuous acceptance of humanity’s embeddedness in nature gleaned from the anthropological
texts, connected with contemporary concerns for a sustainable maintenance of the planet, is
indeed requisite for perfecting the species and securing a well-ordered society. Confronting the
collective project of overcoming climate change and developing the heroic attitude of solidarity
elucidates the virtues needed to create conditions for sustainable cosmopolitanism.
Ecological Stewardship as a Condition for Pursuing our Moral Vocation
Climate change is a challenge to humanity’s place in the world: relations to persons, to nonrational nature, and with regard to humanity’s moral vocation. From an environmental
perspective, Kant’s cosmopolitan vision has much to offer for progress, sustainability,
stewardship, and a paradigm shift in human history. Whereas the notion of civil progress in Kant
is explicit, my connections of Kant’s heroic vision to sustainability, stewardship, and the
environmental paradigm shift are, rather, implied connections that can be drawn from his
thought.213

Matthew C. Altman in “Kant’s Strategic Importance for Environmental Ethics” (2011) also hints at the
resourcefulness of Kant’s philosophy for facilitating a “stewardship model of nature” (Altman 2011, 4851), but he does not expand upon this in much detail and draws mainly from the Critique of Judgment
rather than the anthropological writings.
213
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In Conjectural Beginning, Kant asserts that “the vocation of the species consists in
progressing toward perfection” which includes “the progress of culture” (CB 8:115-17). And in
the Anthropology and Pedagogy, Kant warns that because humanity is destined to be a social
species, the human moral vocation can only be realized if humanity strives together, collectively
(Anthropology 7:323-325; Pedagogy 9:445). This, of course, counters the standard views of his
moral philosophy as strictly individualistic. Thus, in the historical texts214 part of humanity’s
vocation includes not only duties to self and duties to others, but a vast social project of progress
for enlightening and harmonizing humanity with nature in aspiration for the highest good or
realm of ends.
Kant’s discussion of the moral progress of the species inevitably leads to considerations
of humanity’s overarching moral vocation. The heroic project of progressing the species, when
conjoined with humanity’s moral vocation, has implications for the moral necessity of
transitioning to sustainability and pursing a stewardship role vis-à-vis nature. In light of climate
change, humanity’s vocation must be aligned with the ends of ecological stewardship, or else
progress will dwindle and humanity will suffer. Without stewardship as a prevailing attitude in
the Anthropocene, humanity will continue on the path of unsustainable disenlightenment.215
Climate change threatens the welfare of humans across the globe. Thus, sustainability is required
for moral progress because unsustainability is indelibly tied with injustice and inequity—many
humans will suffer as a result, precluding progress. Hindering the transition toward sustainable
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As well as the Critique of Practical Reason and Religion, where Kant introduces the duty of pursuing
the highest good as a social duty.
For a discussion on the idea of American “disenlightenment” as a cognitive and cultural disconnect
from the realities of our current environmental predicament, see Schönfeld, “American disenlightenment,
or climate change made in USA” (2016). Schönfeld draws the term from Kevin Philips, American
Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century
(2006).
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stewardship not only ignores the collective duty of perfecting the species, but cruelly flouts our
duties to others (for example, people in poorer countries who will face the brunt of the initial
climate impacts such as heat waves, food shortages, and water depletion).216 Additionally,
without a benevolent, stewardship attitude toward nature, the disinterested appreciation and care
of beautiful nature is thwarted, and an attitude of domination toward nature leads humanity down
the vicious path of inhumaneness.217 The ecological view of nature discussed in Chapter 3 and
the aesthetic-moral preparation for it discussed in Chapter 4 thus point toward a stewardship
attitude of nature.
That humanity’s moral vocation requires sustainable and humane stewardship in turn
requires a reexamination of what is valued (not just ends in themselves) and those that do the
valuing (how humanity interfaces with the world). The implication, I claim, is that drawing from
Kant’s heroic vision of humanity can be of assistance in making the paradigm shift of human
history. Kant’s heroic vision—by allowing humanity’s moral vocation to be seen in collective
terms as a progression of the species as a whole in the face of a monolithic obstacle—can thus
facilitate the required holistic paradigm shift for sustainability. The radical individualist
paradigm, propped up and reinforced by developments since the industrial revolution, capitalism,
and individualist moral philosophies inherited from the early modern period have led to a
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For a survey of the current and projected existential impacts of climate change on humanity and how
they unjustly affect poorer nations, see the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).
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In the Collins Lectures on Ethics, Kant warns that an attitude of cruel domination toward animals leads
to immoral treatment of humans, and that living responsibly according to our moral vocation requires
stewardship of non-rational nature: “Since animals are an analogue of humanity, we observe duties to
mankind when we observe them as analogues to this, and thus cultivate our duties to humanity. If a dog,
for example, has served his master long and faithfully, that is an analogue of merit; hence I must reward
it, and once the dog can serve no longer, must look after him to the end” (LE 27:459). Cf. to the
Vigilantius Lectures on Ethics: “[I]t cannot be denied that a hard-heartedness towards animals is not in
accordance with the law of reason, and is at least an unsuitable use of means. Any action whereby we
may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or otherwise treat them without love, is demeaning to
ourselves. It is inhuman” (LE 27:710).
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disintegration of the collective bonds of society. As a result, exploitation and corruption have all
run amok, climaxing with the climate crisis.
Part 3: Kant’s Holistic View of Humanity: Antidote to Liberalism?
Before making the transition to potential duties for sustainability, a discussion of Kant and the
question of liberalism is paramount. By liberalism, I refer to the political ideology centered on
the inviolability of individuality and the free pursuit of self-interest. This minimally regulated
sense of individuality can best be understood by reference to the tripartite motto of the French
Enlightenment: liberty, equality and solidarity. According to classic liberalism, liberty—
understood in the sense of economic and moral freedom from external constraints—is vital for
securing an enlightened populace and a flourishing society. This was certainly the view of
liberalist forefathers and proponents, such as Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith and J.S. Mill,218
who believed that individuals pursuing their own self-interest, under minimal constraints, will in
the end maximize the welfare of society as a whole. This obsession with liberty at the expense of
equality and solidarity is problematic for a number of reasons. Without the mutual support of a
free society collectively pursuing each other’s ends in equal stead, corruption, economic
stratification, and environmental exploitation hold sway. By the same token, a society that places
too much emphasis on equality and solidarity without liberty is equally problematic, since it can
foster totalitarian tendencies that render many voiceless. A balance of all three is key. Though in
his later political writings Kant was weary of the enthusiasm of political solidarity (Williams

Liberalism comes in many flavors, and I would be remiss if I didn’t clarify that I do not intend to
conflate the views of these thinkers and other liberals. Liberals from John Locke to J.S. Mill vary on
many positions, including the extent to which regulation on, for instance, monopolies should be instituted,
or whether there should be limits on free trade. However, despite the variances among these and other
thinkers, they can conveniently be categorized as liberal insofar as they all admit individualism as one of
the most, if not the most important considerations with regard to governance, policy, economic views, and
rights.
218
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2003, 131) which he sees as the seed for the French Revolution’s Red Terror, Kant’s philosophy
is—as Wood and I myself claim—less liberal than many would suspect. In fact, his moral
anthropology in many ways conflicts with the neoliberal outlook, since unregulated exploitation
reduces humanity to a mere means and ignores humanity’s collective-character. The ecological
relevance of this claim, to be defended below, is best understood when put in the context of
today regarding climate change and governance.
In the realm of contemporary sustainable policies, it is unsurprising that the most
sustainable (and the most just) societies with respect to planetary boundaries and social
foundations tend to be Democratic Socialist or collectivist-oriented countries (in particular, the
Scandinavian countries, but also others such as Taiwan).219 Individual freedoms and rights are
important in these countries. However, they also focus on the safety and care of the people as a
whole (i.e. equality) and, thus, emphasize the importance of constraints on inequitable and
unsustainable liberal freedom. With regard to making the necessary changes for sustainability,
certain individual freedoms must be challenged with an eye for the nation (or better, species) as a
whole, and these can often best be achieved by unifying the public under the ideal of the
collective good (i.e. solidarity), such as flourishing in accordance with sustainability.220
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For a discussion on the connections between just and sustainable economic and political policies, see
the Worldwatch Institute’s State of the World 2013: Is Sustainability still Possible? Carl Folke,
“Respecting Planetary Boundaries and Reconnecting to the Biosphere” (2013) discusses planetary
boundaries in relation to sustainability. For discussions on the connection between planetary boundaries
and human equity and well-being, bringing forth the moral and political dimensions of planetary science
with regard to social foundations, see Kate Raworth, “Defining a Safe and Just Place for Humanity”
(2013). Steffen et. al. in “Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet”
(2015) discuss how planetary boundaries should not be seen as synonymous with ecological tipping
points, but that the former are rather to be thought of as the fence of a safe operating space where it is
possible to, as it were, halt the brakes on ecological catastrophe.
220

In China (which perhaps leans too much on the side of solidarity without protections for liberty and
equality), collective effort is shored up to garner solidarity by emphasizing that the goal of sustainability
is best framed in terms of “ecological citizenship.” One example of eco-citizenship is the call for green
burials, such as the utilization of the deceased for growing a tree. This gesture not only reinforces the
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There has been much recent discussion of the question about whether classic liberalism
or neoliberal ideologies are compatible with the economic, political, and cultural values that a
sustainable society requires. Without directly challenging these views in this chapter (which,
though interesting, would perhaps lead me too far astray), let it be granted for the sake of
argument that liberal societies will at the very least face severe challenges and impediments in
preserving their values during the necessary transition to sustainability. If this is the case and,
moreover, if Kant’s thought is in fact liberal to the core, is there not a real deadlock in the
imagining of Kantianism as a blueprint for sustainability? The assumption that Kant is a classic
liberal is what needs to be questioned. To be sure, many aspects of Kant’s thought are liberal—
especially where Kant seems to suggest that moral agents are discrete, individual ends in
themselves and that government may not constrain their freedom (e.g., TP 8:290-291). However,
to paint Kant as a mere individualist or mere liberal with regard to his political and ethical
thought is to miss the whole picture; it is, as it were, to miss the forest for the trees.
Drawing from Kant’s anthropological thought can aid in disabusing the misconception of
Kant as an unswerving proponent of liberalism. For, Kant’s understanding of humanity drawn
from his historical, teleological, and anthropological writings—though individuals play a crucial
part of his theory—questions the legitimacy and extent of liberal individualism, as well as the
unsustainable and exploitative economic and political systems they entail/are associated with.
Indeed, many philosophers such as Hermann Cohen and scholars such as Harry van der Linden
and Allen Wood read between Kant’s liberal lines in their interpretations.

unity of humanity with nature and the relevance of previous generations for future ones, but also increases
valuable carbon sinks in the form of forests. For more on this, see Zeng et. al, “Ecological Citizenship and
Green Burial in China” (2016). The notion of an ecological citizen—one who strives to achieve one’s
ends sustainably in accordance with the notion of a kingdom of ends (unifying liberty, equality, and
solidarity)—is an instantiation of what I discussed previously in on the section reevaluating Kant’s
understanding of humanity’s moral vocation vis-à-vis climate change.
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Cohen expresses the incompatibility of Kant’s ethics (especially the respect for persons
formulation of the categorical imperative) with capitalism. The two are at odds because
exploitation is an essential structural feature of capitalism (Linden 1988, 223). Since it is
generally acknowledged that capitalism (and its paradigm of infinite growth and exploitation of
people and the land) is incompatible with the transition to sustainability and cultivation of a
stewardship ethic, it would likewise be wise to understand how the green Kant is incompatible
with capitalism for similar reasons.
Harry van der Linden in his study Kantian Ethics and Socialism (1988) argues that not
only does Kant’s thought contain elements of a proto-communistic vision that Marx’s later
thought lacks (with regard to ethics), but Linden also argues that Kant’s ethical thought provides
the core for considering how a just and realistic transition to socialism is possible.221 And, if
socialistic or collectivist-oriented societies are required, as was granted, for the transition to
sustainability, then perhaps Kant’s thought isn’t a mere limitation after all. Rather, the ideal
republic that Kant’s ethics obliges humanity to pursue is in fact incompatible with capitalism
(Linden 1988, 198-205).
Wood argues throughout Kant’s Ethical Thought (1999) that, much to the surprise of the
liberal fans of Kantian ethics, Kant’s thought is in fact much more non-individualist that is
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To be sure, van der Linden does take some liberties in his interpretation of Kant—perhaps, as Manfred
Kuehn observes (“Review” 1991) by whiggishly reading the socialist neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen back
into Kant’s thought. Nonetheless, even if Kant cannot be read as a communistic thinker like Marx, I
submit that many aspects of Kant’s anthropological thought function as proto-socialist, sustainable
building-blocks. This is especially true with regard to Kant’s injunction to view humanity holistically, as
a species perfecting itself in accordance with the requirements of morality and a view to the flourishing of
the whole. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that Kant was also a champion of liberal ideas, so
one could read him less favorably for socialism if one were to highlight these aspects. The key point is
that Kant’s philosophy sits at an interesting middle-point between socialist and liberal ideals, and has
been appropriated by both sides in post-Kantian political philosophy. I merely wish to highlight the
socialist sides amenable to sustainability. A more in-depth study of the liberal and socialist aspects and
influence of Kant falls outside the scope of this chapter.
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usually supposed. Lamenting the standard approach of commentators of Kant’s thought who
ignore his anthropology, Wood suggests that
Perhaps Kant’s undeserved reputation as an “individualist” is due in part to the fact that
the community in which he placed his strongest hopes is of a kind to which we now find
it impossible to relate. A philosopher who views the coercive powers of the state with
suspicion, and advocates a religion of reason as the only true human community is easily
perceived as condemning individuals to loneliness and advocating social atomism. From
a Kantian standpoint, however, the right conclusion to draw is that the state was always
the wrong institution in which to place one’s hopes and that religion has thus far failed
humanity.
Looking back to the century that preceded it, Kant’s view of history looks like a
rationalistic version of the apocalypse expected by egalitarian German Pietism. Looking
ahead to the next two centuries, it might just as easily be interpreted in terms of Marxian
communism or, as some neo-Kantians did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, as a radical socialist vision lying at the heart of Kantian ethics…if we are to
fulfil our collective historical vocation, we will need to find (or invent) a form of ethical
community that is capable of gradually reshaping our deeply corrupt social life (Wood
1999, 319-320).
Wood’s claims regarding the non-individualist, socialistic-leaning tendencies in Kant’s
philosophy might shock those who have only been exposed to the traditional reading of Kant’s
philosophy. Wood’s reading—though perhaps contentious—is really nothing new. For, in fact,
Kant’s philosophy has been subject to appropriations both on liberalist and socialist lines and for
good reason. Followers of Adam Smith are not unjustified in painting a liberal Kant, as there are
plenty of passages to suggest such a reading. Kant says, for instance, in On the Common Saying,
No one can coerce me to be happy in his way (as he thinks of the welfare of other human
beings); instead, each may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him,
provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of everyone in accordance with a
possible universal law (i.e., does not infringe upon this right of another). A government
established on the principle of benevolence toward the people like that of a father toward
his children—this is, a paternalistic government (imperium paternale), in which the
subjects, like minor children who cannot distinguish between what is truly useful or
harmful to them, are constrained to behave only passively…—is the greatest despotism
thinkable (TP 8:291).
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On the liberal reading, the government may not redistribute one’s wealth (which would amount
to coercion) or determine the subjective ends of autonomous agents. And, moreover, Kant does
cite Wealth of Nations in multiple places (Kleingeld 2012), so there is a clear liberal influence in
his thinking. Yet on the other side, there are less liberal passages, such as in Metaphysics of
Morals, where Kant argues that the government may apply progressive taxes or redistribute the
wealth as a condition for the possibility for its less affluent citizens to exercise their autonomy:
The general will of the people has united itself into a society which is to maintain itself
perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself to the internal authority of the state in
order to maintain those members of the society who are unable to maintain themselves.
For reasons of state the government is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy [die
Vermögenden] to provide the means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide for
even their most necessary natural needs. The wealthy have acquired an obligation to the
commonwealth, since they owe their existence to an act of submitting to its protection
and care, which they need in order to live; on this obligation the state now bases its right
to contribute what is theirs in maintaining their fellow citizens. This can be done either by
imposing a tax on the property or commerce of citizens, or by establishing funds and
using the interest from them, not for the needs of the state (for it is rich), but for the needs
of the people…it will do this by way of coercion, by public taxation, not merely by
voluntary contributions, some of which are made for gain (MM 6:326).
In addition, Kant was not surprisingly (given passages like these) appropriated by socialists in
the 20th century on two fronts. This suggests that a non-individualist view of Kant is not
implausible, in concert with Wood’s view. In Der Marxismus: Seine Geschichte in Dokumenten
(1967), political scientist and historian of ideas Iring Fetscher notes that there were not only
Marxists who imported Kantian ideas, but there were also neo-Kantians who argued that
Marxist-flavored ideas made Kant stronger. The list of individuals noted by Fetscher on the neoKantian side includes Eduard Bernstein, Nikolai Berdjajew, Max Adler, and Peter von Struve
(Fetscher 1973). Linden, in supporting Wood’s non-individualist reading of Kant by means of an
invigoration of socialist Hermann Cohen’s neo-Kantian approach, simply brings to mind the
older socialist appropriators of Kantian thought. In line with Wood’s contention of a non-
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individualist, socialist-oriented Kant, this evidence suggests that Kant’s philosophy has potential
for both sides; thus, Wood’s reading of the non-individualist Kant is not completely at odds with
Kantianism, though there is a tension between Kant’s liberal claims and his more socialistleaning ones. In the end, then, the socialist Kant indeed has textual evidence, historical
precedent, and contemporary defenders on its side.222
Not only is Kant’s collective vision of humanity readily compatible with socialism, but
also now—with the climate crisis—I claim that Kant’s collective historical vocation can be a
philosophical resource to the corruption of political regulatory capture and the capitalistic
incentives of greed that block sustainable change. If Kant’s philosophical anthropology has more
positive affinities to socialism than capitalism and if capitalism and the urge for endless growth,
exploitation, and destruction of nature are intricately related, a Kantian critique of capitalism is
readily possible given my defense of the green Kant’s sustainable outlook. A more in-depth
discussion of the non-individualist elements of Kant’s anthropology, its connection to his ethics,
and the unsustainability of capitalism, however, clearly exceeds the scope intended for this
chapter; the reader is urged to draw his or her conclusions about potential implications of a
Kantian critique of neoliberalism’s domination of humanity and nature and as it pertains to
climate change. At this juncture, I shall conclude by discussing some concrete Kantian duties
that may be instrumental for making sustainable change.

For an example of a rejection of the liberal view and defense of the socialist side of Kant’s ethics, see
Altman’s chapter “Moral and Legal Arguments for Universal Health Care” in Kant and Applied Ethics
(2011). Altman presents a contemporary defense of a Kantian argument for social welfare programs such
as universal health care. Contemporary liberal readers of Kant typically argue, among other reasons, that
redistributing the wealth treats the affluent as a mere means in infringing on their liberty (Altman 20111,
77; Nozick 1974, 30-31). For liberal readings of Kant, see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(1974) and Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty vol. 2, The Mirage of Social Justice (1976).
Finally, some scholars highlight the liberal aspects of Kant but do so with a critical caution. For this
middle approach, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “Kant, Liberalism, and War” (1962) and Paul Guyer, “Kantian
Foundations of Liberalism” (1997).
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The Heroic Project and Duty: Connecting the Foregoing to Kantian Ethics
Is it possible to generate any explicit duties regarding sustainability by taking Kant’s holistic
insights seriously? If not, my exploration would seem to offer only theoretical assistance for the
present challenges regarding climate change. I claim that at least two Kantian duties can be
utilized to prevent the moral and existential failing of climate change and the hindering of
progress—one direct but imperfect duty of perfection to oneself, drawn from Metaphysics of
Morals in a recent reading by Svoboda (2015); and one imperfect duty toward contributing to the
progression of the species,223 interpreted apropos of the kingdom of ends formulation from
Groundwork, drawn from Allen Wood (1999). The former can be helpful for the moral concern
of biodiversity loss. The latter, since it is a social obligation, has important implications for the
specious overemphasis on Kantian liberalism previously discussed.
According to Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals, moral agents have an imperfect though
direct duty to cultivate their own moral perfection (MM 6:446). On Toby Svoboda’s view, this
has several implications for how we ought to treat non-human animals, with his central claim
maintaining that

In Creating the Kingdom of Ends Korsgaard discusses Kant’s claim that we cannot have duties of
perfection to agents other than ourselves, because perfection can only be demanded of oneself (Korsgaard
2000, 220n36). Cf. “Enlightenment” on the notion of enlightened individualism (this would seem to
undermine my claim that we have a duty to promote the perfection of the species). Properly speaking, one
cannot have duties of perfection to others (MM 6:386). However, living in accordance with the kingdom
of ends’ formulation of harmonizing humanity’s ends thereby promotes the perfection of the species. This
duty is instrumental to facilitating humanity’s perfection. Indeed, in accordance with the formulation of a
kingdom of ends, this duty of species-perfection involves perfecting culture and education such that
individuals in society are in a realistic position to foster their own perfection. As Korsgaard puts it,
“Granted, that it would be both disrespectful to you, and unfair to me, to hold me responsible in a general
way for your moral character. Yet it is clear that we have a duty to provide for the moral education of our
children, and, Kant himself insists, our intimate friends [MM 6:470]. Choosing ends on another’s behalf
is as impossible as it would be disrespectful, but putting others in a good position to choose for
themselves, and to choose them well, is the proper work of parents, teachers, friends, and politicians;
providing for someone’s moral education as well as nurturing her self-respect is an important part of the
way we do this” (Korsgaard 2000, 220n36).
223
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Animal cruelty and wanton destruction of flora are both proscribed in virtue of one’s duty
to increase her own moral perfection. Moreover, this duty gives human beings good
moral reason to practice kindness toward animals and to engage in aesthetic appreciation
of flora because such actions are ways to increase one’s moral perfection (Svoboda 2012,
157).
In Kant’s sense, passing on an opportunity to be kind to animals, or to go out of one’s
way to benefit animals, is a missed changed to fulfill one’s duty. By ignoring the plights
of animals whose suffering one could alleviate, for example, one misses a change to
cultivate virtuous dispositions that would be constitutive of one’s moral purity and hence
increase one’s moral perfection. Kind actions toward animals can cultivate virtuous
dispositions, such as benevolence… Similarly, passing on an opportunity to appreciate
the beauty of plant life is also a missed opportunity to increase one’s moral perfection,
insofar as such appreciation could cultivate virtuous dispositions, such as the disposition
to love something apart from its utility (see MM, AA 6:443) (Svoboda 2012, 158).
If Svoboda is right that the duty of perfection toward oneself entails a real concern for nonhuman nature, then a failure to contribute to the heroic project against climate change will
threaten the moral purity of innumerable moral agents, since climate change threatens the wellbeing of flora and fauna on a massive scale: It has been suggested that we are on direct track for
a sixth mass extinction. Despite flora and fauna having no intrinsic value on a traditional Kantian
reading, Svoboda shows how we still have a moral duty to oneself to avoid harm and preserve
the interests of such entities when possible (Svoboda 2015, 159). Failure to mitigate climate
change thus precludes and even massively decreases the perfection of individual moral agents.
This moral damage makes prospects for perfecting humanity as a species—as per the obligations
of Idea and Conjectural Beginning—dubious. This is because, as I argued previously, Kant
considers humanity as a collective, intergenerational species; moral progress cannot be
completed by a single individual, let alone a single generation. Thus, Kant thinks, it is a moral
task for each individual to contribute toward this moral project as fully as possible. This
contribution involves not only an adherence to strict duties (such as treating ends in themselves
with respect), but also a pursuit of wide duties of virtue (such as striving to become morally pure
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and making use of one’s cognitive abilities). If we allow a mass extinction to ensue without
resisting climate change, we not only engage collectively in the self-destruction of moral purity,
but we lose a wealth of biological and ecological knowledge. With the loss of purity, we become
morally vicious, and with the loss of naturalistic knowledge, we miss out on opportunities to
expand and cultivate our mental talents. Both make the moral progress of the species dubious.
For these moral and intellectual reasons, then, a Kantian should worry about the detrimental
effects climate change will have on biodiversity loss.
On Allen Wood’s view, the formulation of a kingdom of ends—rather than the negative
test in the formulation of universal law—asserts a positive aspirational duty toward agents, viz.
that we should unite our ends for the sake of attaining a harmonious, organic system (Wood
1999, 185); The end of one member of humanity is tied up with the aim of the species. Kant’s
formulation of a realm of ends, understood in this way, neatly connects to his injunction in the
historical texts to pursue a world of cosmopolitan order and perfecting humanity. Climate change
poses a threat not only to future generations, but also current generations. Failure to address
climate change harms most of the developing world who will suffer from extreme weather,
displacement, disease, and food shortage. It also precludes the harmonization of human ends.
Ignoring climate change treats impacted peoples as mere means and prevents the realization of a
kingdom of ends as the harmonization of humanity with nature. If Groundwork’s formulation of
a kingdom of ends is to be taken seriously, then these historical texts ought to be taken seriously
as well since they flesh out this notion more determinately.
As I have shown, part of the task for perfecting humanity involves taking on the heroic
project in the fight against climate change. Thus, failure to partake impedes our duty to secure a
realm of ends. And, drawing from Svoboda, it also makes one less morally perfect from the
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standpoint of virtue, since climate change’s impacts will irreparably damage biodiversity and the
beautiful in nature. These Kantian injunctions for perfecting humanity by way of perfecting
oneself and harmonizing our ends clearly have implications for climate ethics, insofar as they
involve no distinction between the nationality of moral agents (as humanity as a species is the
focus). On Kant’s philosophical view of humanity, we are in the same boat and ought to work
together, collectively. Similarly, climate change involves a collaborative effcort on the part of
nations. Perfecting the species also necessarily concerns the welfare of future generations, since
they too considered morally on Kant’s holistic view of humanity.224 This generation’s handling
of climate change will, for better or worse, determine the fate of these future generations. Those
of this generation need to ask themselves: Do we want to be remembered honorably or as the
moral bunglers of humankind?
To summarize: the ethical insights of Kantian anthropology relevant to climate ethics
lead to two concrete duties for progressing and perfecting the species. The historical essays
enjoin the perfection of the species, yet this is not possible unless individual agents strive for
self-perfection and individual enlightenment, both morally and cognitively. Yet perfecting
individual moral purity involves, as Svoboda has shown, a moral duty to promote the well-being
of flora and fauna and avoid their unnecessary destruction. Thus, concern for human progress
involves a concern for biodiversity that is imminently threatened by climate change. Moreover,
as Wood shows, the perfection of the species is not possible unless the kingdom of ends—in
which we harmonize our purposes for the sake of cosmopolitan peace—becomes a moral

Kant’s holistic view of humanity is fleshed out in further detail in section III of Kant’s essay on praxis
(TP 8:307-313). Here, Kant contrasts his holistic view of humanity with Mendelssohn’s individualist
position. Since Kant is taking the defensive here (and the section is rather short), I chose to focus on
Conjectural Beginning and Idea.
224
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aspiration. However, this kingdom remains a mere whimsical fantasy so long as climate change
threatens the lives of others and impedes their educational development,225 especially those of
developing nations. In order to honor this formulation of the categorical imperative and put
humanity on the pathway of perfection, anthropogenic climate change must be combated. For the
impacts of climate change directly affect the possibility of a safe, just, and equitable human
habitat. And so, connecting Kant’s philosophical insights with regard to human progress with
Svoboda and Wood’s accounts provides reasons for considering how Kantian ethics can, and
indeed, must become a blueprints for sustainability. This is the green Kant of sustainability.
Objection and Concluding Remarks
I conclude with a single menacing objection. It goes as follows: in Conjectural Beginning, Kant
discusses how, during its rational awakening, humanity realizes that animals such as the lamb are
mere tools for its use, and this is when humanity first gets elevated to the status of end in
itself.226 The worry is that if non-human animals cannot be valued, how will environments and

Climate change is yet another enabler of humanity’s continued “self-incurred minority,” to draw from
Kant’s essay on enlightenment. The kingdom of ends not only requires humanity to be healthy and
physically flourishing (for one cannot perform one’s duty if one is malnourished, MM 6:388), but it also
has strict demands for culture and education. Ignoring climate change and its harms to many nations
threatens both of these from being actualized. In the Pedagogy, Kant claims that “Perhaps education will
get better and better and each generation will move one step closer to the perfection of humanity; behind
education lies the great secret of the perfection of human nature” (9:444). With regard to climate change,
there is an interesting feedback loop: ignorance and poor education preclude people from accepting the
reality of climate change, and as climate change worsens, education in many areas becomes even more
limited and ineffective. It would be wise to follow Kant, and focus on cultivating a free-thinking,
enlightened populace as a vehicle for striving for the perfection of the species and facing the heroic task
of climate change. For a recent collection of essays addressing the challenges of education in the
Anthropocene, see the Worldwatch Institute’s EarthEd: Rethinking Education on a Changing Planet
(2017).
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“But there was yet a fourth and final step which reason took, and this raised man altogether above
community with animals. He came to understand, however obscurely, that he is the true end of nature,
and that nothing that lives on earth can compete with him in this regard. The first time he ever said to the
sheep ‘nature has given you the skin [Pelz] you wear for my use, not for yours’…from then on he looked
upon them, no longer as fellow creatures, but as mere means and tools to whatever end he pleased…Thus
man had entered into a relation of equality with all rational beings, whatever their rank (3:22), with
226
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nature be given any moral consideration? Since climate ethics is a subset of the broader field of
environmental ethics, this seems like a hard challenge for drawing from these historical texts, as
Kant is explicit here that animals are mere tools. There are at least two ways to respond to this:227
first, despite climate ethics being a subset of environmental ethics, the two are quite opposed and
proponents of each disagree on many things. For example, many environmental ethicists claim
that standard anthropocentric normative ethics are problematic and often espouse more radical
anti-anthropocentric positions.228 Climate ethicists, in contrast, tend to be more analytic, drawing
upon consequentialist traditions.229 Even if it’s granted that Kant’s treatment of animals is
problematic in this text, it doesn’t follow that Kant’s insights fail to be of value for climate
ethics, since the latter is decidedly anthropocentric. And moreover, the concerns of climate ethics

respect to the claim of being an end in himself, respected as such by everyone, a being which no one
might treat as a mere means to ulterior ends” (CB trans. Beck, 8:114).
227

Wilson (2008) grapples with this same objection in a different manner. She asserts that the passage of
CB 8:114 is intended to be descriptive rather than normative: “The story of using sheepskin is not about
how we ought to relate to animals but rather about how we can indeed use animals as mere means,
because we are superior in our ability to compete with animals” (Wilson 2008, 8). While convincing, this
interpretation fails to account for the fact that Kant uses this scriptural passage in order to introduce our
awareness of ourselves as ends in themselves; it isn’t simply descriptive, since this realization has a
normative, binding force. I take Kant to be using this as a depiction not of humanity’s skillful cunning,
but rather as the first major stage in the evolution of humanity’s disposition toward morality.
See, for example, the classic text “Is there a need for a new, and environmental ethic” (1973) where
Routley argues that classic normative theories are deficient for environmental concerns. Other radical
anti- and non-anthropocentric positions in environmental ethics include Callicott’s In Defense of the Land
Ethic (1989), which presents an ecocentric take on Leopold’s land ethic, and proponents of the deep
ecology tradition, such as Naess, “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: A summary”
(1973).
228
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For a good representation of a classic climate ethic approach from the standpoint of utilitarian,
economic, and analytic traditions, see John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (2012).
For a more recent approach in light of new empirical information, a useful guide is Climate Ethics:
Essential Readings edited by Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson, and Shue (2010). It is unsurprising that the vast
majority of approaches to climate ethics take their point of departure from a consequentialist standpoint.
For climate change as a concept includes innumerable variables in calculating its potential trajectories,
impacts, and outcomes, which require international effort from citizens, politicians, an interdisciplinary
approach in the sciences the likes of which has never been witnessed in human history. Because of all
these collaborative and probabilistic considerations, consequentialism is a safe normative strategy for
tackling the ethics of climate change.
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have, arguably, superseded the classical concerns of environmental ethics, such as species
preservation and pollution mitigation;230 that is to say, since climate change is a looming sublime
force that threatens all of life—not just humans, but biodiversity and species-welfare, tackling
climate change will indirectly be a means for saving those species. This is why climate ethics
focuses less on animal concerns and more with the big picture, dealing with climate change,
which is how Kant’s anthropological insights will aid us if we grant his reading of animals as
wanting.
Second, this objection doesn’t contextualize Kant’s understanding of humanity’s
progression in the historical texts.231 To be sure, Kant does discuss how humanity first discovers
its end in itself status through the use-value of animals. However, Kant is clear that this is not the
culmination of humanity’s development.232 The beginning stages of culture are achieved as a
result of this realization that it is an end in itself, but this stage of culture is still incomplete:
“culture, considered as the genuine education of man and man as citizen, has perhaps not even
begun properly, much less been completed” (CB trans. Beck, 8:116). Kant urges in Conjectural

Martin Schönfeld in “Plan B: global ethics on climate change” (2011) argues that the concerns of
classic approaches to environmental ethics are largely moot given the new realities of anthropogenic
climate change. Thus, they should be reintegrated into the new perspective of climate philosophy, which
includes climate ethics on the one hand and new metaphysical orientations (such as from philosophical
Daoism or the holistic vision of Heidegger) and ideology critique (such as materialistic, capitalistic, and
Randian obsessions of Western culture) on the other hand.
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I am not alone in urging us to read Kant’s Conjectural Beginning in light of his larger orientation in
philosophy and ethics. For other proponents of this holistic approach to Kantian thought, see Allen Wood,
Kant’s Ethical Thought Part 2 and especially Chapter 6, (1998) and “The Unsociable Sociability: The
Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics” 1991) and Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant, History, and the Idea of
Moral Development” (1999).
231

Seeing animals as mere means is essential (from the perspective of humanity’s historical development)
for humanity to become aware of the moral law as binding upon it and conferring of dignity and respect.
However, this historical contingency need not be construed as the completion of humanity’s development.
The stage of viewing animals as mere means lacks the maturity of enlightened culture, and this final state
is capable of disinterestedly valuing and loving nature (cf. CJ 5:380). Cf. Conjectural Beginning to Kant’s
Idea: just as strife and war are historically necessary for peace and enlightenment, perpetual war is not the
final state of society.
232
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Beginning and elsewhere that humanity has to attain a stage of enlightened cosmopolitanism in
order for it to live up to its true vocation.233 This enlightened position will necessarily include
stewardship of nature and gentleness234 toward animals in line with Kant’s arguments in the
Metaphysics of Morals against wantonly damaging beautiful nature (MM 6:443)—whether
beautiful flora and fauna or the beauty of harmonious, flourishing environments. Even ugly flora
and fauna have some ecological function to play (and contribute to the harmony and beauty of
said ecosystem), when investigated through the auspices of teleological judgment (as was shown
in Chapter 4). Likewise, enlightened humanity will have good reason not to exploit animals as
mere tools. A Kantian could justify prima facie reasons for using animals,235 but implications of
Kant’s discussion of animals for environmental and climate ethics are not as worrying as might
appear if this passage in Conjectural Beginning is read out of context. Instead, it should be

For evidence that enlightened cosmopolitanism lies at the final stages of humanity’s development or
that it has a place of central importance to the study of anthropology and philosophy, on Kant’s view, see
Idea (8:26), Conjectural Beginning (8:117-118), E (8:39), PP (8:365), TP (8:309-313), Anthropology
(7:120) and Lectures on Anthropology (25:734; Wood 1999, 199).
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On Herman’s reading, our pursuit of a cosmopolitan civil society “shuts down some of the arenas of
domination” (Herman 2009, 157). Surely, these would include an air of benevolence toward non-human
animals and nature.
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That we can be prima facie justified in using animals, especially in the midst of ethical dilemmas, is
how I read the first lines of Anthropology, where Kant asserts that “The fact that the human being can
have the ‘I’ in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth….an entirely
different being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes” (Anthropology
7:127). Though Kant seems to contradict himself with regard to his statements in Metaphysics of Morals
and Critique of Judgment about not treating animals as mere tools, it must be borne in mind that, though
Anthropology was among the last things Kant published in his lifetime (1798), he had been teaching its
course and reworking the material for decades; it would be unsurprisingly if he didn’t, at times, forget to
modify a statement he had qualified in a different treatise elsewhere. This course was intended for a
popular audience; though I suggest we should look at the anthropological works for their value, we should
bear in mind that their less systematic nature more readily lends itself to issues of consistency and
interpretive trouble. This problem is resolved if we simply interpret “with which one can do as one likes”
as true but understood in a qualified sense—for instance, so long as the animal is cared for and not treated
maliciously.
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considered in the larger scheme of Kant’s thought as one of the first major stages in the evolution
of humanity’s disposition toward morality.
To conclude, a reconsideration of Kant’s philosophical understanding of humanity (as
expressed, for instance, in Idea and Conjectural Beginning) shows that his seemingly dated
views of nature, humanity, and history are relevant for the ethical and political challenges of
climate change. My exploration into Kant’s anthropological texts indeed has important
implications for the intergenerational, international ethics of climate change. For if humanity is
viewed from a holistic standpoint, including all generations across all places; that is, as a
collective species pursuing a progressive narrative for achieving a sustainable cosmopolitan
world, Kant can then be seen as a helpful resource for dealing with tricky ethical and cognitive
issues of climate change. Kant’s texts give us a heroic vision for a cosmopolitan world: in short,
they can be read as blueprints of sustainability. They are thus not only philosophically relevant
with regard to Kant scholarship since they articulate the collective, non-individualist elements of
his thought that aren’t as clear from the standpoint of Groundwork, but they also have practical
significance for the pressing concerns we face today, namely with regard to the climate crisis and
the environmental deadlocks associated with liberalism and capitalism.
From Blueprints of Sustainability to an Environmental Ethic
We have established a firm theoretical foundation for the greening of Kant—both with regard to
nature and aesthetics as well as humanity and sustainability. Though we have discussed several
duties with regard to humanity, for example—the duty to perfect the species and Svoboda’s
indirect duty view of animals—we have yet to discuss the possibility of a new Kantian
environmental ethics. Can a Kantian-inspired approach generate or justify actual environmental
duties in applied ethics? In this dissertation’s conclusion, I will indicate how the theoretical,
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aesthetic, and political-cosmopolitan insights of this dissertation provide us with a promising
outlook for applied ethics, thus securing the fate of the green Kant.
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CONCLUSION
THE FATE OF THE GREEN KANT
I conclude this dissertation with a summary and outlook on Kant’s fate. In Chapter 1 and 2, I
characterized the traditional, anti-environmental reading of Kant, summarized the varied
responses of proponents of the new reading of Kant, and then suggested that the divergences of
the two Kants—as well as my own contributions to the literature—can be best understood by
reframing the question of Kant’s resourcefulness for environmental ethics in terms of climate
change. Then, I began a three-pronged approach in my defense for how Kant is an environmental
resource rather than a liability. This included a discussion of the ecological relevance and
framing potential of Kant’s pre-critical ontology of nature. Then, I explored Kant’s critical
aesthetics and teleology of nature in order to articulate indirect environmental duties regarding
flora, fauna, and ecosystems. I also showed how a Kantian approach to environmental ethics can
be helpful for the moral preparation of humanity for sustainability. This led to a defense and
application of the usefulness of Kant’s philosophical anthropology and philosophy of history for
environmental virtue and sustainability. Finally, I defended how Kantianism can assist humanity
as a blueprint for ecological stewardship, orienting humanity for a sustainable, enlightened
future. In the last analysis, I have given reasons for why non-humans and nature in the broader
sense can be seen from a moral perspective on Kant’s view, why a Kantian account can provide
defensible indirect duties toward non-rational nature, and why humanity has a collective and
intergenerational duty as part of its moral vocation to strive for sustainability in the
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Anthropocene.236 All of these converge into a new vision showing that the greening of Kant is
not only possible, but that Kantians must indeed become green today. Moreover, environmental
ethicists now have another environmental ally and theoretical resource from which to draw. They
can thus give up their moot quarrel with the traditional Kant. Both sides indeed have much to
gain from these contributions.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I argued that teleological judgment can help us to see nature
itself as an organized Gaian system. These conclusions can fortify the apparent weakness of
Korsgaard’s account for environmental ethics, namely, that she cannot account for collectives
such as species, ecosystems, or planetary systems, since her account hinges on the idea of the
“nature goods” of animals. On my view, self-regulating systems such as ecosystems,
environments, and Gaia itself are viewed as if they were organized beings and have, in some
sense, a natural good corresponding to the maintenance and flourishing of their systems. My
exploration into the pre-critical view of nature and the teleology of the third Critique helps her
view to consider these sorts of entities from a Kantian perspective.
In Chapter 5 I built upon Wood’s insight that ecosystems matter for Kant. With my
discussion of humanity’s moral vocation in light of sustainability, I sharpened Wood’s account
by arguing how a Kantian should reframe humanity’s moral vocation in line with stewardship
and preservation rather than lordship and domination. In addition, Chapter 3 deviates from
Wood’s account by considering how the pre-critical view of nature leaves greater potential for
moral reflection of proto-rational nature. I refined Wood’s discussion by factoring in the
relevance of climate change and the Anthropocene with regard to our duties to non-rational
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It is well known that Kant claims that humanity is the end of nature. In a nice play of irony, this turns
out to be empirically true in the Anthropocene now, where humanity is truly the dominant force of the
planet. This also means that humanity has a responsibility to own up to its vocation. To be authentically
Kantian in the Anthropocene means, then, to be responsible stewards of nature.
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nature, since climate change and our new role require us to think seriously about sustainability
and the fate of both humanity and non-humans.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 also reinforced Svoboda’s virtue theoretic account of Kantian
ethics for our moral and aesthetic consideration of flora and fauna by considering it in light of
the existentially pressing terms of climate change. For if we have duties to ourselves toward flora
and fauna and also should be concerned for the natural good of such entities, the exigency of
climate change with regard to the imminent sixth mass extinction presses us to take seriously
Svoboda’s reading of Kant and think about its relevance in relation to the climate crisis.
Finally, I interfaced with Wilson’s account in two ways. First, I took her insight about the
ecological embeddedness of humanity on Kant’s view seriously, taking it one step further, since
in Chapter 3 I showed how Kant’s pre-critical ecological ontology is even more environmentally
resourceful than the regulative view of nature from which she draws. Second, in Chapter 5 I took
Wilson’s suggestion for taking the anthropological works seriously, articulating how Kant’s
holistic view of humanity in those texts has relevance not only for the ecofeminist concerns that
Wilson discusses, but for the even more pressing heroic challenge of climate change.
In sum, this dissertation has drawn from and expanded upon the aforementioned
influential proponents of the new, green reading of Kant in order to explore alternative avenues
for the greening of Kant. These avenues, as noted above, in many ways strengthen their
approaches and in other ways illuminate important implications of a Kantian environmental ethic
applied to climate change. In doing all this, I have made my case for the green Kant at the
intersection of environmental ethics and Kant scholarship.
Is the green Kant not just a theoretical asset for climate change, but a practical one as
well? Can the greening of Kant have any use for concrete issues in applied ethics? If this
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dissertation has been successful, I submit that the answers to these questions are in the
affirmative. I leave the specifics to these queries unanswered. They are tasks for a later time. My
goal was simply to lay the foundation. In my exploration of the undervalued and underexploited
environmental vistas of Kant’s works, I have shown how Kant’s philosophy can prove to be
helpful and relevant as a theoretical resource for the climate crisis and the shift toward
sustainability. The old views of Kant aren’t necessarily wrong, but the times are changing; they
require us to take a different perspective on these philosophical texts and what they offer us
today. In light of these considerations, the fate of the green Kant is secured.
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Ökonomie, Soziologie, Politik. 2 Aufl ed. München: Piper.

205

Folke, Carl. 2013. "Respecting Planetary Boundaries and Reconnecting to the Biosphere."
In State of the World 2013: Is Sustainability Still Possible?, edited by Erik Assadourian and
Tom Prugh, 19-27. Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press.
Förster, Eckart. 2009. "The Hidden Plan of Nature." In Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with
a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James
Schmidt, 187-199. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Friedman, Michael. 1992. Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
———. 2013. Kant's Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Frierson, Patrick. 2014. "Kant, Individual Responsibility, and Climate Change." Ethics, Policy
and Environment 1: 35-38.
Garber, Daniel. 1995. "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy." In The Cambridge Companion to
Leibniz, edited by Nicholas Jolley, 270-352: Cambridge University Press.
Gardiner, Stephen Mark. 2010. Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press.
———. 2011. A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Garvey, James. 2008. The Ethics of Climate Change: Right and Wrong in a Warming World.
London; New York: Continuum.
Ginsborg, Hannah. 1997. "Lawfulness without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of Imagination and
Understanding." Philosophical Topics 25 (1): 37-81.
Gleyzer, Roman, Alan R. Felthous, and Charles E. Holzer. 2002. "Animal Cruelty and
Psychiatric Disorders" The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 30
(3): 257-65.
Greaker, Mads, Per Espen Stoknes, Knut H. Alfsen, and Torgeir Ericson. 2013. "A Kantian
Approach to Sustainable Development Indicators for Climate Change." Ecological
Economics 91: 10-18.
Guyer, Paul. 1993. Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality.
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2004. "Kant on the Purity of the Ugly." Kant E-Prints 3: 1-21.
———. 1997. "Kantian Foundations for Liberalism." Jahrbuch Für Recht Und Ethik:
Themenschwerpunkt: 200 Jahre Kants "Metaphysik Der Sitten" 5: 121-140.
———. 2005. Kant's System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays. Oxford: University
Press.

206

———. 2007. "Natural Ends and the End of Nature: Naturalizing Kant’s Teleology." In Hans
Christian Ørsted and the Romantic Legacy in Science: Ideas, Disciplines, and Practices,
edited by Robert M. Brain, Robert S. Cohen, and Ole Knudson, 75-96: Springer.
Haeckel, Ernst. 1866. Generelle Morphologie Der Organismen: Allgemeine Grundzüge Der
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Rorty, Amélie and James Schmidt. 2009. Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a
Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Roulier, Scott. 2004. Kantian Virtue at the Intersection of Politics and Nature: The Vale of SoulMaking. Vol. 7. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
Routley, Richard. 1973. "Is there a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?" Sofia Press, 17-22
September, 1973.
Sandler, Ronald L. 2018. Environmental Ethics: Theory in Practice. Oxford ; New York: Oxford
University Press.
———. 2013. Environmental Virtue Ethics. Blackwell Publishing.
Schönfeld, Martin, ed. 2016. American Disenlightenment, Or Climate Change made in USA.
Environmental Ethics for Canadians, edited by Byron Williston. 2nd ed. Oxford/Toronto:
Oxford University Press.
———. 2006. "Animal Consciousness: Paradigm Change in the Life Sciences." Perspectives on
Science14 (3): 354-381.
———. 2008a. “The Green Kant: Environmental Dynamics and Sustainable Policies.”
Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application, edited by Louis P. Pojman and
Paul Pojman. 5th ed.: Thomson Wadsworth.
———. 2018. "Kant on Animals." In Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior, edited by
Jennifer Vonk and Todd Shackelford. Berlin: Springer (Forthcoming).
———. 2008b. "The Kantian Blueprint of Climate Control." In Global Warming and Climate
Change: Ten Years After Kyoto and Still Counting, edited by Velma I. Grover. Vol. 1, 201215. Enfield: Science Publishers.
———. 2000. The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project. New York: Oxford
University Press.
———. 2009. "Phoenix of Nature: Kant and the Big Bounce." Collapse 5.
———. 2011. "Plan B: Global Ethics on Climate Change." Journal of Global Ethics 7 (2): 129136.
———. 1992. "Who Or what has Moral Standing?" American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4):
353-362.
Schott, Robin May. 1997. Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant. University Park, Pa.:
Pennsylvania State University Press.
Schulting, Dennis. 2011. "Kant’s Idealism: The Current Debate." In Kant's Idealism: New
Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine, edited by Dennis Schulting and Jacco Verburgt,
1-25. Netherlands: Springer
Singer, Peter. 1990. Animal Liberation. New York: New York Review of Books : Distributed by
Random House.
211

———. 1993. Practical Ethics. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Skidmore, J. 2001. "Duties to Animals: The Failure of Kant’s Moral Theory." The Journal of
Value Inquiry 35: 541–559.
Smith, Norman Kemp. 1918. A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'. London:
Macmillan.
Stach, Reiner and Shelley Laura Frisch. 2005. Kafka, the Decisive Years. Orlando: Harcourt.
Stan, Marius. 2013. "Kant’s Third Law of Mechanics: The Long Shadow of Leibniz." Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 44 (3): 493-504.
Starke, Linda, Erik Assadourian, Tom Prugh, and Worldwatch Institute. 2013. State of the World
2013: Is Sustainability Still Possible?. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'.
London: Methuen.
Svoboda, Toby. 2012. "Duties regarding Nature: A Kantian Approach to Environmental
Ethics." Kant Yearbook 4 (1): 143-163.
———. 2015. Duties regarding Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic. Vol. 32. New York;
London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Taylor, Paul W. 1986. Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Thompson, Michael. 2011. "Climate, Imagination, Kant, and Situational Awareness." Journal of
Global Ethics 7 (2): 137-147.
Timmermann, Jens. 2005. "When the Dog Wags the Tail: Animal Welfare and the Indirect Duty
in Kantian Ethics." Kantian Review 10: 128-149.
Vaihinger, Hans. 1911. Die Philosophie Des Als Ob. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.
Van der Linden, Harry. 1988. Kantian Ethics and Socialism. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1976. The Mirage of Social Justice. Vol. 2. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Vaughn, Michael C., Qiang Fu, Matt DeLisi, Kevin M. Beaver, Brian E. Perron, Katie Terrell,
and Matthew O. Howard. 2009. "Correlates of Cruelty to Animals in the United States:
Results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related
Conditions." Journal of Psychiatric Research 43 (15): 1213-1218.
Vorländer, Karl. 1900. Kant Und Der Sozialismus Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Der
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